Provisions, liquor, and hot meals abounded along Denver’s Blake Street, symbolizing Colorado’s spontaneous urban frontier in the mid-1860s.

Colorado: The Centennial State in the Bicentennial Year

BY HOWARD R. LAMAR

During the joint celebration of Colorado’s admission to statehood and the nation’s Centennial in the summer of 1876, the Del Norte Prospector took time to speculate on what Colorado would be like in 1976. Its editor, caught up in the optimistic rhetoric of the hour, wrote:

And when the centennial shall come again, Colorado will be among the fairest of the sisters; her hillsides will have become beautiful under the joint ministry of nature and art; her mountain tops will be glorified by the sunlight of freedom; and all the bright blessings of civilization and religious liberty will shimmer around her pathway in a golden shower.¹

Generally speaking the editor’s comments on American progress and the survival of freedom are not far off the mark, but they will give small comfort to the various centennial-bicentennial committees of Colorado, and, indeed, to those in other western states, for the automatic progress that the editor envisaged no longer seems automatic and not that many hillsides have become beautiful through the joint ministry of nature and art.

The fact of the matter is that recent national political scandals, and international events such as the Vietnamese War, have created a mood of national self-criticism that makes it difficult to celebrate the two-hundredth anniversary of the American Revolution in the traditional patriotic way. Understandably many of the national planners have taken refuge in reenacting the dramatic events of 1775-76, in tracing military campaigns, and in recreating eighteenth-century costumes and life styles.²

¹ The Del Norte Prospector (n.d.), quoted in the Del Norte Daily Record, 12 July 1876.
American West when the battles of Lexington and Concord were fought, and no "western" representative was present at the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Despite George Washington's reputation for having slept in many different places, he never spent a night in Colorado. Benjamin Franklin succeeded in establishing a claim to our first "West"—the trans-Appalachian region—in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, but that claim did not include any area west of the Mississippi River. Thus, the centennial-bicentennial committees in Colorado, and elsewhere, have shown a healthy reluctance to reenact the battle of Bunker Hill or to trace with loving care Washington's military movements up and down the Atlantic seaboard. Instead, they have tried to find new ways to commemorate the birth of the Republic.

If, like the editor of the Del Norte Prospector, we raise our sights above the antiquarian aspects of the revolutionary period, it can be demonstrated that the region comprising Colorado and the southwestern states bore a closer relation to some of the underlying causes and ideals of the American Revolution than anyone has previously suspected. By looking at the Revolution from the perspective of what was then the northern borderlands of New Spain, we can gain a fresh and valuable comparative view of the events that led to the birth of the American Republic.

The long-range causes of the American Revolution may be found in the rise of representative local governments and a free society in the thirteen colonies. But most historians of the Revolution would agree that the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which ended the French and Indian War and gave victorious England most of France's new world possessions, triggered new imperial policies, heavier taxes, and restrictive laws, which in turn brought about the rebellion of the thirteen colonies in 1775-76.

What does the Treaty of Paris of 1763 have to do with Colorado and the Bicentennial? It should be recalled that the third major signatory at the Treaty of Paris that year was Spain, who claimed possession of the American Southwest from Texas to California. Spain had been France's ally in the war and, now, as her partner in defeat, had to give up the Floridas to the British.

The spectacular success of the British badly frightened the Spanish government. It seemed possible, even logical, that in some future war Britain might seize Spain's new world colonies. To protect her northern borderlands, and as compensation for aiding her ally, Spain acquired French Louisiana in 1763 as a buffer state. All this swapping of colonies took place as the Spanish court, led by the vigorous king Charles III, was being swept by the secular ideas of the European Enlightenment. Both in reaction to the British threat and as an expression of the crown's new Enlightenment philosophy, Spain decided to reform her own imperial policy and, thus, strengthen her hold on her own colonies. The change in attitude, because of Enlightenment ideas, was so great that David Brading has noted that even the style of handwriting used by Spanish officials underwent a dramatic transformation.

With a vigorous new set of royal officials in charge, Spain tried to make her presidio system more efficient, banned the Jesuit Order from her colonies, and began to secularize existing Indian missions. The anticalerical bent of Spain's officials helped to shape Indian policy in Louisiana where the crown gave up the mission system and instead allowed French traders to handle Indian relations. To govern Texas the Spanish appointed the highly capable administrator, Athanase de Mezières.


Meanwhile the Spanish decided to settle California, and in 1769 Gaspar de Portolá and Junipero Serra established a foothold there. At the very time the Revolution was beginning Juan Bautista de Anza was busy leading settlers from Mexico to the Bay of San Francisco to establish Spain's northernmost outpost of empire. In 1777 Anza was made governor of New Mexico; in that post he instituted a new Indian policy, which affected both the mountain and plains tribes, among them the Ute and Comanche.6 In the year of American Independence, Fray Francisco Atanasio Domínguez and Fray Francisco Silvestre Vélez de Escalante and a party of eight left Santa Fe for the purpose of finding a route to Monterey. While they failed to achieve their goal, they crossed southwestern Colorado on their tour. Their efforts were only a part of a larger Spanish effort to link the borderland provinces to one another. Fray Francisco Garcés and Anza sought suitable routes between the Gila River basin and Santa Fe. Pedro Vial was engaged in finding practicable routes between San Antonio and Santa Fe and between New Mexico and Saint Louis. In so doing he helped define the future Santa Fe Trail, which has played such a large role in the history of southeastern Colorado.7

