DENVER’S ANTI-CHINESE RIOT, 1880

BY ROY T. WORTMAN

The year 1848 marked the discovery of gold in California and an embryonic Chinese migration to the United States. Chinese immigration was stimulated by the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, which allowed Chinese laborers to enter the United States and which recognized “the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance.” Most of the Chinese settled in California, but a few ventured eastward.

In 1869, the first Chinese settled in Colorado. “He’s come,” said the Colorado Tribune, “the first John Chinaman in Denver. He came in yesterday, a short, fat, round-faced, almond-eyed beauty.... He appeared quite happy to get among civilized people.” With the completion of the transcontinental railroad a small number of Chinese settled in Denver. A territorial house joint resolution of February 11, 1870, encouraged Chinese immigration because “immigration of Chinese labor is eminently calculated to hasten the development and early prosperity of the Territory, by supplying the demands of cheap labor.”

By the latter part of 1870 there were forty-two Chinese in Denver. Most of them came from the Pacific coast, but a few were imported from Louisiana in 1874 to work in the Cameron mines. Because the Orientals were willing to work for cheaper

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2 Colorado Tribune (Denver), June 29, 1869, p. 5, typewritten copy in the library of the State Historical Society of Colorado, hereinafter cited as SHSC.
4 Colorado Territory, Legislative Assembly, House, Joint Resolution for the Encouragement of Chinese Immigration into Colorado Territory, 8th Sess., 1870, p. 134.
5 Daily Register (Central City), October 30, 1870, p. 4; Ourada, The Colorado Magazine, XXIX (1952), 275.
wages, and because of their strange language and customs, they were the victims of xenophobia. Of all the anti-Chinese nativists, the most infamous was California's Irish-born, naturalized American citizen, Denis Kearney. Most vocal in the late 1870's, he feared that cheap Chinese labor would displace unskilled white labor. Kearney maintained that "the Chinaman must leave our shores." His supporters backed him not only with shouts of "Immericky for Immerikan, bejabers!" but with actual acts of violence as well.

Nativist sentiments were not confined to California. Colorado's Chinese population also suffered from mistreatment at the hands of the whites. In 1871 the first anti-Chinese incident in Colorado occurred when vandals set fire to a Chinese house. In March, 1874, one hundred and sixty Chinese laborers at Nederland were threatened with harm, and in that same year anti-Chinese sentiment was exacerbated when Italian coal miners in Caribou were replaced with cheaper Chinese laborers. Leadville, in 1879, did not have to proclaim the nativist slogan of "the Chinese must not come." A Colorado newspaper in 1880 described the state's population and dealt with the lower orders: "Then there are the Indians, the Chinese, and the Mexicans. Of these it would be difficult to say which is the worst class. We have quite a number of Celestial heathens in this state." The census of 1880 listed 612 Chinese in the state, with 238 of them living in Denver. F. A. Bee, the Chinese consul who visited Denver after the riot of October 31, 1880, perhaps gave a more accurate estimate of 450 Chinese in Denver out of a total population of about 40,000. Most of Denver's Chinese were laundrymen. A Colorado visitor from Illinois noted in her diary in July, 1880: "Laundry—Lee Whang and Whang Lee, or something similar are to be seen at almost every turn." Since most of Denver's Chinese were laundrymen, they did not pose a serious threat to unskilled white labor; the

nativists, however, thought differently, as events of the 1880 Garfield-Hancock presidential campaign would show.

Denver's Rocky Mountain News, owned by W. A. H. Loveland, a prominent Democrat, made its campaign position clear in August, 1880, when it supported Hancock:

"Indeed, "Garfieldism" already means jobbery cloaked in pious hypocrisy and glittering eloquence, while "Hancockism" means gallantry in the hour of danger, magnanimity to a brave but crushed foe, and strict enforcement of the law in time of peace."

With its Democratic sympathies for the laboring class, the News launched a campaign against the Republicans and the Chinese. The campaign was intensified in October, 1880, the month before elections. On October 20 the New York Truth, a Democratic newspaper, published the "Morey letter," which was purportedly written by Garfield. Dated January 23, 1880, and addressed to H. S. Morey of the Employer's Union of Lynn, Massachusetts, it read:

I take it that the question of employees is only a question of private and corporate economy, and individuals or companies have the right to buy labor where they can get it cheapest.

We have a treaty with the Chinese government, which should be religiously kept until its provisions are abrogated by the actions of the general government, and I am not prepared to say that it should be abrogated until our great manufacturing interests are concerned in the matter of labor.

The News took up the cry on October 21, when it printed the letter under a headline reading: "Political Death Warrant of the Radical Candidate." The Republicans contended that the letter was a forgery; even Democratic newspapers such as the Philadelphia Times, the New York World, and the Chicago Times denounced the letter as a fraud. The News, however, stood firm, and used the Morey letter as a campaign issue. A rival newspaper, the Denver Republican, caustically commented that "in Siam the penalty for lying is to have the mouth sewed up. That would not work here since the Democrats got hold of that forged letter. There is not enough thread in this nation to go around." Even the News would later report that the letter was a forgery, but this came after the elections.

Innovations against Garfield and the Chinese increased as the election grew closer. The wiley heathen, the "Pest of the Pacific Coast," lamented the News on October 23, in invading the state,
forcing men into starvation and women into prostitution. “California is already ruined through Chinese labor and Nevada is seriously injured, and now Colorado is threatened with the same disaster.” Opium smoking was attacked, because the dens on Arapahoe Street catered to Caucasian women as well as to Chinese. But the opium business was not a serious threat to white labor, the News said, because it “is only monopolized by a few Chinamen. It takes capital to run opium joints, and John is coming now in such large numbers that he has to occupy other fields of labor, which he does very successfully.” The issue of October 27, which attacked the opium dens, was also concerned with morality in other spheres. An anonymous person, signing himself as “For Hancock,” thanked the News for exposing the dens. In his letter to the editor he continued his moralizing by stating that “Chinese harlots have diseased small boys of ten years of age and upwards, of some of the most respected citizens.”

Next day, on October 28, the News noted that the Chinese, instead of the tariff question, would be the chief campaign issue in Colorado. The newspaper also hinted at violence: “There has been considerable talk about town the past few days about running out the Chinese. The flock is increasing every week, and they are not wanted.” Garfield was attacked because “he voted to ‘conserve’ the interests of the capitalists. He voted to starve our laboring men.” Facsimiles of the Morey letter were featured in the News issues of October 29, 30, and 31.

Colorado's Democratic party was charged with importing illegal voters to swell its ranks in the election on Tuesday, November 2. Many of the alleged illegal voters marched in a Democratic parade in downtown Denver on Saturday evening, October 30, the night before the riot. Transparencies with anti-Chinese slogans were carried by various members of the parade, leading the Denver Daily Times to make a perceptive observation on nativism:

The happiest man in the procession on Saturday night was an old, gray headed veteran who had seen a dozen presidential

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22 Ibid., October 23, 1880, p. 8.
23 Ibid., October 27, 1880, p. 5.
24 Ibid., October 23, 1880, p. 5.
25 Ibid., October 27, 1880, p. 6.
26 Ibid., October 28, 1880, p. 3.
27 Ibid., p. 6.
28 Ibid., p. 2.
29 Denver Daily Times, November 1, 1880, p. 2; Denver Republican, November 1, 1880, p. 3; Denver Tribune, November 1, 1880, p. 1. The Daily Alta California (San Francisco), November 1, 1880, p. 1, estimated that 8,000 people were illegally registered in Denver.
campaigns. The anti-Chinese transparencies, he said, reminded him of the know nothing days of a quarter of a century ago. True, he stated, the weather vane had shifted around a little; then it was anti-Paddy, it is now anti-Chinese and pagan, but as the latter had a smattering of native Americanism about it, he felt as though his younger days were coming back.29

The background for the riot was set. The anti-Chinese campaign issue, the inflammatory writings of the Rocky Mountain News, and the hostile feelings of the crowd in Saturday night's parade merely needed a spark. It came on Sunday afternoon, October 31.

Although there are several versions for the immediate cause of the riot,30 possibly the most accurate is the statement of John Asmussén, in whose saloon at Wazee and Sixteenth Streets the riot started. According to Asmussén, a white man and two Chinese were playing pool, when three or four inebriated whites entered and quarreled with them.

One of the Chinamen asked them to quit; the men then commenced abusing the Chinamen, and I remonstrated with them, and they said they were as good as Chinamen, and they came up to the bar and got some beer. While they were drinking I advised the Chinamen to go out of the house to prevent a row, and they went out at the back door. After a few minutes one of the white men went out at the back door and struck one of the Chinamen without any provocation. Another one of the crowd called to one of the gang inside to "come on Charley, he has got him," and he picked up a piece of board and struck at the Chinese. . . . This was the beginning of the riot.31

By two o'clock a crowd of approximately three thousand people gathered at the scene of the fight in Denver's Chinatown at Blake and Wazee Streets, between Sixteenth and Seventeenth Streets.32 The milling mob, composed of the alleged illegal voters, Irishmen, and some Negroes,33 called for the death of people gathered at the scene of the fight in Denver's Chinatown.

In 1880 Denver's police department numbered between twenty-five and thirty men.34 They were without competent leadership, for their chief had been removed because of dereliction of duty earlier in October.35 According to Mayor Richard Sopris only eight men were on duty at the outbreak of the riot,36 and they were unable to handle the crowd.

Early in the afternoon Mayor Sopris arrived on the scene with reel and hose carts from the Denver Fire Department. Before using the hoses, Sopris sought to pacify the crowd with a speech:

Gentlemen—the people of this city do not desire mob violence. I do not think that the majority of you desire it. I see before me men who are apparently intelligent and honest gentlemen, and I know you cannot desire such a thing.38

His speech was jeered with cheers for Hancock. Some peaceful spectators urged the fire department to disperse the crowd with water. The crowd, angered by this, answered with yells of "wash the damn Chinamen out—drown the sons of b------s."39

William Roberts, foreman of Hose Number Two and Hose Number Four, feared that the mob's anger would increase if the hoses were used. Roberts pleaded with Mayor Sopris, but the latter was adamant; the crowd would be hosed down. The Woodie Fishers, a Denver fire company, laid out a hundred and fifty feet of hose backed up with a one hundred pound

34 Denver Daily Times, November 1, 1880, p. 2.
35 Ibid., p. 3.
36 Ibid., p. 4.
37 The Colorado Antelope (Denver), December 1880, p. 4; Denver Republican, November 1, 1880, p. 4; The Times (London), November 19, 1880, p. 3; Rocky Mountain News, November 1, 1880, p. 3.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
hydrant pressure. Jets of water were directed at the mob, who retreated out of range. The mob's violence was intensified by the soaking; picking up bricks from a construction site, some of the mob—Civil War veterans, according to Roberts—began hurling them at the firemen. The mob halted momentarily when it saw that one of the firemen, Dick Brooks, was bleeding, but the crowd was once again aroused when someone cried: “Hurrah for Hancock.” The fire department was ineffective; the mob vented its fury on Chinatown and looted the saloons which were shut by order of Sopris. At 4:30 P.M., J. F. Welborn of the Democratic State Central Committee attempted to pacify the mob.

In behalf of the Democratic party . . . I beg you to disperse and go to your homes. This course is not calculated to serve the Democracy; it will—it may—injure the cause of Hancock. I beg of you to cease and go home.

Welborn's speech subdued some of the mob's anger, but by dusk cries of “burn them out” were raised. The mob raided washhouses, looted Chinese homes, and injured many Chinese. When the rioters moved from Blake Street to Arapahoe they attempted to destroy a Chinese laundry patronized by Jim Moon, a gambler. An anonymous London Times correspondent who witnessed the riot described the encounter between Moon and the mob.

One of them, Jim Moon, is a gamester who recently had a fight with the police, and who bears a character which is not to be envied. I learn that he opposed single-handed a portion of the mob . . . . Facing the crowd, he demanded in very strong language what they wanted. No response being made, he added, “This Chinaman is an inoffensive man, and you shan't touch him, not a ---- one of you.” This speech being enforced by the mute elegance of a levelled revolver, the crowd turned abruptly away, being afraid, according to the slang phrase common in this country, “to face the music.”