Thus, those same Enlightenment ideas, which influenced the thought of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson and other American Revolutionary leaders, also affected the history of the Spanish borderlands of which Colorado was then a hazy and undefined part. What we need to remember is that the American Revolution was based on new modes of thought and new principles that were world-wide rather than local in their impact. Operating through Spain, policies stemming from these ideas touched even the tribes of remote Colorado. If we acknowledge the Spanish Enlightenment tradition and the Anglo-American Enlightenment tradition as a part of Colorado's past, Colorado's heritage from the eighteenth century is indeed a rich one.

When Colorado entered the Union in the summer of 1876, her citizens had no problems in relating to the national centennial celebrations. Even a casual glance at the files of the Denver Rocky Mountain News for 1876 indicates how completely the new state had identified itself with the Declaration of Independence and the ideals of the nation. The circumstances of Colorado's founding had made such an identification virtually inevitable, for the Colorado pioneers had defined their social and political values, both in word and deed, during the first three years of settlement. The Pikes Peakers created what was probably the most self-conscious frontier community in American history, with the possible exceptions of Texas and California. They also had the advantage of perspective over the other two, for although gold was discovered in Colorado only ten years after it was found in California, during that turbulent decade (1848-58) techniques for mining gold and precedents for establishing law-abiding western communities had been found and applied.8

Among other things miners had learned that the secret to successful mining was not lawlessness but law and order. During

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the rhetorical question was posed: “Shall it be government of the knife and revolver or . . . a new and independent state?” The maxim of the Revolution that Americans believed in the “rule of law” was clearly recognized in frontier Colorado, and the many violent episodes that were later to mar the state’s history should not obscure a passion for law and order, which was so strong that the passion often provoked violence in the name of order.

Colorado’s pioneers also exhibited an extraordinary sense of the right of property. The citizens of Gregory District imposed a mining code and adopted the laws of Kansas almost as soon as gold was discovered there. The desire for legal security of property was, in fact, evident everywhere. Yet, it is interesting to see that the laws of Gregory District also exempted certain properties, tools, bedding, and necessary provisions from attachment, levy, or sale for three months. When some ambitious pioneers got together at Bergen’s Ranch on 15 February 1861 to establish the county of “Ni-Wot,” one of their first concerns was to exempt from attachment six months of provisions for a family, a homestead of 160 acres if one owned ranch land, and the family library. More often than not, the “family library” meant the family Bible. The provisions take on added symbolic meaning when we read that the founding fathers of the United States had a fundamental aversion to debt, since debt undermined the independence of the debtor and, thus, threatened the republic. The free, independent, property-owning citizen was the key to a republican government.

The founding fathers also had an aversion to the landless, urban working man because in Jefferson’s words they were dependent upon the “casualties and caprice of customers.” Eighteenth-century Americans, writes Edmund S. Morgan, distrusted free labor and especially a free labor surplus, which could become an army of roving, thieving vagrants, a restless male society with guns. Either consciously or unconsciously the settlers of Colorado accepted the ideas of the founding fathers concerning property, debt, and landless labor. In time those beliefs would bring them into conflict with the realities of the new industrial state, which Colorado became in the years between 1876 and 1910, and would provoke social crises between the property-owning and the landless.

Colorado’s commitment to American values was further guaranteed by the fact that it was settled by a population that had resolved the slavery issue in Kansas and had practiced popular sovereignty there to the degree that they were the most confident people about self-government that could be found in the United States. It seemed only natural that they would create their own squatter “Territory of Jefferson” in 1859, set up a “Peoples’ Government” for Denver, form counties and towns at will, send representatives to Congress and the Kansas and the Nebraska legislatures, and demand that Congress give them territorial status.

Once Colorado became a territory in 1861 it experienced a series of crises that further defined its character. From its inception it was self-consciously different from Spanish-American New Mexico and Mormon Utah. When the Civil War came Colorado forged anew its bonds with the Union by sending the Colorado Volunteers against the Confederate invaders of New Mexico. Between 1861 and 1868 its citizens also came to see the Indians as such bitter enemies to progress that they agreed the red man must be eliminated. It would be difficult to exaggerate the lasting impact of the Kansas-Nebraska troubles, the Civil War, and the Indian wars on the Colorado settler’s psyche. Undoubtedly this multiple experience, and the traditional commitments to law and order and to the right of property, help to explain the local “wars” that later took place between capital and labor, cattlemen and sheepmen, and ranchers and homesteaders.

The Colorado gold rush and the resulting settlements also occurred at the end of a decade of town site booming and land speculation in the Midwest and particularly in Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas. The techniques of town development had been perfected by 1858, so that an urban, mercantile population was even more visible on the Colorado frontier than one of rural pioneer settlers was. In an attempt to rescue the western town

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9 Ibid., pp. 236 and 255.
10 Laws of Gregory District (Denver, 1890), Western Americana Collection, Yale University Library, New Haven. (hereinafter cited as WYA).
11 Laws of the County of Ni-Wot (Denver, 1861), WYA.
13 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
14 “Manuscript Minutes of the Meetings of the People’s Government of Denver, October 8, 1860—November 19, 1861,” WYA; Provisional Laws of Jefferson Territory (Omaha, 1860), WYA. The various expressions of local popular sovereignty are summarized in Lamar, Far Southwest, pp. 205-25.
Denver City Town Company shares evidenced an initial faith in city-building by an "urban mercantile population," who created the "Boss City" of the 1870s between San Francisco and St. Louis that matured into the Denver of the early nineteen hundreds.


Denver City Town Company, 12 July 1876.

Robert G. Atearn, "A View from the High Country," *Western Historical Quarterly* 2 (April 1971):131. "I see these corporations as avenues that not only led men of an earlier day in the direction of town building, land development, industrial expansion and similar ventures, but their history also points the way for modern students of history to explore further the growth and development of the American West."

rado's statehood the *New York Herald* opposed admission saying, "we want commonwealths in the union that represent men and women and not Indians, buffalos and prairie wolves."  

When Colorado citizens voted for statehood on 1 July 1876 by a majority of 15,000 to 4,000, they were already deep into the celebration of the national Centennial. Colorado and Kansas shared a pavilion at the Philadelphia Exposition, or "Fair" as it was often called. A correspondent for the *Denver Rocky Mountain News* kept them informed of events there. Visitors to the Fair could gain a dramatic impression of the incoming state since the young photographer William Henry Jackson had been sent to Philadelphia to show the reports and the pictures from F. V. Hayden's western surveys. Some of Jackson's photographs, taken on Hayden's important survey of the mineral resources of the territory in 1874, were spectacular views of the Colorado Rocky Mountains. The readers of the *News* soon learned, however, that the exposition was a financial failure; thus, they followed with interest the debate that if the Fair stayed open on Sunday, it would break the Fourth Commandment, but if it closed on Sunday, it would make people break the Third Commandment, since they would start swearing.  

Once statehood had been endorsed by the voters on 1 July, Denver went ahead with the "Grandest Celebration Ever Seen in the Rocky Mountains" on 4 July. That celebration is worth following in some detail since it provides an opportunity to contrast the themes of the centennial and the bicentennial years.  

The day began with a mishap: a nervous courthouse employee raised the American flag upside down. Despite a cloudy day the festivities began with a giant parade led by a military unit, the Colorado Commandery, Number 1. The soldiers were followed by the Masons and a group of "Pioneers" who kept stopping bystanders to ask about the prospect of wood, water, and grass ahead. Next in line came representatives of the Scandinavian settlers of Colorado, and after them a German turnverein or gymnastic society. After the Odd Fellows had marched by, a coach appeared carrying "Miss Liberty" who was holding a baby in her lap entitled "The Young Republic." The local typographers' union, calling themselves representatives of "The Press," then passed by. The climax came when the "Grand Car of the Union" appeared. In the first section were thirteen comely matrons representing the thirteen original states, and behind them was "Miss Colorado," surrounded by beautiful girls who symbolized the remaining thirty-eight states. Perhaps the most intriguing juxtaposition of marchers occurred when the Irish, or Fenian Society, appeared followed by the Prohibitionist and Temperance Society. Someone on the parade committee had a sense of humor.  

Governor John Routt, escorted by the Knights of Pythias, was followed by the firemen, and after them came anyone else who wished to parade. Commercial floats were also in evidence. Daniels, Fisher and Company had a fine dry-goods display, and a lumberman exhibited a huge pine stump bearing the caption: "This is my second centennial." With remarkable good patience a crowd in the cottonwood grove on the west bank of the South Platte River heard the governor and the Reverend Dr. Frank M. Ellis speak, survived the recitation of an epic poem, and listened to a three-hour lecture on the history of Colorado by Professor O. J. Goldrick, Denver's first schoolmaster. Goldrick's rich oratory praised the pioneers who  

Opened the vaults where the gold dust shines,  
And gave us the Key of the silver mines; ...  
With cattle on a thousand hills,  
And room for millions more;  
With gold enough beneath to pay  
The nation's debt twice o'er.  

Perhaps the most solemn moment in the ceremonies came when Judge Hiram P. Bennet proposed thirteen patriotic toasts, which again revealed a remarkable meshing of local feelings and national sentiments. Bennet raised his glass to (1) the Declaration of Independence as the hope of mankind; (2) to the American flag; and (3) to the political fathers of the republic. After
honor the 4 George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, Bennett singled out 5 “La Belle France” with the salutation “from Republic to la Republique.” In so doing he acknowledged the help France had given the United States during the Revolution, while congratulating them on the recent creation of a new republic. Bennett then toasted 6 the president of the United States, and 7 LaFayette, DeKalb, Pulaski, Steuben and other foreign-born patriots who had aided the American cause. In the next five toasts he paid tribute to 8 The Law of the Land, 9 The People, “on which the ship of liberty floats,” 10 The Press, “an engine of almost boundless power,” 11 Peace and War “with faith in arbitration.” and 12 Woman, “the last and best Gift of God to Man.” Naturally the final toast 13 was to Colorado, the Centennial State: “Like the star of Bethlehem, it is rising and the wise men of the east are beholding it and coming to it.”