The rioters also had a skirmish with some of the city's prostitutes. At Seventeenth and Holladay Streets, Liz Preston, a madam of a local brothel, was protecting four cowering Chinese with a shotgun. According to fireman William Roberts, a force of “ten Amazonian beauties” armed with champagne bottles, stove pokers, and high-heeled shoes, backed up Miss Preston. The crowd finally retreated when Roberts—who was by this time in the riot made a deputy sheriff—and his men arrived. The four Chinese were placed for protection in the side parlor of Miss Preston's brothel. By the end of the riot the madam and her colleagues had sheltered thirty-four Chinese. Recalling the role of the prostitutes in the riot, Roberts said: “That day the pariahs, the outcasts of society, the denizens of Holladay Street, the center of the red light district, put themselves in the hall of fame . . . . And perhaps the recording angel gave them one white mark.”

Happily . . . some of the least reputable citizens distinguished themselves by showing a humane and courageous spirit.

40 Roberts MS, pp. 4-5.
41 Denver Tribune, November 1, 1880, p. 1.
42 Denver Tribune, November 1, 1880, p. 1.
43 Because of the “strict rule of anonymity, we are unable to reveal . . . who wrote the dispatch in which you are interested.” Letter from W. R. A. Easthope, editor of the London Times Archives, March 29, 1965.
44 One of them, Jim Moon, is a gamester who recently had a fight with the police, and who bears a character which is not to be envied. I learn that he opposed single-handed a portion of the mob . . . . Facing the crowd, he demanded in very strong language what they wanted. No response being made, he added, “This Chinaman is an inoffensive man, and you shan't touch him, not a ---- one of you.” This speech being enforced by the mute elegance of a levelled revolver, the crowd turned abruptly away, being afraid, according to the slang phrase common in this country, “to face the music.”
45 Moon's “very strong language,” not described by the Times correspondent, was: “What in hell do you fellows want?” Denver Tribune, November 1, 1880, p. 1.
46 The Times (London), November 19, 1880, p. 3. Moon was killed by Clay Wilson in Denver, June 17, 1881. The Ouray Times apparently neglected to remember Moon's service to the Chinese when it stated that “Wilson has done the city of Denver a great favor by putting this desperate man out of the way.” Ouray Times, June 18, 1881, p. 1.
47 Roberts MS, p. 11.
The recording angel might have approved of the actions of the denizens of Holladay Street, but the actions of the rioters would have surely merited a different rating. By six o'clock the crowd had destroyed every washhouse in Chinatown. During the course of the riot Mayor Sopris notified the city councilmen of an emergency meeting; by six o'clock a sufficient number had arrived to approve his appointment of Dave Cook as acting police chief. Cook appointed one hundred and twenty-five special policemen. Coordinating the efforts of the special police and Sheriff Spangler's newly-appointed deputies, Cook began to quell the riot. Although later sources suggest that the National Guard was sent to the riot, an examination of the Guard papers reveals that this was not the case. Three of Denver's Guard units—two infantry companies and the Chaffee Light Artillery—voluntarily assembled at their armories in case they were needed. Under arms, the Governor's Guard later moved into an alley near the riot where their presence (but not their participation) posed a threat to the rioters. Cook felt that municipal and county forces could adequately handle the mob and did not, therefore, request National Guard aid.

Cook's police and Spangler's deputies were unable to act in time to save the life of Sing Lee, a laundryman. The mob attacked Sing at Nineteenth and Lawrence Streets. George Hickey, a printer, gave this account:

I saw Sing Lee on his knees, and when he saw me he came and dropped down in front of me for protection, and I endeavored to shield him and prevent them from putting the rope around his neck. The crowd then commenced kicking him, and he said I was a damned Chinaman, and they would hang me if I did not get away, and attempted to put the rope over my neck.

Sing was dragged down Nineteenth Street by the mob. Dr. C. C. Bradbury saw Sing on the pavement. "Blood splattered all over my clothes as I knelt down beside him, placing my own body between him and the vengeful throng, and I received several severe blows. When one of the crowd yelled: "God d--n you, I'll kill you if you don't clear out," Bradbury was forced to leave. After the mob had finished with Sing at Nineteenth and Arapahoe he was taken to Dr. O. G. Cranston's office in the Moffat and Rassler Block. Medical efforts failed to save him; he died at 8:30 P.M. "From compression of the brain, caused by being beaten and kicked."

After Sing's death the mob lost much of its momentum. Under pressure from the forces of Cook and Spangler the mob diminished in size at nine o'clock. At eleven o'clock General Cook made an inspection of the streets and reported that all was quiet. By midnight the immediate danger had passed. By the time the riot had ended, between 134 and 400 Chinese were placed in the county jail for safekeeping. On November 4, they were

44 Denver Daily Times, November 1, 1880, p. 2.
48 Denver Republican, November 1, 1880, p. 4.
50 Testimony of George Hickey, ibid., p. 320.
51 Rocky Mountain News, February 17, 1881, p. 8.
52 Ibid.
53 Coroner's report in Denver Daily Times, November 16, 1880, p. 4; also in Foreign Relations, 1881-82, p. 326.
54 Denver Daily Times, November 1, 1880, p. 2.
55 Figures for the number of Chinese jailed for protection vary with the source: Denver Daily Times, November 1, 1880, p. 2—134 jailed; Georgetown Courier, November 4, 1880, p. 2—140 jailed; Denver Tribune, November 1, 1880, p. 1—158 jailed; Rocky Mountain News, November 1, 1880, p. 4—185 jailed; Denver Republican, November 1, 1880, p. 4—225 Chinese jailed, including 11 women and one boy; Colorado Miner (Georgetown), November 6, 1880, p. 3—"upwards of 300"; F. A. Bee to Chen Shu Yang, December 8, 1880, Foreign Relations, 1881-82, p. 321, estimated the number at over 400.
released to face the ruins. Every Chinese house, with perhaps one or two exceptions, had been destroyed. The Rocky Mountain News described the Chinese quarters as being “gutted as completely as though a cyclone had come in one door and passed... out the rear. There was nothing left... whole, and the rooms, so recently the abode of ignorance, vice, and shame, contained nothing beyond the horrid stench emitted by the little wads of opium.”

Of the rioters arrested, most were dismissed on the grounds of insufficient evidence. In February, 1881, the alleged murderers of Sing Lee were tried and found not guilty.

The police maintained patrols until election day, watching for a renewed outbreak of hostility. Speaking of Denver’s law enforcement, the Georgetown Courier noted that “the policemen did their duty like men. They stood up manfully in their efforts for the preservation of peace, life, and property.”

A prominent citizen of Denver, M. M. Pomeroy, also felt that the riot could have been suppressed by the regular police force had they fearlessly arrested the ringleaders; but which owing to the disorganized condition of the police force of the city, and the incompetency and inefficiency of its government by the proper authority, and the failing of the county authorities to render the necessary aid... required in such emergencies, the mob assumed such portions [sic] as culminated in the destruction of human life and the disgrace of the city in not affording protection to life and property.

A few days later the Rocky Mountain News commented: “The Outrageous Throwing of Water Caused it All.” A few days later the News proclaimed that more was gained for the anti-opium crusade through mob rule than through all the words of preachers. Showing no remorse at all, the News referred to “the alleged Denver riot as the riot would have died a-borning.”

On Monday, the day after the riot, the Rocky Mountain News maintained in a headline that “The Outrageous Throwing of Water Caused it All.” A few days later the News proclaimed that more was gained for the anti-opium crusade through mob rule than through all the words of preachers. Showing no remorse at all, the News referred to “the alleged Denver riot.”

and still retained its motto, “The Chinese must go.” Other Denver newspapers reacted in a different manner, using the riot to condemn the News and to gain Republican votes on Tuesday. The Denver Daily Times commented: “The News charges the riot of Sunday upon the Firemen as a result of throwing water upon the mob, from which we suppose that the News wishes to be understood as asserting that cold water will effect an average Democratic crowd as a red flag will a bull.”

The Denver Republican also blamed the News for the riot and stated:

Till last Sunday we thought the Democratic party possessed of a liberal spark of human sympathy. The Chinamen of Denver never violated any law. John Brown was hung for violating the laws of Virginia. John Hus, and Wickliffe [sic] and George Washington broke the laws of their time, and we raise them as heroes because they broke bad laws.... But these poor creatures who were murdered by Denver Democrats had faithfully kept every law. Their only offense was that they... washed the linen of their white oppressors better and cheaper... The blue-eyed, light-haired men who murdered these Chinamen were serfs and slaves for centuries and waited till Christianity and humanity broke their fetters.

In an address to Denver Republicans, Judge J. B. Belford capitalized on the riot and used it as an election issue. The rioters, he said, could merely be added on to a long list of Democratic mobs—the whisky rebels of Pennsylvania, the South Carolina nullifiers, and the Confederate States of America.
Reaction to the riot also came from Denver’s churches. The Congregational Association entered an “earnest protest against the unreasonable prejudice cherished by some portion of our citizens,” while the Rev. Dr. Westwood of the Central Presbyterian Church pleaded that Christians should stand up for the Chinese. Denver feminists could not resist combining the temperance crusade with their gentle chastisement. In their paper, “Devoted to the Interests of Humanity, Woman’s Political Equality, and Individuality,” they remarked:

As regards the mob violence of our own lovely city... let us believe that our Democratic editors anticipated the wicked outcome of their inciting editorials. If the consequences could have been foreseen, these gentlemen would have drawn milder similes and not have exasperated the ever reckless Irishman with the fermenting sour mash which he is so prone to carry in his manly bosom.

Newspapers in other parts of the state were also critical of the riot. The Colorado Springs Weekly Gazette blamed the riot on the Democratic procession with its “transparencies covered with the communistic utterances of the News.” The Leadville Daily Herald contended that “the worst of Chinese are angels of light” when compared to the rioters, while the Central City Daily Register-Call succinctly expressed its opinion in five words: “The democratic party should die.” The Express, Fort Collins’ Republican newspaper, angrily commented that only “the party that hung Negroes to lamp posts and burned colored orphans in New York would torture...Chinamen in Denver.” On the other hand the Fort Collins Courier, a Democratic newspaper, blamed the riot on misgovernment in Denver and audaciously stated that “the democracy of Colorado has reason to be proud of the Rocky Mountain News, and the Leadville Democrat, its two leading organs. Neither has contained a particle of filth during the whole campaign.”

Eastern newspapers expressed their indignation. The New York Times referred to the incident as a “disgraceful riot.” Connecticut’s Hartford Courant blamed the riot on the publication of the Morey letter and editorialized: “Can any decent, respectable citizen give his aid to a cause which depends on such methods for success?” On the West Coast the San Francisco Chronicle, a Republican and violently anti-Chinese newspaper, sanctimoniously headlined the telegraphic dispatch of the riot: “The Democratic Forgery Bears Bloody Fruit.” The San Francisco Daily Alta California considered the Democratic party as an unholy alliance of rebels who hated national authority, enemies of New York’s public schools, Communists, stubborn hereditary Democrats, and demagogues.

The paper capitalized on Denver’s riot by stating: “If San Francisco wants security against such a demonstration which... might be a thousand-fold more disastrous than in Denver, she should elect a Republican majority.” Of all the comments made on the riot the most appropriate one came from a Chinese lecturer in Chicago, Wong Chin Foo. He declared that “if a single American was treated in China as were the victims of the anti-Chinese riots at Denver, the United States would send 100,000 missionaries to civilize the heathen.”

The riot also had diplomatic ramifications. Although the Rocky Mountain News estimated “the damage done through the negligence of republican officials” at not over a thousand dollars, Denver attorney E. B. Sleeth had on file one hundred and fifty claims totalling $30,000. Consul F. A. Bee, after investigating the riot, estimated Chinese losses at $53,655.69. Although at least one historian has concluded that the matter of indemnities was settled, an examination of the diplomatic correspondence between the Chinese legation at Washington and Secretaries of State William Evarts and James G. Blaine reveals that the United States refused to pay for losses sustained by Denver’s Chinese.