Less extravagant but equally enthusiastic celebrations took place in other Colorado towns. At Sedalia in Douglas County the celebrants built a table one hundred feet long and a dancing platform of the same length. One hundred people were scheduled to sing “The Star Spangled Banner,” and one hundred trees were to be decorated and lighted at night.24 Even the inmates at the territorial penitentiary were allowed to honor the Centennial. Beginning at 9:00 A.M., Warden B. F. Allen permitted the prisoners to sing songs and to make speeches for three hours. The orations were followed by a meal of roast pork, mutton, pink lemonade, and pies. That evening the Canon City brass band serenaded the inmates, after which an Italian minstrel troupe gave a performance in the prison. The warden ended his report by adding: “I forgot to say that I took off all their irons in the morning at sunrise.”25

Beneath the surface of the Denver parade and the patriotic rhetoric three contradictory themes or “divergent unities” can be discerned. John Higham says that these “divergent unities” have always given Americans a sense of national unity.26 One of the fundamental features of American society in the past, explains Higham, has been a sense of belonging to some localized group or place. It could be a sense of belonging to southern kinfolk, identification with an ethnic group, a feeling of belonging among fellow citizens of the Hoosier state of Indiana, or the association with a club or society. Distinctive occupations or life styles can also promote the sense of belonging, whether that style be that of the cowboy or that of the hippie. Borrowing a phrase from Clifford Geertz, Higham has called this form of belonging a sense of “primordial unity.”27 In the Denver parade that sense of primordial unity could be seen in the Masonic Order, the Scandinavian marchers, and the German turnverein. The typographers’ union represented an occupational sense of unity, while the sharing of a past experience gave the “Pioneers” a temporary sense of oneness. It seems likely that even the crowd, Midwestern and Yankee in origin, and unionist in its political sentiments, had a sense of unity.

A second factor, which has always made for “national unity” according to Higham, has been a general ideology that was basically Protestant, progress-oriented, and full of hope for equality and democracy. This ideology was so broad it could include persons and groups who were neither Protestant nor American.28 The presence of German-Americans, Fenians, and Scandinavians in the parade implied acceptance of this national ideology. The significance of their presence was not lost on the Denver Rocky Mountain News, which declared: “all honor to the adopted citizens who thus show their devotion to our American institutions.”29

25 Ibid., 11 July 1876.
27 Ibid., pp. 8-9; see also Bartlett, New Country: A Social History of the American Frontier, p. 346.
29 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 7 July 1876.
On the other hand, there clearly were limits to what may have seemed a healthy example of nineteenth-century cultural pluralism. The News gave no evidence that Colorado’s Spanish-Americans had been invited to participate in the parade nor were Colorado’s Indian tribes in the march. When the News reported that the Fourth of July celebrations in Santa Fe had been religious in nature, the paper adopted the tone of commenting on a strange event taking place in a foreign country. News of the defeat of Custer and the death of his troops on the Little Bighorn, which took place on 25 June, and reached Denver a few days later, provoked anti-Indian sentiments and a new call to drive the red man from the continent.30

Higham’s third divergent unity can be found in the nineteenth-century American’s belief that technology was the key to progress; for them technology was also democratic and beneficent by nature.31 No new state ever put more faith in technology in the form of the railroad lines, new mining processes, industrialization, and irrigated farming than Colorado. Although the University of Colorado was chartered in 1861, the Colorado School of Mines was the first state institution of higher learning to open its doors.32 Colorado’s early heroes were not so much the frontiersmen and the Indian fighters as they were the engineers, and that category included the railroad expert such as William Jackson Palmer, the mining engineers such as Samuel F. Emmons, and the practical professor-scientists such as Nathaniel P. Hill.33 The western mining engineer became such a well-known figure, in fact, that he represented the first group of professionally trained Americans whose services were in demand abroad. By 1900 the mining engineer could be found in Latin America, the Far East, and in the mines of South Africa.34

Together, all of Higham’s factors spelled out the kind of economic and civil liberty we were to bring to the rest of the world. The Reverend Dr. Ellis commented on the country’s destiny when he said: “We are therefore more than a nation among nations. We are a nation of a thousand nations. Heirs to the blood and experience of all other civilizations we are the guardians of the hopes of the world. This nation is the heritage of mankind, not of Americans only.”35 The Colorado Woman’s Suffrage Association, though furiously protesting the lack of civil rights for women—a protest they expressed weekly in the columns of the Denver Rocky Mountain News—also felt that destiny was on their side. “America,” said an association speaker, “is the topmost branch of the slowly growing tree of civilization.”36

The parade, the toasts, and the speeches of 1876 touched on nearly all of the topics and the problems that trouble us today: the national purpose, the role of the military, cultural pluralism, law and order, the press, and equal rights for women; but given the sense of inevitable progress that prevailed then, how differently were they viewed. Some of these differences deserve special comment. The Civil War and the Indian wars, for example, had convinced Coloradoans of the necessity and the efficacy of a military organization. While they debated the use of the militia at Sand Creek, they did not question the role of war in our national life as Americans now do. Certainly one of the most profound dilemmas that American society faces today is that it is attempting to celebrate a revolution and its military heroes at a time when there is a tremendous distrust between the citizen and the soldier. It is a debate that troubles Colorado as much as it does any state.