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83 Hartford Courant, November 1, 1880, p. 2.
84 See San Francisco Chronicle, November 1, 1880, p. 3.
85 Daily Alta California (San Francisco), October 31, 1880, p. 2.
86 Ibid., November 2, 1880, p. 2.
87 Denver Daily Times, December 13, 1880, p. 2.
88 Rocky Mountain News, November 2, 1880, p. 2.
89 Denver Daily Times, November 30, 1880, p. 2.
90 Foreign Relations, 1881-82, p. 325.
91 Ourada, The Colorado Magazine, XXIX (1962), p. 263, states: “With the passing of the international negotiations and the final payment of the indemnity by Denver, the Chinese, instead of being terrified into leaving the city, began to rebuild Hop Alley (Chinatown).” The author based her conclusion on a Denver Tribune article of November 30, 1880. The Denver Times, November 30 is not included in the bound Tribune collection in the SHSC. A typewritten copy of the same article dated November 1, 1880, in a reference file, deals with Consul Bee’s visit to Denver and mentions attempts made to secure indemnity for the Chinese, but makes no mention of a “final payment.” The Denver Daily Times, November 30, 1880, p. 4, states that claims were still in the process of adjudication. Payment could not have been final because the Denver Daily Times for November 30 reports that the claims were being forwarded to Washington for settlement. Furthermore, the Denver Daily Times, December 2, 1880, p. 4, states that Consul Bee returned.
Five years after the Denver riot, Chinese were massacred at Rock Springs, Wyoming Territory.

legation's inquiry on indemnities. By quoting his predecessor Evarts, Blaine gave the United States government's final point of view on indemnities:

Under circumstances of this nature, when the government has put forth every legitimate effort to suppress a mob that threatens or attacks alike the safety and security of its own citizens and the foreign residents within its borders, I know of no principle of national obligation, and there certainly is none arising from treaty stipulation, which renders it incumbent on the Government of the United States to make indemnity to the Chinese residents of Denver, who, in common with citizens of the United States at that time resident in that city, suffered losses from the operations of the mob. Whatever remedies may be afforded to the citizens of Colorado, or to the citizens of the United States from other States of the Union resident in Colorado, for losses resulting from that occurrence (sic), are equally open to the Chinese residents of Denver who may have suffered from the lawlessness of that mob. This is all that the principles of international law and the usages of national comity demand.91

In conclusion it is suggested that the campaign of 1880 and the Rocky Mountain News's stand on the Chinese question magnified a xenophobia which already existed in Colorado because of the issue of cheap Chinese labor. The anti-Chinese articles in the October issues of the News, the Democratic procession the evening before the riot, and the hostility of the laboring class exploded on Sunday, October 31. Denver's police department was unable to handle the mob, and although Cook and Spangler eventually dispersed the rioters, their efforts came too late in the day to protect Chinese life and property. Of Denver's riot, the correspondent of the London Times rightly said: "With the scenes which I witnessed yesterday still vivid before my eyes, I cannot help thinking how bitter a sarcasm does the conduct of the riotous citizens of Denver pass upon the immortal Declaration of Independence."92 The riot ended; anti-Chinese hostility did not. In his 1881 inauguration speech Governor Pitkin deplored the riot but nevertheless feared that the Chinese posed a threat to the American laborer and his family.93 Arguing for the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the speech of Senator Henry M. Teller, Republican from Colorado, was a classical example of Social Darwinism.94 Congress voted for the act, but this did not placate nativist sentiment in Colorado. Sporadic actions against the Chinese continued, and as late as 1902 Chinese were not allowed to settle in Leadville.95 Given the situation of the Chinese in the United States, it was with reason that Mark Twain noted that a Chinaman had no rights that any man was bound to respect: that he had no sorrows that any man was bound to pity, that neither his life nor his liberty was worth the purchase of a penny when a white man needed a scapegoat; that . . . nobody befriended them, nobody spared them suffering when it was convenient to inflict it; everybody, individuals, communities, the majesty of the State itself, joined in hating, abusing, and persecuting these humble strangers.96

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92 The Times (London), November 19, 1880, p. 3.
93 The complete text of Pitkin's inaugural address may be found in the Denver Tribune, January 12, 1881, p. 8.
95 Denver Times, January 9, 1902, p. 1.
ACTION AT FORT MASSACHUSETTS:
THE INDIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1855

BY MORRIS F. TAYLOR

The truism that new or unused data requires a fresh interpretation of historical events seems to apply in the case of Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy's campaigns against the Indians during the late winter and spring of 1855. The military actions were in what was then the northern part of New Mexico Territory, and they were based on Fort Massachusetts in the San Luis Valley. The personal letters of DeWitt Clinton Peters, assistant surgeon, United States Army, stationed at Fort Massachusetts (1854-56), to members of his family are the principal unused source available. A re-examination of material in official documents has yielded significant points overlooked or ignored. Observations by Rafael Chacon, who participated in the campaigns, are important, and information from the National Archives is relevant. Colonel Fauntleroy's campaigns probably were prompted mainly by the 1854 Christmas Massacre at Fort Pueblo, a traders' post on the Arkansas. This atrocity may have been the outgrowth of a belief held by the Muache Utes that the smallpox which struck them in the summer of 1854 was caused from disease-ridden blankets given to them knowingly by the territorial superintendent of Indian affairs. The survivors soon joined with Apaches in hostilities against the whites. It has generally been accepted for many years that the Indians who murdered all but three of the residents of Fort Pueblo were Muache Utes under Chief Blanco. Certain primary sources, however, indicate quite clearly that both Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches carried out the massacre under Blanco's direction. Christopher (Kit) Carson, then Indian agent at Taos, said the Pueblo settlement was destroyed by Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, and he also identified an Apache chief named "Wherro." Brevet Brigadier General John Garland, commanding the Military Department of New Mexico, reported the incident from Santa Fe in an official communication dated January 31, 1855, stating that the deed was done by "a war party of over one hundred (100) Utahs and Jicarilla Apaches." Apparently writing about the
same event, Assistant Surgeon Peters at Fort Massachusetts recorded in a letter to his sister that the murders were committed by a band of a hundred and fifty Utahs. He received his information from one of a small group of men from the Arkansas, east of the mountains, who stopped at Fort Massachusetts on their way in the snow and bitter cold to Santa Fe to report the horrible massacre. It is more than likely that these men were George McDougal, J. W. Atwood and Marcelino Baca, who gave an account of the Pueblo Massacre to Indian Agent Kit Carson on their arrival in Taos on the evening of January 6. McDougal and Atwood were part of a small settlement established that fall at the junction of the St. Charles and Arkansas Rivers. Baca lived on the north side of the Arkansas, where the Fountain joins it, having moved there from the Greenhorn in 1853.

These men were the source of Carson’s statement that both Utes and Apaches were involved, and the Indian Agent’s report probably should be given greater weight than the statement one of the men made while Peters entertained him at dinner. It seems certain, therefore, that two bands of Indians, one Ute and the other Apache, made the Christmas Day attack.

General Garland decided immediately to initiate retaliatory action against the Indians for the Fort Pueblo killings. That winter was very severe, with much snow and cold. The temperature at Fort Massachusetts was down to 16° below zero on January 7, 1855. Garland told the War Department that more than five hundred recruits were necessary to fill up the regular companies in the Department of New Mexico. To help take up the slack, he had requested the territorial governor to provide five companies of mounted volunteers to serve for six months; the last of the companies was mustered into service on January 31, 1855. The undermanned regulars simply could not cope with the marauding Utes and Apaches. The garrison at Fort Massachusetts at this time, for instance, consisted only of Company D, Second Artillery—eighty-one men, including officers—and this company was not up to full strength.

Details of these stirrings and preparations were slow in reaching Fort Massachusetts. By early February it was rumored there that volunteer companies were forming and that most of these units would reach the fort late in the month, probably under Kit Carson’s command. It was also reported that mounted U.S. dragoons would come with the volunteers northward, and Assistant Surgeon Peters wrote to his sister that he would probably accompany the troops against the Indians.

The volunteer and regular units of the force did not reach Fort Massachusetts at the same time. Company D, Third Infantry, under Captain Nathaniel C. Macrae, came up from Fort Union to replace the Fort Massachusetts garrison. On the night of March 3, a volunteer “spy company” arrived with the report that the rest of the force had left Taos. It was comprised of two companies of the First Dragoons and four companies of New Mexico Volunteers. Company D, Second Artillery, from Fort Massachusetts later joined the force.

Serving under Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, who was commanding officer both of Fort Union and the Northern Military District of New Mexico, Indian Agent Kit Carson served as chief guide for Fauntleroy’s troops.

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11 Peters Correspondence, January 14, 1855.
12 Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 57.
13 Grant, Kit Carson’s Own Story of His Life, p. 117.
14 Post Return of Fort Massachusetts, New Mexico, for January, 1855, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, National Archives Microfilm.
15 Peters Correspondence, February 3, 1855. The medical officer was in error about the number of volunteers to be based on the fort; about half of them were deployed in other parts of the Territory of New Mexico.
17 Peters Correspondence, March 3, 1855. The term “spy company” undoubtedly refers to guides and scouts, who were civilians attached to the force. There is reference to such a group in Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 64, and Peters’ letter of April 5, 1855.
18 Peters, Life and Adventures of Kit Carson, p. 489.
19 Post Return of Fort Massachusetts, New Mexico, for March, 1855.
21 Post Return of Fort Massachusetts, New Mexico, for March, 1855.
of the New Mexico Volunteers was Lieutenant Colonel Ceran St. Vrain, well known and popular partner in the big trading firm of Bent, St. Vrain and Company, and claimant to the vast Vigil and St. Vrain Grant between the Arkansas and Purgatoire Rivers east of the mountains. Kit Carson was engaged as chief guide.

By 1863, First Sergeant Rafael Chacon had been promoted to major. Volunteer Company B, under Captain Francisco (Repito) Gonzales, had a first sergeant named Rafael Chacon, and it is from Chacon's accounts of the campaigns that much important information comes about the undertakings against the Utes and Apaches in the late winter and spring of 1855. After a brief training period and before going to Fort Massachusetts, Chacon's unit was sent in pursuit of a raiding band of Apaches. Their trail led northward past the site of Wagon Mound to the vicinity of present-day Raton, then through the foothill and mesa country of the Raton Mountains into what is known as Long's Canyon in Las Animas County, Colorado. There, somewhere in the canyon, the volunteers, their horses about played out, came upon the Apaches. The Indians were eating, but they mounted quickly and managed to escape, leaving their repast of horseflesh to the famished soldiers. The volunteers returned to Fort Union to refit and then proceeded via Taos, Rio Colorado, Costilla, and Culebra to Fort Massachusetts, where the joint expedition of regular troops and volunteers was being put together.

On March 14, 1855, Fauntleroy's unified command of over five hundred men set out from the rendezvous at Fort Massachusetts and headed south into the snow covered landscape. About two hundred of these men were regular troops; the column was replete with pack mules (one for each officer’s blankets and provisions), some wagons, and two cannon. Surgeon Peters had packed medicines, instruments, and bandages into panniers to be carried on his mule, and “rigged up a tent to weigh as much as a buffalo skin.” During the third day's march the troops found the first sign of Indians, who had evidently killed and consumed some stolen sheep, but the trail was dim. Marching about twenty-one miles on the fourth day (March 17), camp was made at the mouth of a canyon through which the Rio Grande flowed. It was known in the little army that the canyon led westward into the frigid mountain fastnesses where Colonel John C. Fremont nearly met disaster in 1848. Some of the men were detached to probe into the canyon for Indian signs, but they found nothing. On the fifth day out (March 18), word raced along the column that Kit Carson had found a large, fresh trail made by Indians and their stolen stock. These recent signs were followed about twenty-five miles along the mountains on the west side of the San Luis Valley. That night the troops made camp on a small stream, a campsite which had been used the previous summer by Indians when they were hit by smallpox. Bones of the stricken victims lay scattered about. No fires were permitted that night, and the men had to try to sleep with only some bacon, cold water, and a little bread in their bellies.

Peters, Life and Adventures of Kit Carson, pp. 484-485.
Ibid., 489.
Excitement and anticipation carried them through, and they were out early on the morning of the nineteenth, checking their weapons carefully, because Kit Carson warned of a possible fight with the Indians. 29

Colonel Fauntleroy’s force pushed forward to the mouth of Saguache Pass, which DeWitt Peters said was an Indian word pronounced “Sow watchey” but not spelled that way. Here the trail grew dim, it having snowed hard intermittently since the troops left the fort. The column turned into the pass about ten o’clock in the morning. Kit Carson and the quartermaster were in advance of the column as it proceeded two abreast through the canyon. The two men climbed a mound and soon spotted about a hundred and fifty warriors coming down the pass towards the troops. 30

On Christmas Day, 1854, Utes and Apaches massacred the unsuspecting inhabitants of El Pueblo. The warriors were a mixed band of Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, 31 including the Muache chief, Blanco, of Fort Pueblo Massacre fame, who was easily discernible in his red woolen shirt. 32 Interestingly enough, Rafael Chacon mentions only Apaches in this encounter in the Saguache Pass. 33

The Indians were not aware of the full size of the force against them. They drew up in a line ready for battle and taunted the white men in Spanish. The dragoons were ordered to charge, and throwing off their overcoats, they came galloping over the mound. The enemy, greatly astonished, broke and rode for the mountains. Surgeon Peters selected a place for the wounded, left his steward there with medicines and instruments, and then spurred his horse after the dragoons. He had a lively few minutes with one of the warriors, firing five shots at the man, throwing the empty pistol at him, and finally hitting him with his fist. “That I find is the best way I can fight,” he reported later. 34

The dragoons were dismounted to pursue the fleeing Indians into the mountains, where they had abandoned their horses; the women and children had headed for the hills prior to the charge. The little army’s losses amounted to two soldiers wounded and two horses lost. The Utes and Apaches left two chiefs and six warriors killed, and it was believed that many were wounded. 35

Horses and men were exhausted. It was still daylight when the roaring campfires were started, and the men gathered around them, resting and chatting. Someone noticed two mounted warriors coming from the mountains opposite those into which the defeated Indians had fled. This pair had not seen the troops’ encampment, the wagons being screened by trees, so two soldiers quickly saddled up and started after them. It was quite a race for about two miles, but the Indians reached the timber first and left their horses; one of them had been wounded in the flight, but the two managed to scramble through the trees to safety. 36

Even with the coming of night, excitement did not cease altogether. A sleeping soldier near the center of the camp, doubtless dreaming wildly of the day’s events, suddenly started up and fired his rifle at random. A Mexican sentinel was nearly hit, and he fired in the direction from which he thought the shot had come. By this time, of course, the entire command was aroused and ready for action. Calm was restored with some difficulty and only after several more rifles were nervously fired into the darkness. 37

Preparations were made early next morning to pursue the Indians. Wagons, cannon, most of the provisions, and most of

29 Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
30 Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855; Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 66.
31 Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855; Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 63.
32 Peters, Life and Adventures of Kit Carson, p. 492.
the pack mules were left behind with a guard of a hundred and fifty men under Lieutenant Lloyd Beall, Second Artillery. Beall was instructed to meet the rest of the force at a rendezvous in the Wet Mountain Valley.\textsuperscript{38} The rest of the officers and men, on horseback and leading a few mules, started out, a half bushel of corn on each horse and seven days' rations on the mules. The place where the scattered Indians had reassembled was found, and the trail led northeast over such high and rough country that it was often necessary for the soldiers to lead their horses. This doubtless was in the vicinity of Poncha Pass if not in the defile itself. They seemed to be gaining slowly on their quarry, on one occasion capturing one straggler and killing another.\textsuperscript{39}

On March 23 the pursuing troops encountered a large number of Indians. The soldiers, according to Surgeon Peters, "killed some of them, took a great number of horses, meat, camp utensils, & some prisoners. One woman told she destroyed her own child & a niece & that others did the same to prevent our capturing them."\textsuperscript{40} This fight took place north of Poncha Pass, probably somewhere along the upper Arkansas, whither the Utes had been pursued.\textsuperscript{41}

The Indians were scattered once again; soldiers searched for them during the night and all next day, but they brought in only a few animals. Prisoners said this band was now entirely destitute and probably would starve, because the deep snow would prevent them from joining others of their tribe.\textsuperscript{42}

Just how far up the Arkansas the expedition, or parts of it, may have gone is a matter of some conjecture, but Peters gives a few clues. He remarked:

\begin{quote}
We went where no white man or Mexican had been before, for we had the oldest hunters, trappers & guides in the country along & they said no. I have had the honor of seeing the headwaters of the Arkansas which but few men who live on it can say, I doubt if any. ... On the opposite side of the pass I was describing [presumably the north side] there were hot springs that were sending their fumes to heaven—the day was beautiful & this lent its aid to the grandeur of the scenery, which I assure you I enjoyed much. I should say the Territory of Utah from the little I saw of it must be more valuable than that of New Mexico.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} Grant, Kit Carson's Own Story of His Life, p. 119; Peters, Life and Adventures of Kit Carson, pp. 496-497; Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
\textsuperscript{39} Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
\textsuperscript{40} Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
\textsuperscript{41} Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855; Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 63; Sabin, Kit Carson Days, p. 398; and Chacon, The Colorado Magazine, XII (May, 1934), p. 120.
\textsuperscript{42} Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. Utah Territory was west of the Continental Divide, and the sources of...
Fatigue in both men and horses was beginning to show and there was also a severely wounded man to care for. Colonel Fauntleroy gave the order to start for Fort Massachusetts. The order, however, was not simply to retrace the route back to the San Luis Valley and thence to the fort. Lieutenant Beall, with the artillery and provision wagons, was waiting at a rendezvous in the Wet Mountain Valley. In order to make that connection, Colonel Fauntleroy's force rode some distance down the Arkansas and then turned southward through rugged canyon country into the wide Wet Mountain Valley. Near the site of the later mining camp of Rosita, the Utes were met with again, but they escaped into the fastnesses of the immense Greenhorn Mountain.

The Mexican ponies of the volunteers were standing up to the strain of the march and the cold quite well, but by this time the dragoon horses were in bad shape. Five or six broke down each day and were shot to prevent their being picked up by Indians. Lieutenant Beall and the provision wagons were found, but it was a day later than planned, because the mounted troops and wagons had unknowingly passed each other during a fierce snow storm. The pangs of hunger were somewhat relieved, but the men and animals still had to endure the snow and the coldest weather Kit Carson had ever experienced. The men of the volunteer companies, few of them in possession of more than one blanket, suffered most; but so great was the cold that the regular troops, with their blankets and buffalo robes, were not much better off. Kit Carson and Ceran St. Vrain did much to keep up the men's morale.

Turning westward near the headwaters of the Huerfano, Colonel Fauntleroy's command crossed over Mosca Pass into the San Luis Valley, "blazing the trail to Fort Massachusetts." When finally the weary men, horses, and mules passed through the welcoming gate of the log fort, the expedition had been out from the post for more than two weeks.

the Arkansas, of course, are on the eastern side. The expedition had been in Kansas Territory (created in 1854), since it passed the great sand dunes on the eastern side of the San Luis Valley on the march north from Fort Massachusetts.

46 Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
47 Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855.
48 Peters Correspondence, April 5, 1855. Game birds and animals were all about them in profusion, but the colonel had ordered that there be no firing from the ranks, presumably so as not to alert the Utes.
The rest of the command under Colonel Fauntleroy set out from Fort Massachusetts on April 23, 1855, to resume operations against the Utes. Four companies rode with Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy, of whose staff Assistant Surgeon DeWitt Peters was again a member. They were Company D, First Dragoons; Company D, Second Artillery (most of the men not mounted) under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Horace Brooks; and the volunteer companies of Captains Manuel Chavez and Charles Deus. Company D, Third Infantry, commanded by Captain Nathaniel Macrae, was again left as the Fort Massachusetts garrison.

The field force moved forward in favorable weather along the eastern fringe of the San Luis Valley. After three days of difficult marching they came to the head of the valley, where they found signs of about six lodges travelling north. Great care was taken to prevent discovery by the Indians, who were thought to be on a buffalo hunt. No fires were permitted. Daytime marching clung close to the edge of the mountains, and, when practicable, marching was restricted to the night.

Opposite the point where the Saguache Pass canyon opens into the San Luis Valley from the west, Fauntleroy discovered the trail of a few Indians on horseback crossing the valley from east to west. His troops followed the trail across the head of the valley. Upon reaching the other side, they came upon the remains of a rather large Indian camp only a few days old. From there they followed clear signs of Indians towards the Poncha Pass. That was on the morning of April 28, and at night camp was made about half way up Poncha Pass at the mouth of a side canyon coming in from the west. Around ten that night, scouts brought in a report of a day-old trail of about five hundred animals headed towards the Arkansas. Subdued excitement prevailed as the men packed up their camp gear and made themselves ready for a night march. Thirty picked men under Captain Chavez pushed ahead as scouts, while the rest of the force followed as closely as they dared. The trail was easily discernible in the moonlight, and the only sound from the column was that of hooves and the jingle of weapons and equipment. A halt was called about four o'clock in the morning, when the scouts came in to report a large Indian encampment—about twenty-six lodges and an estimated one hundred fifty warriors—not far ahead in a side canyon about a mile off the main trail. The morale of the men was remarkable. They had traveled ninety miles in about thirty-two hours, with only one meal, and that not a hot one. The foot soldiers of the artillery company had shown unusual stamina.

Fauntleroy ordered the supply wagons and pack animals to be concealed with men to guard them, and the rest of the men were dismounted in two groups. The commander thought his chances for a successful surprise attack to be poor, because the

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56 Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 63.
57 Ibid., p. 64;
58 Peters Correspondence, May 10, 1855;
59 Peters Correspondence, May 10, 1855; Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 64.
60 Peters Correspondence, May 10, 1855; Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, pp. 64-65 and 67-69.
61 Peters says it was the seventh day out from Fort Massachusetts, which would make it April 29; Fauntleroy expressed it as the night of April 28.
Indians were awake and active in what apparently was an all-night dance.\(^6\)

Ten men were picked to run off the Indians' horses during the attack, and a cautious advance was made. The men were so primed for the encounter that Colonel Fauntleroy and his officers had difficulty restraining them. The dragoons were deployed to the right of the Indian camp, and the volunteers were sent to the left side. The basic plan was not to surround the camp but to embrace it in a semi-circle. This tactic apparently was based on the belief that full entrapment would inspire the warriors to greater resistance in the defense of their women and children. At least so said DeWitt Peters. The Indians were Utes, although contemporary sources do not indicate that this identification was certain prior to the fight. Campfires illuminated the scene, with war chants and drums echoing louder and louder as the soldiers formed their lines on two sides of the camp. Just before dawn, the two lines had advanced to within about one hundred fifty yards of the camp, when the camp dogs sensed their presence and barked vigorously.

That gave the alarm, and the Utes began firing in the direction of the troops. There could be no delay if the assault were to be successful, and the two lines poured their volleys into the milling confusion of the camp. DeWitt Peters described it thus:

The word fire!!! was given, when over two hundred rifles & revolvers opened on them looking like sheets of fire coming from each soldier's mouth. This fire was a cross one sending missels \[sic\] of death home to many a poor red man.

Colonel Fauntleroy saw it this way:

A fire was opened from our parties on two sides of the square, which formed one continuous line on each side of a light, most beautiful to behold, and almost eclipsing the illumination of the camp.