In 1876 Coloradoans were told over and over again how a free press was the secret of liberty, a posture at once understandable when it is realized that out of the ten prominent founding fathers of Colorado, at least four were newspaper editors.37 Today that “engine of almost boundless power” seems more far-reaching and complex than it was in 1876, but its basic role seems unchanged. In 1876, however, the concept of a free press was inextricably tied to the belief that education and literacy would solve all problems. Using phrases that sound cliché today, Governor Routt wrote that “where intelligence is largest, wealth is greatest,” while a German-American group in Denver declared that “a free school in a free state is the bulwark of our liberty.”38 The Coloradoans of 1876 further believed that education should be used to instill morality and patriotism in the young. “Teach!”

30 Ibid., 12, 17 July 1876.
33 Paul, Mining Frontier, pp. 121-34.
35 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 12 July 1876.
36 Ibid., 26 April 1876, and in previous and subsequent issues for the same year.
37 In the random choice of ten prominent early Coloradoans: N.P. Hill, W.N. Byers, D.H. Moffat, Frank Hall, Dave K. Waite, J.B. Chaffee, Moses Hallett, John Evans, Otto Mears, and H.A.W. Tabor, five owned or ran newspapers. They were Hill, Byers, Hall, Evans, and Mears.
38 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 6, 7 July 1876.
declared the editor of the *Del Norte Prospector*, using all the patriotic examples you can find.\(^{39}\) Just as there were limitations to cultural pluralism, there were limits to the types of education endorsed. By 1876 the mass of Colorado citizens were opposed to Catholic schools and Catholic culture and to integrated schools for Blacks.\(^{40}\) These attitudes naturally limited educational opportunities for the Spanish-Americans of southern Colorado, while the idea of a general education for Indians was never seriously discussed.

Underneath the rhetoric about inevitable progress were some very real worries about the future of Colorado, which have a remarkably contemporary ring.\(^{41}\) The arguments for women’s rights in 1876 were the same as those being used today. More muted but recognizable was a concern about the exhaustion of the state’s timber supply. This issue worried Governor Samuel H. Elbert so much that he broached the idea of forest conservation and sustained yield in his annual message to the 1874 legislature.\(^{42}\) All Coloradoans were aware of the scarcity of water and the need for irrigation. Others feared that a purely mining economy would turn Colorado into a dependent colony. That fear led Coloradoans to promote agricultural colonies and ranching, so that eventually the rancher and the cowboy took their place alongside the engineer as local heroes.\(^{43}\)

The greatest concern was how to develop Colorado without losing local freedom. Territorial Secretary Frank Hall declared that though Colorado’s streets were paved with gold, without a railroad the state was worthless. At the same time other leaders feared a takeover by giant absentee corporations and railroad firms. In 1875-76 Coloradoans seemed to have little choice, so that the authors of the first Colorado Constitution avoided reform issues and fostered economic development, although H.P.H. Bromwell and others voiced strong Granger antirailroad sentiments in the debates. Colorado’s leaders knowingly agreed to temporary economic colonial status in order to develop the state but hoped that technology and a diversified economy would, in the end, make them free.\(^{44}\)

As Colorado boomed in the years between 1876 and 1890 with a swelling population, thousands of miles of new railroad lines, and the incredible silver bonanzas of Leadville and other towns, it seemed that the gamble had paid off. In the long run, however, there were some tragic losses as well. Faith in industrial capitalism, or technology, eventually worked to deny a sense of community to miners and ethnic groups, to exclude them from any prospect of property ownership, and to indebted them to employers. In the end they were forced to question the broad Protestant national ideology to which they had previously subscribed. The difference between the myth of success and the actual reality of their depressed condition, writes James E. Wright, led the miners to express themselves first in the Populist third party movement and then through the militant Western Federation of Miners.\(^{45}\) Questioning Colorado’s colonial status and the politics of development, the miners continued to express their dissent in the twentieth century by turning first to the Socialist and then to the Democratic party for relief. In so doing they made Colorado a two-party state and provided the transition from the consensus politics of development in which the state becomes the arm of business to the present politics of conflict and reform.\(^{46}\) However extreme and violent the troubles between labor and capital were during the years between 1890 and 1920, it could be argued that much of the difficulty was caused by the fact that from the miners’ point of view all three of John Higham’s divergent unities were at one time or another ignored or suppressed, while the new industrial technology proved to be neither democratic nor beneficent.