Death and consternation took over in the Ute camp, succeeded by confusion as the Indians ran in all directions, trying to reach the haven of darkness among the trees on the mountain sides. The Utes returned a scattered fire as they fled, and the soldiers pursued them in sporadic action for an hour. The main camp, however, was captured in about twenty-five minutes. Forty Utes were killed, many were wounded, and six children were taken prisoner. Also taken were thirty-three horses, twelve

\(^6\) Peters called it a war-dance, while Fauntleroy referred to it in his first report as a scalp-dance and in the second as a war-dance.
sheep and goats, six rifles, four pistols, twenty-four bows with their arrows, and baggage of all descriptions. Blanco, the Muache chief, was thought to be the Ute leader, and much of his personal paraphernalia was part of the plunder. After the soldiers had loaded themselves with all of the booty they could carry, an estimated two hundred fifty buffalo robes and one hundred fifty pack saddles were burned.

Not one soldier was killed in the affray, but two were wounded, one of whom died after a leg amputation. On the morning of the same day, a small party from D Company, First Dragoons, scoured the adjacent country in a kind of mopping-up operation, bringing in a few head of livestock and sustaining the loss of one man killed. All of the companies returned to the camp they had left in the Poncha Pass and buried their dead comrade with military honors. Colonel Fauntleroy reported that the regular troops and their officers "acted with the most admirable decision and promptitude," while "the conduct of the volunteers excited my warm approbation." The victory was considered one of the most important ever secured over this formidable and elusive enemy.

May 1, the ninth day out, saw the entire force proceeding south and west at the upper end of the San Luis Valley in the direction of Saguache Pass, where another party of Utes with quite a lot of horses was said to be. Company D, Second Artillery, was allowed to drop behind about ten or twelve miles. Most of the men of this company were not mounted and were nearly exhausted from having marched fifty-two miles in twenty-four hours before the big fight on the Arkansas. At dusk the mounted companies reached the entrance to the pass, where they saw about fifteen Utes some distance up the valley of the Saguache. The Utes galloped their horses towards the other side of the valley, the soldiers in full chase. After the soldiers splashed through Saguache Creek, they noted about the same number of Indians converging towards the others as they approached the mountains. Darkness and distance saved most of the Indians, but they lost two men and five horses killed and thirteen horses captured. One lance was seized during the chase. Fauntleroy's command returned to the creek and found six abandoned lodges in which were found pots and kettles and thirty buffalo robes.

Pursuit and skirmish was resumed at dawn. Just before the troops went out, fifty more Utes came down the valley. The newcomers were thought to be from the large band which had been so thoroughly trounced in the attack of the twenty-ninth...
entire force after a brief stay at Fort Massachusetts. The plan was not fulfilled, however, the Colonel in his next report to Santa Fe signifying that he would return to Taos, where he would reunite his command and then proceed once more against the Utes.\(^6^5\)

Reunification involved three groups. The bulk of Colonel Fauntleroy’s force was one. The second was Company C, New Mexico Mounted Volunteers, which had been detached to pursue Indians south and west of the Rio Grande.\(^6^6\) The third part was composed of the regular and volunteer companies under Lieutenant Colonel St. Vrain, who had successfully campaigned against the Jicarilla Apaches east of the Sangre de Cristo and Culebra Mountains on the Cucharas, the Apishapa, the Purgatoire, and through the Raton Mountains.\(^6^7\)

The efforts of Fauntleroy and St. Vrain had been more effective than was immediately realized. There were no other major fights with Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches. The New Mexico Volunteers were discharged at Taos on July 31, 1855, at the end of their six months enlistment.\(^6^8\) On September 10, 11, and 12, 1855, chiefs of the Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches met with Indian Agent Kit Carson and others at Abiquiu, New Mexico Territory, where agreements were reached about reservations and monetary payments to the Indians. In his report, Carson expressed his opinion that the Muaches and Jicarillas would remain friendly for a long time.\(^6^9\)

As for the Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, they waited in vain for the Senate of the United States to ratify the treaties which Agent Carson and Governor Merriwether had so hopefully sent to Washington. For some years these Indians lived in a sort of political limbo, until new agreements were reached in the middle of the next decade. But that is another matter.

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\(^6^5\) Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, p. 66.
\(^6^6\) Sabin, Kit Carson Days, p. 391.
\(^6^7\) Ibid., 389-390; Report of the Secretary of War, 1855, pp. 68-69; Stanford Research Institute, Historical and Documentary Evidence, pp. 566-567, 584.
For more than a decade after the campaign of 1896, Colorado politics went through a bewildering sequence of political fights and fusions of bipartisan factions. On the surface the fights discredited Colorado in the eyes of uninformed but influential observers beyond the state. In addition, the state's leaders expended their energies fighting these extraordinary battles, thereby diverting their attention from the great changes occurring throughout the United States.

Typical of politicians in other states, Colorado leaders had assumed proprietary attitudes; they knew what action and inaction was best for the state. With the succession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency, a new sort of proprietor pushed onto the national and the local scenes. Roosevelt hoped to ally with what he considered to be the best type of such people. In Colorado he sought to establish a political base through the dispensation of federal patronage. He selected Philip B. Stewart,
of Colorado Springs, to be his field representative, perhaps even before he entered the White House.

Roosevelt's plan to add Colorado to his political following was, however, continually disrupted by shifting political fortunes in the state. Stewart's problems were not identical to Roosevelt's. Similarly, the President's friendship with Phil Stewart was constantly threatened by Roosevelt's readiness to judge most activities and occurrences as either right or wrong. He trusted Stewart but occasionally showed his exasperation when they failed to reach the same ethical conclusions. Under the surface of this politically useful friendship ran an undercurrent of suspicion that Stewart too frequently supported political losers. Roosevelt more than once praised Stewart for his loyalty to unfortunate political acquaintances, but he also reluctantly implied that hard facts proved the losers wrong. All things considered, this aspect of the Roosevelt-Stewart friendship was not significant enough to cause the President to sever ties with his Colorado ally, at least not while he was in a position of power as President.

Possibly Roosevelt's hunting interests attracted his attention to Colorado. He had written the introduction to a book of Rocky Mountain animal photographs produced by two Coloradans, Mr. and Mrs. A. G. Wallihan. Immediately after his election to the vice presidency he came to Colorado for an extended hunting trip in the Meeker region. Among his hunting companions was Phil Stewart, who made a good impression on him. Within a month or two after his return to Washington, Roosevelt confided in another friend that Stewart was "as fine a fellow as it seems to me I have ever met." The letter continued:

It made me feel good as an American to think that he was after all one of our national types. I greatly admire strength both moral and physical; but I do not admire it at all unless it is combined with the sweetness and highminded disinterestedness which Phil Stewart possesses to such a high degree.

By the end of 1900, prior to assuming the presidency, Roosevelt considered Stewart one of his types and an American. Roosevelt therefore decided to rely on Stewart to look after his Republican interests in the state in place of Mark Hanna's representative, Senator Edward O. Wolcott.

It was not long before their friendship was put to the test. During the last few days in September, 1900, Roosevelt made a campaign tour of Colorado in behalf of the Republican ticket. The tour earned the vice presidential candidate both publicity and criticism. Confused reports from Pueblo stated that anarchists plotted to destroy his train somewhere between Victor and Cripple Creek. The Democratic Rocky Mountain News charged that members of Roosevelt's press escort fabricated the report in order to improve Republican political fortunes. This incident was quickly followed by a riotous rally in Victor, an area most observers typified as strongly opposed to Senator Wolcott, who had accompanied Roosevelt. Some stories of the meeting reported that Wolcott was drunk, that he antagonized the crowd, and that Roosevelt followers attacked small boys carrying Bryan banners. Roosevelt was angered by these and subsequent interpretations of the various incidents.

Perhaps because of these experiences, Roosevelt refused to return to Colorado during the winter of 1900-1901 to speak in behalf of the party and Senator Wolcott. He even refused an invitation to a Rough Rider reunion in Colorado on the grounds
that the convention might be "regarded as in some way held for my especial glorification." After several months' resistance he finally agreed to attend Colorado's quartocentennial celebration only if the Rough Riders were considered guests, if they behaved themselves by avoiding the "red light and hurrah business," and if responsible state citizens such as Stewart and Wolcott decided his presence was necessary. But by the spring of 1901 the campaign scars had healed. Roosevelt pleasurably anticipated his stay with the Stewarts and noted his interest in hunting again.  

Colorado's quartocentennial celebration centered in Boulder and Colorado Springs, with Roosevelt and the Republicans meeting in the latter city. Banquets were given, speeches delivered, and appropriate contests held. However, William Allen White, editor of the Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, noted that Roosevelt's visit was not entirely devoted to public appearances and friendly chats with the Stewarts. One of the President's greatest concerns at that time was the presidential campaign of 1904. He had begun organizing support for his candidacy. Roosevelt felt he needed a strong following in the farm belt. Consequently, he called a meeting of influential men from this region to convene at Stewart's house during the celebration. The Kansas editor, who was present, wrote that Roosevelt had to work within the confines of the existing political alliances, which were composed of "as fine an assemblage of political gangsters as you would meet on a journey through a long summer day." He added:

We did make proper plans and we did give due pledges, with our political lives as hostages, for those promises, to return Roosevelt delegations to the Republican presidential convention of 1904 from Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri—and, we hoped, Iowa.  

By these pledges and promises the first Roosevelt machine was compromised into existence. Roosevelt's next concern was to reconstitute the state organization, which included "some awful people." By the end of 1901 the President's intentions were quite clear. He planned to replace such men as Archie Stevenson and Edward Wolcott with Stewart. Stewart became what Senator Wolcott's apologist-biographer called "the distributor of Federal patronage" in the state. Few important letters were sent by the President to any Coloradan other than Stewart while Roosevelt was in the White House. At the same time the President coolly notified Stevenson of his intention to honor former President William McKinley's appointments in the state, although he also implied that Wolcott was tied politically to Stevenson. Perhaps the best test of Roosevelt's feeling toward the representatives of the Colorado camps was his revelation that Stewart had been to Oyster Bay during the autumn and that Roosevelt treated him and other visitors as "playmates and took rides and scrambles with them." The two friends had even collaborated on articles for Scribner's Magazine concerning their cougar hunt in Meeker.  

During the last few months of 1901 and much of 1902 Roose-

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10 Roosevelt to Lodge, October 15, 1901, in ibid., III, 179.  
12 Roosevelt to Lodge, October 19, 1901, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 179; Roosevelt to Archie MacNicol Stevenson, September 27, 1901, in ibid., 181.  
13 Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., October 19, 1901, in ibid., 179.  
14 Theodore Roosevelt, "With the Cougar Hounds," Scribner's Magazine, XXX (October, 1901), 443-54, and ibid., (November, 1901), 545-64.

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A well dressed crowd greets President Roosevelt in front of the old Antlers Hotel in Colorado Springs.
velt reorganized federal offices in Colorado. Most officers of the U.S. mint and many of those in charge of customs were removed and replaced with men who were, in Roosevelt's term, "safe." He urged Stewart to see Edward Kent, assistant U.S. attorney, about the appointments, because Kent was "a gentleman."

Wolcott, on the other hand, conferred with the President concerning the positions but was directed to see Stewart. Roosevelt also confided that he would not remove the men immediately and would soon write Wolcott about the dismissals, since he represented "an organization of which he is the head." But clearly the President had relied on the judgment of Stewart and others, and made a decision which he himself did not wholeheartedly accept.

Roosevelt's doubt about the wisdom of removing Brady and Hodges was pushed into the background by more disturbing developments at the end of 1902. Colorado Republicans elected James Peabody governor and took control of the House of Representatives, for which the President was thankful; he commended Stewart for his unselfish and effective work. Roosevelt's sympathy and thanks were, however, extended prematurely. One of the state's senatorships had to be filled by the legislature. The two candidates were Wolcott, representing the Republicans, and Teller, representing the Democrats. Roosevelt favored neither, but he could not support the re-election of Teller. Stewart, fighting his battle for control of the party on the state level, in addition to performing as the President's personal representative in the field, strongly opposed Wolcott.

Shortly after the November, 1902, election a victory rally was called in Denver. Wolcott's opponents, Stewart and D. B. Fairley, chairman of the state Republican committee, withdrew from the celebration. The meeting was held and proved very successful, when measured by attendance and volume of cheers. But Wolcott, Edward P. Costigan, and other leading Republicans at the rally recognized the danger in a party split just before the critical time for the senatorial designation. After a relatively long, chaotic, and complicated sequence of events, Democrats in the Colorado legislature met during the absence of the Republicans and elected Teller. The event was notable for its allegations of fraud, threats to unseat opponents, partisan rump sessions, and threats to call out the militia. Few, including Roosevelt, fully understood the whole affair.

As nearly as can be ascertained, anti-Wolcott Republicans urged the adjournment of the joint session of the Colorado legislature for a period of several days during the height of the battle for the senatorship. During this adjournment period the Democratic legislators

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19 Roosevelt to Stewart, October 25, 1901, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 185.
20 Roosevelt to Stewart, September 26 and November 4, 1901, in ibid., 180-81, 187.
met and elected Teller legally, as Wolcott later admitted. Roosevelt told a friend that Stewart had “sacrificed in the interest of a local quarrel what I regard as very big interests.” Nine months later he still characterized the election as “a great misfortune.” Nonetheless, he began once more to ask Stewart’s advice about Colorado’s political problems.

Superimposed on this fight within the Republican party was a renewal of labor unrest, which indirectly strained relations between Roosevelt and Stewart. In February, 1903, the reduction mill workers at Colorado City struck for recognition of their union, the Western Federation of Miners. Cripple Creek miners responded with a sympathy strike. Ultimately the mill workers and coal miners struck for an eight-hour day, which the Cripple Creek gold miners had won nearly ten years earlier as a result of their successful 1894 strike. Various pressures were applied, including blacklisting, lobbying in the state legislature, and legal delays. The Republican, Democratic, and Populist parties formally supported the adoption of an eight-hour day through legislative action and constitutional amendment. The amendment was properly ratified, but legislation was blocked. Consequently, walkouts were called, protests made, and Governor Peabody moved the state militia into the troubled mine areas of Cripple Creek and Telluride. In November, 1903, the governor requested federal aid. Roosevelt refused to place the federal troops at the disposal of Colorado’s executive branch, pointing out to the governor that if the troops were proven necessary, they would be at the disposal of federal officers.

Peabody persisted momentarily, which angered the President, as he reported to Phil Stewart during this phase of the dispute.

Roosevelt continued to collect information on the Colorado mining situation. During the first part of 1904 he authorized the dispatch of investigators from the Bureau of Labor and the Attorney General’s office. By January, 1905, Carroll D. Wright, U.S. Commissioner of Labor, sent the official report of the disturbance to the President. Therefore, Governor Peabody’s name was periodically brought to Roosevelt’s attention for a period of a year and a half. About midway in that period the President decided that “Peabody had behaved very foolishly, and had winked at mob action so long as mob action was on his side.” Yet shortly thereafter he wrote Philander Knox:

Peabody manfully did his duty in stopping disorders and in battling against a corrupt and murderous conspiracy among the Federation of Western Miners; but he let himself be put in the position of seeming to do this not in the interest merely of law and order, of evenhanded justice to wageworker and capitalist, but as the supporter and representative of the capitalist against the laborer. . . . I am sure that if he had acted as you would have acted in his place, he would have made it so evident that he was acting not as a representative of capital against labor, but as the representative of law, order and justice against all forces of disorder and corruption, that the State would have rallied to him by a great majority.

Nowhere did Roosevelt ever demonstrate his understanding that Governor Peabody had been left in an exposed position by his natural political and economic allies. In Roosevelt’s judgment, someone had to bear the responsibility for disorder. What was perhaps worse, a potential political ally, Governor Peabody, had been discredited shortly before the presidential election campaign of 1904.

Roosevelt had for some time had the compulsion to be elected to the presidency in his own right. He had a premonition that the chaotic state of the Republican party in Colorado might cost him that state’s electoral vote. In early summer the reform

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24 Roosevelt to C. G. LaFarge, February 9, 1903, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 423.
25 Roosevelt to Stewart, November 23, 1903, in ibid., 655-56.
27 Roosevelt to Stewart, November 23, 1903, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 656.
29 Roosevelt to Philander Knox, November 10, 1904, in ibid., 1024.
30 Roosevelt to Moody, August 24, 1904, in ibid., 905.
31 Roosevelt to Stewart, January 26, 1905, in ibid., III, 412-13; Roosevelt to Lodge, June 2, 1904, in ibid., IV, 814; Roosevelt to Paul Morton, September 28, 1904, in ibid., 956-57.
Republican mayorality candidate in Denver, John W. Springer, lost the election. More disturbing was the fact that Democratic Senator Patterson supported conservative Republican leader Edward Wolcott, whose opposition also was composed of both Democrats and Republicans. Predictions were that Wolcott would control the state committee and its nominations. Roosevelt felt that Colorado was probably lost to his cause but partially pacified his own disappointment by noting that “our people have made the great error of permitting lawlessness on their side to offset lawlessness on the other.” He hoped that “the Denver and Rio Grande and Colorado fuel people” could prevail upon Wolcott to support the Republican ticket. Beneath this surface of presidential concern for party regularity, Phil Stewart fought for party control and against Colorado’s twin evils of traditionalism and fusionism. The hard facts seemed to indicate to his satisfaction that he had to confront Wolcott head-on. To do so, he had to support Governor Peabody’s candidacy. Roosevelt was reluctant to define which of the two factions was regular and which was not; his pre-election indecision implied in part that selection was left up to the voters.

The 1904 fight among Colorado Republicans was typically complex. Wolcott’s supporters lost the struggle for power, but the political leaders with whom Stewart allied did not succeed immediately to party control. Contemporary accounts indicated that Simon Guggenheim, David Moffat, and William Evans assumed practical leadership of the party, their power being

Within the state rather than reliant upon federal patronage, as was Stewart’s case. As an almost coincidental development, Stewart’s opposing forces within the Republican party, the old Wolcott combination, deteriorated at this time, notably with Frank Howbert’s secession to the anti-Wolcott faction. About all that resulted on the surface to Roosevelt’s followers was that Stewart obtained some notoriety by being designated a presidential elector. The subsurface flow of state and national politics indicated that industrial and business leaders had assumed the ascendancy in the Republican party, with a group of reform-minded aspirants forming a new type of coalition in the background.

Political fighting in Colorado continued after the presidential election in November, 1904. A bitter dispute broke out over the election of Democrat Alva Adams to the governorship. Charges of fraud circulated widely and were in part based on fact. The Republican-controlled legislature unseated the Democratic governor-elect and considered his replacement. Phil Stewart supported Governor Peabody, who was essentially repudiated by the victorious Republicans in the state legislature. During this struggle for control of the Republican party in Colorado, Roosevelt wrote Stewart that he would not intervene. Roosevelt also admitted he had talked to advisors in Washington, who were

33 Rocky Mountain News, June 10, 1904, p. 2.
34 Roosevelt to Morton, September 28, 1904, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 956-957.
35 Roosevelt to Stewart, December 7, 1904, in ibid., 1060-61.
36 Rocky Mountain News, June 29, 1904, pp. 1, 3.
37 Ibid., September 13, 1904, p. 3.
unable to find any justification for recommending either candidate. The President reasoned that if he “wrote about fraud,” he would also have to “write about corruption.” He had heard from several unidentified correspondents that a sizable fund had been raised, and utilized in questionable ways, to support Peabody’s candidacy. He subsequently confided to Stewart that other observers of Colorado politics viewed the seating of Peabody as a hazard to the party nationally. In the same paragraph, perhaps indicating some continuity in the President’s thought, he speculated whether or not Wolcott was still influential in Colorado. In actual fact, the former senator was ill, and died early in 1905. Colorado’s conservative leader was fading, but Stewart had allied with the wrong man insofar as Theodore Roosevelt was concerned. It was only Peabody’s ultimate defeat that enabled Roosevelt to forget Stewart’s indiscretions for the time being.

Stewart soon re-established his lines of communication with the President. Roosevelt sent him the familiar invitation to visit Sagamore Hill and the White House, but the degree of presidential confidence was more effectually demonstrated in the investigations and exposés of federal administration in Colorado. John F. Vivian, one of Stewart’s political allies, was removed from the office of surveyor general pending an investigation of maladministration. Stewart subsequently proved to the President’s satisfaction that the charges brought against Vivian were unfounded in fact, but in the meantime Roosevelt reluctantly accepted Stewart’s recommendation that William G. Lewis fill the vacated position. In typical Roosevelt fashion he appointed Lewis, but he emphasized that Lewis had to administer the complicated and important office efficiently or suffer removal also. Similarly, Roosevelt never forgot that the investigation condemning Vivian had been executed poorly and that a land office investigator, Edward B. Linnen, had done the job. The President urged Secretary Hitchcock to dismiss Linnen, but Hitchcock only suspended him. Within a year Linnen became the center of an investigation into charges of fencing the public domain, levied against the Warren Land Company. Stewart quietly carried on an investigation of Linnen’s disclosures and techniques and advised against Linnen. Roosevelt listened to Stewart and the U.S. Attorney General’s office then indignantly ordered Linnen’s dismissal. All things considered, Stewart’s political position was once more a strong one as the President’s confidential adviser in Colorado.

Before the local and congressional elections of 1906 Stewart’s influence with the President moved toward its peak. Trouble flared up between proponents of the proposed Moffat Tunnel and a Colorado River reclamation project centering in Gore Canyon. Arizona and southern California claimed need for waters from the Colorado. The Reclamation Bureau proposed to construct a dam at Gore Canyon. David Moffat and his associates intended to use the same canyon as part of the railroad route to northwestern Colorado and on to Salt Lake City. Each group maintained that the canyon was vital to the efficient operation of its project. Once more Phil Stewart looked into the serious conflict of interests and reported that, although he was partisan, local interests must prevail. Roosevelt, professing faith in Stewart, the paramountcy of Colorado’s development, and the unreasiness of the Bureau of Reclamation to undertake the construction of the dam, ruled in favor of the Moffat Tunnel. Political expediency was no consideration, according to Roosevelt’s explanation of his decision.

During the summer of 1906 Colorado suffered its biennial political explosion. Stewart and Roosevelt were involved essentially in the same ways and with the same intents as previously. This time Roosevelt was a little less cautious with his political endorsement, and Stewart was a little more successful in his effort to obtain political prestige. Roosevelt implied his support of Stewart by sending William Howard Taft to speak in Colorado. Ostensibly, the President took a stand against what he called “those dynamiters and thugs.” Stewart of course had other battles to fight in order to renovate the Republican party. According to the volatile Democratic jurist-politician, Ben Lindsey, William Evans searched for the best gubernatorial candidate and ultimately selected Stewart to run. Stewart obtained the nomination and apparently tried to strengthen the ticket by demanding that the disgraced state supreme court candidate,

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38 Roosevelt to Stewart, December 7, 1904, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1060-61.
39 Roosevelt to Stewart, December 27, 1904, in ibid., 1061-82.
40 Roosevelt to Stewart, June 16, 1905, in ibid., 1296.
41 Roosevelt to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, July 8 and October 19, 1905, in ibid., 1296-97, and V, 54.
42 U.S. Congress, House, Investigation of Charges that the Interior Department Permitted the Unlawful Fencing and Inclosure of Certain Lands, 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1911, Rept. No. 1555, pp. 3-64.
43 Roosevelt to William E. Curtis, May 19, 1906, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, V, 276-78.
44 Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot, September 15, 1906, in ibid., 413; Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, September 17, 1906, in ibid., 415.
W. H. Gabbert, withdraw from the race. Gabbert refused, and two days after the convention Stewart withdrew his own name from the ballot. One source reported that Roosevelt had advised his friend to withdraw rather than be a party to the virtually-assured defeat.