The story was not always grim. In other parts of the state a sense of community, assisted by technology, grew. Public and private schools and colleges vied to bring education and culture to Colorado.\(^{47}\) In Denver between 1900 and 1915 civic enterprises, urban renewal, and political reform flourished. The heightened awareness of the natural splendor of the Rocky Mountain region led its more thoughtful citizens to add the cult of the environment to the national ideology.\(^{48}\)

\(^{39}\) ibid.
\(^{40}\) ibid., 16 February 1876.
\(^{41}\) Women’s rights information was carried on the front page of the *Denver Rocky Mountain News* in columns entitled “Women’s Suffrage Department” or just “Women’s Department.”
\(^{42}\) Elbert’s message was printed in the *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, 7 January 1874.
\(^{46}\) ibid., pp. 226-49.
\(^{47}\) McGiffert, *The Higher Learning in Colorado*.
It is not the purpose of this essay to undertake a review of Colorado history but to comment on the changes that stand out as we compare the Colorado of 1876 to the Colorado of 1976. It seems likely that while the Coloradans of 1876 would recognize most of the issues that the state and the nation face today, they would be amazed that an ideology of cultural pluralism has all but replaced the older national ideology. Some would be astounded to learn that José de Onis of the University of Colorado has been invited to write a bicentennial volume on the Spanish-Americans of the state and that twenty-three percent of Denver's population is Chicano. They would also be astounded to learn that Indian Americans are not only asserting their rights as citizens but that American Indian Movement (AIM) officials meet regularly in Denver to map out the next legal move to reclaim lands or seek redress in the courts. They would probably experience cultural shock at the idea that Indians and Mexican-Americans have been identified by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians as having a sense of primordial unity, a positive spirit of belonging and community. Thus, as divisive as it seems, and often is, the phenomenon of modern cultural pluralism begins to have reciprocal values for the whole society.

The authors of the Colorado Constitution, on the other hand, would understand the 1974 gubernatorial campaign in which the politics of reform, as represented by Governor Richard Lamm, were pitted against the muted politics of development, as voiced by former Governor John Vanderhoof, for they had faced this dilemma themselves. Rather than be surprised at the new states' rights ideas, which have swept all western states in the last decade, or the command to "think small in order to think big," they would remember a universal desire to separate from Kansas and Nebraska, to start their own territory in 1859, and to risk economic hardship in 1876 in order to be a state. They would have no trouble recognizing that the Colorado rancher and cowboy have become familiar stereotypes or that the state is considered truly "Western." 

There are other changes that the citizens of 1876 would not fully understand, and that is where the joint Centennial-Bicentennial must take on new meanings. They would be mystified and saddened, for example, at what seems to be a general disillusionment with public and higher education all over the nation and by the stress on innovation rather than tradition and morality in the curriculum.

Perhaps the most significant change the citizens of 1876 would note is the new image of Colorado. In 1876 the power of the press was used to promote and sell Colorado to the world. Immigrant groups were lured here from all over Europe. Today the press in Colorado is busy selling a concern for ecology and overpopulation with such success that once again it has drawn the nation's attention to the state. Colorado rejected the 1976 Winter Olympics and elected a governor (in 1974) whom the New York Times admiringly called an "eco-freak," which sounds considerably different from the New York Herald's complaint of one hundred years ago that it was a land of buffalo and prairie wolves. The debate over what shall be done with Colorado's resources is, in the most fundamental sense, a continuation of the debate begun by Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson over the role of industry and commerce in our national life and over whether the national domain should be used for commercial or social purposes.

It would be difficult to exaggerate just how closely the new local debates over water, land, and minerals have become the new symbol of Colorado. As in 1876, Coloradans today are talking about the future, and the nation is listening. Just as the ideas of the Enlightenment had far-ranging consequences, one of which was the American Revolution, Colorado's debates over local issues have come to symbolize the universal problem of the proper relation of man to his environment.

The state's recent "declaration of independence" from federal policies, and its efforts to preserve rather than exploit, go directly back to 1776 and the issue of local freedom versus "imperial" order. All this suggests that the new way of thinking in Colorado is actually the oldest American way, and that the belief in automatic progress that characterized the 1876 Centennial was an aberration. The fact was that Colorado made progress between 1876 and 1976 only by hard work and the lavish application of technology to its refractory ores, its dry soil, and its isolated position.

Stated another way, the combination of despair and nervous hope we show about the future in 1976 would have been better understood by the Americans of 1776, who were about to launch a noble but untried experiment, then it would have been by the
citizens of 1876, who were so sure that the mastery of the future lay in their hands. Perhaps this means that a quiet revolution of sorts is taking place in our heads right now. This new-old way of thinking should remind us, incidentally, of John Adams's famous remark that the real American Revolution had taken place in the minds and hearts of men and women before the first shot was fired.

Many still suspect that those who advocate conservation of resources, wilderness preservation, and a slow-down in economic development are elitist and romantic in their thinking—somewhat as Jefferson seemed to be when he glorified the role of the yeoman farmer. Others worry that the beneficent results of technology are being thrown out with the bad results. And many others feel that cultural pluralism is not the proper substitute for the more traditional national ideologies. Some say it is already too late; that, in the words of a recent critic, all we are doing is rearranging the deck chairs on board the Titanic.

But there are favorable signs as well. Colorado, with its remarkably homogeneous population—in terms of those native to the state—appears to be giving attention to Higham's divergent unities as it discusses the reintroduction of bilingualism to the schools, tries to reestablish community, define new public values, and question the proper use of technology. If a new balance is achieved, the Centennial State could indeed give a meaning to the national Bicentennial, which it still lacks. Even if that should not happen, the return to an honest concern for basic social problems and the willingness to undertake a painful reordering of values suggests that Coloradoans, while celebrating their own Centennial, are trying to preserve rather than to destroy the good life they have achieved; and that, of course, is what the American Revolution was all about.