As the 1906 chapter of the Colorado political fight closed, the Stewart-Roosevelt friendship reached its climax. The President had suffered exasperation after frustration in trying to keep his administration and the Interior Department above suspicion, but by the end of the year he felt the latter had to be reorganized completely. As he wrote Stewart: “The Department has utterly gone to pieces and I am at my wit’s end to know who is efficient and who inefficient, who straight and who crooked in it.” The President offered to appoint Stewart as Commissioner of the General Land Office. Stewart declined, and ultimately the ill-fated Richard A. Ballinger was elevated to the position. After this offer and Stewart’s refusal to accept the nomination, relations between the two men deteriorated. Several letters passed between the two concerning federal appointments, but the President’s letters were more patronizing than confidential, as they had been in the past.

Events leading up to the climactic election of 1912 exposed the strains political necessity put on what had originally been a warm friendship. After Roosevelt’s tour abroad, it became apparent to him that he would have to re-enter the political arena. To do this, he needed stout political bases, since President Taft controlled the patronage. As related to Colorado, Roosevelt began corresponding with the urban progressive Democrat, Judge Ben B. Lindsey, in the early summer of 1911. By the end of the year Roosevelt wrote a letter “that I could only write to one or two men, to Jim Garfield, for instance.” The letter explored the possibilities of Roosevelt’s returning to the White House. More pertinent is the fact that Colorado was again in the throes of its cyclical political fight. Denver progressives had fused liberals of both parties into one faction, led by Edward P. Costigan and Ben B. Lindsey, while liberal Republicans else-

In 1912 Roosevelt threw his support to Ben B. Lindsey, Colorado Progressive. This photograph of Lindsey was taken some years after the Bull Moose campaign.

where in the state were finding a leader in Philip Stewart. Perhaps more important than the personalities involved was the fact that the Denver progressives first backed Robert LaFollette’s Progressive party. After its temporary collapse in early 1912, they shifted support to Roosevelt and stayed with him until he lost the 1912 election under the Bull Moose flag.

Phil Stewart’s plan was still predicated on the idea of ridding Colorado politics of the fusionism which had prevailed since the free silver campaign in 1896. He tried to gain control of the party, renovate it by removing the practitioners of compromise, give it a clear progressive platform, and then lend as much support to the national political reform movement as possible. After the Republican convention of June, 1912, Roosevelt decided Stewart’s plan was impractical and threw his support to the Costigan-Lindsey forces. In mid-August presidential candidate Roosevelt took a brief moment to write his former friend the last letter of any significance. The letter was a curious mixture of human emotion, hard politics, and contradiction. Roosevelt praised Stewart for his manliness and loyalty, but criticized Stewart for his contrived political strategy and outlined his own intricate plan for victory in the pending election. In short, Roosevelt had no time to waste in his drive for the presidency, having delayed his third party movement till June.

46 Lindsey and O’Higgins, The Beast, 271; Rocky Mountain News, September 2, 1906, p. 2; September 14, 1906, pp. 1 and 5; September 15, 1906, pp. 1, 3; September 17, 1906, pp. 1, 5; September 19, 1906, p. 1.
48 Roosevelt to Stewart, December 22, 1906, in Morison and Blum, Letters of Roosevelt, V, 533-34.
49 Roosevelt to Stewart, April 16, 1907, January 17 and February 15, 1908, in ibid., V, 533-34, 619-50; and VI, 909-46.
50 Roosevelt to Benjamin Barr Lindsey, May 19 and 26, 1911 in ibid., VII, 268 and 271.
51 Roosevelt to Lindsey, December 5, 1911, in ibid., 450-52.
52 Roosevelt to Lindsey, August 15, 1912, in ibid., 599-600.
Edward P. Costigan, a leader of the Denver progressives, allied with Roosevelt in 1912.

Lindsey, the former Democrat, and Costigan, the future Democrat, were his new allies for the immediate transformation of national politics. Most ironic of all was that Stewart's bid for designation as Republican gubernatorial candidate fell short by about 2,500 out of 40,000 votes, with the Denver progressives no longer members of the party. Yet after his defeat, Stewart resigned his party office and supported Roosevelt's fruitless Bull Moose movement.

In subsequent months Roosevelt returned to the party, to be tolerated by party regulars. What happened to Stewart is neither easily determined nor essentially relevant. Roosevelt had tried to set Stewart up as his entree into Colorado power centers and had failed to do so, possibly because of his own shortsightedness in 1912. Or perhaps Roosevelt had always received support from the people and Stewart from the traditional powers of Colorado politics.

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A BULL MOOSE
IN THE ROCKIES

A Pictorial Record of T. R. in Colorado
Leaving the train at New Castle, Colorado

On a train trip through the Royal Gorge

Taking the waters at Glenwood Springs

Lunch at a chuck wagon in Hugo

Beaming on a Denver crowd
Bestriding the University of Colorado campus like a mighty colossus, the concrete giant that is beginning to take shape as the Engineering Science Center almost dwarfs the red-tiled buildings that stand in its shadow. Its lofty towers tend to draw the eye upward and onward, just as its purpose serves to remind one of the boundless developments in science and technology that lie just ahead. Above all, however, it is apparent that the structure has been built on firm foundations—foundations formed years ago by men and events long since departed from the scene. In a way, this new engineering structure arises as a monument to those early educators of another age who inaugurated what was first called the “Engineering Experiment.”

The first references to the teaching of engineering at the University of Colorado date back to 1883—a scant six years from the time the university had first opened its doors in 1877—a brief year from the commencement marking the graduation of its first class in 1882. The introduction of such a course was a bold and audacious move considering the university’s almost total dedication to the classical curriculum of the day, not to mention its scarcity of college-level students.

But, then, the university was under heavy fire from its critics who charged that it was more prep school than college. (It was; the preparatory students outnumbered the college students by 76 to 11.) Others protested that the classical and Latin curriculums then in vogue had little relationship to the practical needs of a frontier society. (This, too, was true, as Old Main, the lone building that constituted the university, was separated from the nearest sidewalk by more than a mile of mud, and students had to ford Boulder Creek and climb the muddy hill to scale the heights of knowledge.) The more learned of the populace questioned whether the university justified its lofty appendage, arguing that a university was really a collection of colleges.¹

The president and the regents, sensitive to public opinion and eager to make the struggling institution a true university, responded in 1883 by establishing several new branches. Included among these were a department of medicine, a department of pharmacy, a conservatory of music—and, a course in engineering.²

The first practical consideration in organizing a course in engineering was, of course, to procure a professor who could teach the subject. Thus, the regents petitioned the Navy Department, which assigned an engineer, Lieutenant W. F. C. Hasson,

² University of Colorado, Minute Book of the Board of Regents, 1876-1898, p. 83, referred to hereafter as C. U. Minute Book.
to the university to teach classes in civil engineering and mechanics, as well as to organize a student cadet corps.¹

The engineering course was popular—the instructor was not. In 1885, his second year at the university, Lieutenant Hasson had the misfortune to become involved in a row with members of the faculty of the newly-established department of medicine. Although the details of the disagreement have never been recorded, it is known that the students sided with the medical faculty, with the end result that Lieutenant Hasson had the distinction of being the first man in the history of the university to be hung in effigy. This episode temporarily terminated the engineering adventure. In the meeting of the regents in June, 1885, it was announced that Professor Hasson’s connection with the university had “ceased.” Hasson, no doubt, considered this a better alternative than “deceased.” At any rate, he returned to active duty with the Navy, and the university once again petitioned the Navy Department for an officer to teach engineering. When no action was forthcoming, it turned to the War Department with a similar request. Again, there were no results.² What was described as the “Engineering Experiment” remained dormant from 1885 until 1893.

When James Baker was inaugurated as the third president of the university in 1892, it was an important milestone in the history of the school. An experienced educator, Baker had an intimate acquaintance with some of the giants of his age, and was anxious to keep in step with the times. Not satisfied to have his school regarded as a backwoods institution on the fringe of a wilderness, Baker moved quickly to upgrade the scope and objectives of the university. His assessment of the university at the time he assumed command was more vision than fact, as he stated: “It is a true University in both the American and in the German sense... It is a University in the American sense, because it contains the college and the Professional Schools, in the German sense, because it is arranging to offer Graduate courses with true Seminary methods.”⁵ Having made the statement, he set out to fulfill the dream.

Within a year he had established a College of Liberal Arts as distinguished from what had been simply “the College”; he upgraded the Medical School, which began offering clinical opportunities in Denver; he established a Law School; and he formalized the graduate program. In this same period he laid the groundwork for the organizing of a School of Applied Science.⁶

Paraphrasing an old adage, “Deans are made, not born,” Baker set out to make a dean for this new engineering school. A mature student on the Colorado campus caught his eye, and the President began grooming him for his important role. This was Henry Fulton, a character who would fit the script of a modern Hollywood western.

Born in Rochester, New York, and brought up as a “New York Yankee Puritan,” Fulton was a man of mature years and scholarly attainments when he arrived on the Colorado campus. He had served with distinction in the Civil War in General Sheridan’s cavalry, had been wounded in battle, captured, and placed in Libby Prison. Following the war, he remained an officer in the army and participated in various Indian campaigns in the West. During this time he was stationed in Colorado. Upon leaving the army, Major Fulton began the practice of civil engineering.

Deciding to make some special investigations in metallurgy, he enrolled at the University of Colorado at the age of forty to take the full scientific course. Entering as a freshman and described as “asking no favors, showing only a magnificent ambition without a trace of flinching,” he went on to earn a Bachelor of Science degree in 1891. The following academic year, he was appointed as an instructor in chemistry and physics on the university faculty.

Baker, in 1892, invited Fulton to investigate the principal engineering schools in the East. Fulton departed, visiting the mechanical engineering plants of Cornell and Harvard before settling down for a year of advanced study at the University of Michigan. In 1893, upon his return, the University of Colorado conferred upon him the degree Master of Science. Immediately thereafter, he was appointed dean of the newly authorized School of Applied Science.⁷

Also joining the faculty of that school at the time of its inception was George H. Rowe as professor of electrical engineering. Rowe, like Fulton, brought with him the Michigan influence, having graduated from that institution in 1891, and

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⁵ “Professor Henry Fulton, M.S.,” Silver and Gold (Boulder, Colorado), December 10, 1901, p. 5.
served as an instructor in electrical engineering and physics there until coming to Colorado in 1893. Although it has not been documented, Fulton probably had become acquainted with Rowe while on the Michigan campus and undoubtedly was instrumental in bringing him to Colorado to help start the new school. Rowe, who had done advanced work at Cornell University and had examined the best physical laboratories in Europe, was to have charge of the department of physics in addition to his teaching of electrical engineering.8

To house the new school, the first story of an engineering building was erected in 1893 on the site where the north wing of Norlin Library now stands, and an engine and electrical machinery installed. A dynamo and storage battery with measuring instruments were also added as part of the equipment.9

Thus, when the School of Applied Science opened in the fall of 1893, it boasted a one-story building, a drawing board, a dean, one-third of a professor, and one student. Fred W. Whiteside, who was to become the school's first graduate, constituted the entire student body. By the following year it was stated that there was an enrollment increase of 400 percent—four students. The succeeding year, the student body numbered ten, and the success of what was still referred to as the "Engineering Experiment" was claimed to have been assured.10

Baker, of course, never had any doubts. He made an eloquent (or at least lengthy) case for the school in his Biennial Report for 1894, stating:

It is impossible to escape the logic of events demanding provision for civil and electrical engineering for college students. Much of Civil Engineering is required as laboratory work in a collegiate department of Mathematics, and much of Electrical Engineering as laboratory work in the department of Physics. This would be offered informally by those departments, if not formally in separate courses. Most of the state universities have Engineering, and this is historic proof of the demand for it as a university department.

The extra expense to the State for these engineering courses is merely nominal; only one additional professor has been employed, the Professor of Civil Engineering. The Professor of Physics conducts the special work in Electrical Engineering.

An electrical plant has been established sufficient for immediate needs, and the most important apparatus is in position.11

With the increased enrollment, the faculty began to expand.