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"As 1976 begins, the Bicentennial seems almost like an abandoned dream," asserted the editors in a recent issue of the publication USA-200. Despite a decade of planning, "that rare opportunity for the nation to take cognizance of where it has been and to plan creatively for the third century appears to have evolved into a confusing non-event. In this troubled period of our history, there seems to be no real national consensus on how to commemorate the Bicentennial." While such statements may be unduly pessimistic, they reflect some of the essential differences between celebrating the Centennial in 1876 and celebrating the Bicentennial in 1976. Today, although some Americans are traversing the country in bicentennial wagon trains and many more are watching "Bicentennial Minutes" on television, no single event is providing a national focal point. How different it was in 1876! One hundred years ago all eyes were on Philadelphia, where Coloradoans joined other Americans in celebrating the centennial of independence at the grand international exposition in Fairmount Park.

The exhibition that Frank Leslie's Historical Register termed "the culminating effort of a century of grand achievement" had its beginning shortly after the Civil War, when John L. Campbell, then a professor at Wabash College in Indiana, suggested the idea to Philadelphia Mayor Morton McMichael in 1866.
After lobbying by the committees of the Philadelphia Select and Common Councils, the Franklin Institute, and the Pennsylvania legislature that successfully thwarted the efforts of rival communities, the United States Congress passed an act in March 1871 that provided "for celebrating the One Hundredth Anniversary of American Independence, by holding an International Exhibition of Arts, Manufactures, and Products of the Soil and Mine" in Philadelphia in 1876. The legislation authorized the creation of the United States Centennial Commission, to consist of one delegate from each state and territory appointed by the president on nomination of the respective governors; alternate commissioners were to be appointed in the same manner. The commission was to hold its meetings in Philadelphia and to determine suitable opening and closing dates for the exhibition, plans for the buildings, and such matters as customs regulations and procedures for receiving and classifying articles.

Following the terms of the act, Colorado Territorial Governor Edward McCook soon forwarded his nominations for the centennial commission posts to Washington, D.C. For commissioner he selected J. Marshall Paul of Fairplay, a lawyer and former Philadelphian with substantial mining interests, including the Printer Boy Mine in California Gulch. Nominated as the alternate commissioner from Colorado was Nathan Cook Meeker of Greeley. A founder of the Union Colony and the one-time agricultural editor of the New York Tribune, Meeker was well known both locally and nationally and could effectively represent the agricultural interests of the territory.

In March 1872 the centennial commissioners gathered in Philadelphia for their first meeting. It was readily apparent that finances constituted their most serious problem, for Congress had specifically stated that "the United States shall not be liable for any expenses attending such Exhibition." The commissioners therefore decided to apply to Congress for the charter of a corporation to be known as the Centennial Board of Finance, and on 1 June 1872 the appropriate enabling legislation was passed, naming corporators from each state and territory.}

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1 Centennial Commission Reports, 2:107-8; Appendix C, p. 101. This was the official name of the event; it was commonly called either the "Centennial Exhibition" or the "Centennial Exposition." See the "Semantic Note" in John Maass, The Glorious Enterprise: The Centennial Exhibition of 1876 and H. J. Schwatrzman, Architect-in-Chief, History in the Arts (Watering Glen, N.Y.: Published for the Institute for the Study of Universal History through Arts and Artifacts by the American Life Foundation, 1973), 66.


3 Edward McCook to J. Marshall Paul, 7 September 1871, Executive Record, Book 2, p. 103, Colorado State Archives and Records Service, Denver (hereinafter cited as CSA). Paul had come to Colorado in the 1860s and had been active in politics, serving in the territorial legislature. He had also been a trustee of both the Agricultural College of Colorado in Fort Collins and the School of Mines at Golden. He died in New York City two years after the exposition (Denver Daily Rocky Mountain News, 26 May 1878; Jerome C. Smiley, Semi-Centennial History of the State of Colorado, 2 vols. [Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co., 1913], 1:631, 625.

4 McCook to Nathan Meeker, 7 September 1871, Executive Record, Book 2, p. 104, CSA.

5 The 1871 act establishing the commission stated that the alternate commissioner could only assume the duties of the commissioner in his absence. Subsequently, the alternate was authorized to participate in debates and to serve on committees, but he could not vote unless the commissioner was absent (Centennial Commission Reports, 2:Appendix C, p. 109). Meeker was named to the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Live Stock; Paul, to the Standing Committee on Mines and Mining (ibid., 2:114-15).