8 Silver and Gold (Boulder, Colorado), September 19, 1893, p. 7.
10 Coloradoan, 1903, p. 72.
By 1900, the Engineering School, while not yet acknowledged as a "jewel," was considered a "rapid-growing, practical school." Dean Fulton had obtained some money to purchase some field instruments; and Professor Rowe, who occupied the chair of electrical engineering, had bought some small dynamos with money from the same "slow-yielding purse." The school had begun to take on the aspect which officials described as "well-equipped," and fifty-one students were working for degrees.  

The engineer, according to one modest description, was "essentially a man of keen brain and invincible determination, daring anything in the magnitude of his schemes and accomplishments." The writer went on to say: "The engineer has linked the whole world together with the chain of communication and has made possible the advance of civilization." Cocky, spirited, confident, the engineers loudly proclaimed:

Bevel gears, devil gears,
Wot 'ell, Engineers,
Hike, there, wait! Steen big beers,
We're from the School of Engineers—.[17]

This creature continually was to be a source of wonderment to his classical oriented schoolmates in the arts college. Almost from the beginning, the engineer took pride in being a different breed.

That the rowdy behavior of the boisterous engineers occasionally had to be curbed was gleefully reported (no doubt to the delight of the more civilized and genteel members of the student body) by the Silver and Gold, which stated:

The edict has gone forth from the powers that be that the juniors and seniors in the civil engineering department shall in the future, while in the drawing room, conduct themselves within the limitations of the latest approved rules for kindergarten classes. There shall be no loud talking, chaffing or conduct unbecoming a senior; above all is whistling tabooed. The instructor's permission must be obtained before leaving the room or else a severe penalty will be imposed and the offender will have to work five minutes after bell time.[18]

This did not, however, appear to have any lasting traumatic effect upon the tender feelings of the student engineers.

By 1902, the school had two departments, civil and electrical, and a department of mechanical engineering was soon to be added. This description of the course in civil engineering gives some idea of the curriculum at that time.

Mathematics is thoroughly taught in the first two years, while mechanics, and the calculus are continually applied in the remaining two. Chemistry, physics and mineralogy are studied in Freshman and Sophomore years; geology and astronomy in the Junior. Courses in shop work in the Freshman year are followed by others in elementary mechanical and electrical engineering. The theory of elasticity is applied with special reference to the use of metal and stone and especially to structural steel work in engineering designs.[19]

Adherents of the philosophy that the squeaking wheel gets the grease, engineering students loudly protested their school's confined quarters, announcing:

We want more room! The present building is fairly bulging with brains and such as that of this year, and we will be swamped, So here's hoping that the Legislature loosens up, and gives us a building so that the present junk-shop may be put to its proper use.

Draw a line north and south across the Campus, and touching the east end of Woodbury. Fill all the present waste of prairie with shops, laboratories and draughting rooms, and then you begin to see the Engineering School of the University of Colorado as we Engineers expect to see her... Our period of development has only begun. May it never end.[20]

Their words were to prove prophetic beyond even their most optimistic dreams.

Dean Henry Fulton died December 6, 1901, after an illness of two years. He was replaced by Professor George Rowe, who had been appointed to the chair of physics by Dean Fulton in 1893 and afterwards to the chair of electrical engineering. Rowe's tenure as dean, however, was brief as he resigned in the summer of 1903 to accept an appointment at Stanford University.

Henry B. Dates, S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accepted the position as dean in September, 1903, along with the chair of electrical engineering. He too, however, was destined to serve a short time, resigning after two years to accept an appointment at Case School of Applied Science in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1905.

Thus, in September, 1905, Milo S. Ketchum, professor of civil engineering, was appointed as the fourth dean of the School of Applied Science, its third in four years.[22] This time,
however, the tenure of the dean was to be of a more permanent nature, as Ketchum was destined to head the engineering program for fourteen years.

A graduate of the University of Illinois, where he had received a B.S. in civil engineering in 1895 and the professional degree in 1900, the new dean had joined the Colorado faculty in 1904. Prior to coming to the university, Ketchum had been in charge of the Kansas City office of the American Bridge Company. From 1893 to 1895 he had been instructor in surveying at Michigan State College of Mines, and from 1895 to 1997 an instructor of civil engineering at the University of Illinois. His background thus combined practical engineering with considerable teaching experience.

Ketchum was dean of the College of Engineering from 1905 until 1919, when he left to return to the University of Illinois. In 1922 he was appointed dean of engineering at that institution, serving until his retirement in 1933. Colorado School of Mines, where in 1917 he had been offered but had declined the position of president, awarded him an honorary Doctor of Science degree in 1926. The University of Colorado also presented him an honorary doctor's degree in 1927. During the fall of 1924, a few months before his death, he was elected to honorary membership in the American Society of Civil Engineers. The tall, muscular looking man—six feet four inches in height and weighing over two hundred pounds—made a lasting impression on the University of Colorado campus with his remarkable memory for details, his professional competence, and his constant interest in people. The engineering administration building completed in 1938 was named in his honor.

During the years 1902 to 1906, there was to be a series of internal changes in the organization and composition of the faculty of the school. In 1902 the department of mechanical engineering was added to the academic program, with Professor H. Crouch as its head. He died in October, 1903, and was succeeded by Professor Morris M. Green, who served until 1906. He, in turn, was replaced in the fall of that year by John A. Hunter. Professor Hunter had received his M.E. degree from Pennsylvania State College, where he later taught as a professor before coming to the university.

Hunter was to serve as head of the department of mechanical engineering and also as head of chemical engineering (organized in 1908) until his retirement in 1936. This distinguished professor died in 1939, and, like Ketchum, was to be honored by having an engineering building named in his honor as well as a university residence hall.

Meanwhile, the department of civil engineering, which dated back to 1893, had a series of new "heads." Upon the death of Dean Fulton, Professor Charles Derleth, Jr., filled the chair for a short period before leaving for a similar position at the University of California. He was succeeded by Professor Lindsay Duncan, and he by Professor Milo S. Ketchum in 1904.

Electrical engineering, which boasted that its courses also dated back to the establishment of the school, was headed by Professor Henry B. Dates. When Professor Dates resigned in 1905, the new appointee was Herbert S. Evans.

Great things also were in store for Evans. During World War I, when Dean Ketchum took a leave of absence to supervise the construction of a powder plant, Evans was appointed as acting dean. A year later, when Ketchum resigned to go to Illinois, Evans was appointed dean of the College of Engineering. For the next twenty-five years "Shorty" Evans was to guide the college through some of its most important years of transition—years in which it developed from a small school to one of the large, fully-accredited engineering colleges in the country. Evans' retirement in 1943 marked more than thirty-eight years of service to the University. His alma mater, the University of Nebraska, from which he received his B.S. and his electrical engineering degrees, awarded him an honorary Doctor of Engineering degree in 1928. But the professional records of more than three thousand graduates who had studied at the University of Colorado under his deanship were a more lasting tribute to his talent and ability.

In 1906, the name of the School of Applied Science was changed to the appendage by which it is known today, the College of Engineering. With a booming enrollment of 215 students, an expanded curriculum, and the sophistication of three distinct departments, it had come of age.

Along with these developments came the establishment of several student engineering societies, including the student branch of the American Institute of Electrical Engineering, and
the Chemical-Mechanical Engineering Society. These organizations combined to form the Associated Engineering Societies, the main purpose of which was to publish the *Journal of Engineering*, an annual publication devoted to a discussion of technical and engineering topics by the faculty, students, and alumni of the college. Not content to rest on their undergraduate laurels, each department of the newly established college was soon offering courses leading to the professional degrees of Civil Engineer, Electrical Engineer, Mechanical Engineer, and Chemical Engineer. Clearly, the old School of Applied Science was busting out all over—not only physically, but also academically.

Yet in spite of what was always to be a rigorous and demanding curriculum, a warm and intimate relationship between students and faculty continued to characterize the engineering program. Perhaps it was the close proximity in which they worked, physically and mentally, to tackle the great problems that lay before them. Or perhaps it was some streak of stubbornness, ruggedness, and determination that was typical of the breed. At any rate, here was no theoretical educational log with Mark Hopkins sitting on one end and the student on the other. More likely, professor and student would be found hacking away at the log shoulder to shoulder.

The informality of the times and the close relationship between students and professors is reflected, in part, in the fact that almost all of the members of the faculty were tagged with nicknames by the undergraduates. Just as in the early days of the school the old-timers had referred to their faculty as the "Major," the "Little Prof," and "Tally," so the new dean was to be known as "Uncle Milo" or "Mile High" Ketchum. Professor Evans was called "Shorty," a name that was to stick throughout a long and distinguished career. With genuine affection, a student said of Evans: "His eye is as bright as any boy's."

These early pioneers of the faculty and student body were men of vision. They were acutely aware of the technical and industrial potential of the slumbering nation just beginning to flex its muscles and awaken to the great challenges of the scientific revolution that beckoned in the years ahead. Correctly, these men prophesied the expansion of the university's engineering complex eastward and southward on the campus.

The dream of filling the waste of prairie with shops, laboratories, and drafting rooms began to be realized in their time with the construction of the Engineering Shops Building (later called Hunter Building, Engine II) in 1908. Evans was acting dean when another new building of the same modified saw-tooth roof style (Engine I) was added in 1918 along with a "temporary" wooden building constructed as a shop during World War I. (This "temporary" building still stands behind the old Engine Shops.) Evans was still dean when the engineers built their first and only building constructed in the University's distinctive flagstone architecture in 1937, the engineering administration building named in honor of Ketchum.

But even the most farsighted prophet of the early 1900's could hardly have envisioned the massive $10.5 million Engineering Science Center that was to spring up in the sixties and indeed fill the prairie south of Pennsylvania Avenue and just east of 24th Street. This development was to mark the University of Colorado as the hub of a scientific complex of not only regional but also national and international significance. But
there can be little doubt that they had something to do with laying its spiritual foundation.

Through the years great men stepped in to fill the ranks as the old-timers departed from the scene. Evans was followed by Clarence "Jimmy" Eckles as dean in 1943, and he, in turn, by Max Peters in 1962. In the classrooms a veteran corps of distinguished professors, such as Clint DuVall, John Hunter, Charles Hutchinson, Frank Easton, and Otto Birk, served the university through long and fruitful tenures. Countless other members of the faculty and literally thousands of engineering students were to carry on the great traditions, taking their places in the long line of thinkers and doers that blend history with the living present and the glowing future.

Looking back, it is difficult to pinpoint just when a college passes from the early (or ancient) era to the modern. But for the engineers at Colorado, this must have occurred sometime during the first decade of the twentieth century when the "Engineering Experiment" became a thing of the past and the Engineering College became a vibrant, permanent fixture in the academic life of what was at last a true university. Certainly, a nostalgic description of the 1905 Senior Promenade captures an image of a way of life and a campus now greatly changed. The first Engine Building, located where Norlin Library now stands, dominated the east end of the old campus "quad." The lights that brightened the festivities of the prom were the work of the electrical engineers. As reported in the Coloradoan of 1907:

At nine-thirty dancing began. The campus was transformed into a fairy land of lights, music and people. At the west end of the quadrangle was the twenty-five foot electric design, "University of Colorado," built against the clump of trees beneath which the band was stationed. At the east end on the engineering building, were the numerals 1905 in five foot electric figures. Along the walks and rows of trees were seven hundred Japanese lanterns making a wonderful effect. Hundreds of seniors in cap and gown, alumni, students and town people, promenaded the walks of the quadrangle, stopping in at the gymnasium occasionally to dance.

At eleven o'clock the chapel tolled eleven strokes, the dancing ceased and graduates and alumni collected on the south steps of the main building to sing. Cheers were given for the regents, Dr. Pfeiffer (a regent), the President, and the Class of 1905. Then "U. of Colorado" and "Glory Colorado" were sung; the lights were all turned out and the Class of 1905 had finished its college career.

And somewhere the serenity of that classic June night must have been shattered by a few boisterous voices as they loudly proclaimed:

Bevel gears, devil gears,
What the hell, ENGINEERS!

In 1907 Nat Fitts, an engineering student, climbed to the top of the smokestack back of the power plant and took what is perhaps the first aerial view of the university.

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39 Coloradoan, 1907, pp. 29-30.