6 Ibid., 2:109.

7 Ibid., Appendix C, p. 102.

8 Ibid., 102-9. The executive committee of the centennial commission had asked each commissioner to submit names for corporators from his state or territory; those suggested from Colorado were
The board was authorized to issue stock in shares of ten dollars each, not to exceed ten million dollars. Although the generally depressed business conditions in the country following the Panic of 1873 did not provide fertile ground for the sale of the stock, some two and one-half million dollars ultimately was raised in this manner.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition to finances, the commissioners addressed themselves to the myriad details of running an international exposition, issuing a steady stream of proclamations, general regulations, and information for exhibitors. And in appropriate ceremonies on 4 July 1873, the site of the exposition, 450 acres of land in Fairmount Park, was transferred by the park commission to the centennial commissioners.\textsuperscript{13}

As the centennial commissioners and the board of finance directors were meeting in Philadelphia, plans were proceeding on the local level for the representation of individual states and territories at the exposition. Each state or territory, of course, was anxious to “boost” its area in Philadelphia, and Colorado was no exception. In his message to the territorial legislature on 6 January 1874 Territorial Governor Samuel H. Elbert urged the members of the Council and the House to take the necessary action “to spread before the eyes of the world, upon that interesting occasion, the rich products of your farms and mines.” There was no reason, he pointed out, “why Colorado should not compete successfully for supremacy . . . the occasion will be one which we should improve to the full measure of our ability, and which it would be most unwise to neglect as an opportunity of displaying to the world the wealth and resources of our Territory.”\textsuperscript{14} Some two weeks later, the territorial legislative assembly approved a concurrent resolution authorizing the governor to appoint a board of centennial exhibition managers, not to exceed seven in number, to make “a thorough representation of our varied and important industrial and productive interests at the Centennial Exhibition.”\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Edward McCook, Jerome B. Chaffee, James Archer, Henry M. Teller, George M. Chilcott, and William Gilpin. Changes were made by Congress, however, and in the final version only David H. Moffat, Jr., and George M. Chilcott were named to the Centennial Board of Finance from Colorado (ibid., 2:116; Appendix C, p. 106).

\textsuperscript{13} New Jersey subscribed $100,000; New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Delaware, $10,000 each. The state of Pennsylvania and the city of Philadelphia gave another $2,500,000, and a last-minute appropriation in February 1876 of $1,500,000 from the federal government insured that the exposition would open (McCabe, Illustrated History, pp. 286-284).

\textsuperscript{14} Elbert, “To the Members of the Legislature of the Territory of Colorado, 1874,” p. 336 (hereinafter cited as General Laws).

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 175-82.

\textsuperscript{16} Colo., Legislative Assembly, Council Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Colorado, Tenth Session, 1874, p. 18 (hereinafter cited as Council Journal).

\textsuperscript{17} Colo., General Laws, Private Acts, Joint Resolutions, and Memorials, Passed at the Tenth Session.

In February 1874 Elbert made his appointments to the Board of Centennial Exhibition Managers. Those named were William N. Byers, editor of the Denver Rocky Mountain News; A. J. Williams, a Denver businessman and politician; Jose Victor Garcia, a Conejos County pioneer and veteran of several legislative terms; Mahlon D. Thatcher, a Pueblo banker; John A. Coulter, a Georgetown lawyer; Joseph A. Thatcher, a Central City banker; and William R. Howell, a pioneer Boulder County farmer.\textsuperscript{18} Little was accomplished during the remainder of 1874, however, principally because the legislature had appropriated no funds for the board’s work.

In early May 1875 the board members held a major meeting in Denver, electing William N. Byers the permanent chairman and Joseph A. Thatcher secretary. Pointing out that the board “has no exchequer; not a dollar at its command,” the members promised their “united effort” to obtain an appropriation from the territorial legislature at the next session. Meanwhile, admonishing that “we must help ourselves and one another,” they called on the territory’s counties, mining groups, “Industrial, Stock-Growers and Fair associations,” railroads, and individual citizens to provide assistance. “If Colorado is represented at Philadelphia in 1876, it must be by the voluntary contributions and united aid of her citizens.”\textsuperscript{19}

Even before the Board of Centennial Exhibition Managers issued its call for assistance, the miners of Summit County had taken steps to make sure that their area, at least, would be properly represented in Philadelphia. Meeting in Denver on 2 April 1875, they resolved “to organize an association for the purpose of gathering up the minerals and everything of interest in the county, to be forwarded to the Centennial Exposition, under the auspices and management of our own officers.”\textsuperscript{20} Other groups soon followed suit. In August, for example, a centennial association was formed in Boulder County with capital stock of $5,000, the proceeds of the shares to be used for the purchase and transportation of minerals to Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{21}

As Colorado’s planning continued despite the lack of funding, to the east the neighboring state of Kansas was also taking
steps toward its representation at the exposition. On 30 March 1874 Kansas Governor T. A. Osborn appointed five state centennial managers; the following year $5,000 was appropriated toward expenses. By 14 January 1876, when the board transmitted a report to the legislature, the members could point to considerable progress, including the securing of a site in Fairmount Park for the erection of a separate building to house the Kansas displays.20

Meanwhile, activity in Colorado was proceeding along several lines at the beginning of the centennial year. At a meeting of the centennial managers on 3 January 1876, chairman William N. Byers presented correspondence between himself and George T. Anthony, president of the Kansas board, looking to a possible union in the exposition. He was authorized to apply to Kansas for space in that state's building, not to exceed one-half, and to ascertain the terms and the conditions of such a mutual effort.21

The Kansas centennial managers were immediately receptive to Byers's proposition; they had, in fact, been thinking of making overtures to Colorado.22 In mid-January the Kansas board unanimously passed a resolution accepting the Colorado proposal, "believing a joint exhibition of the products of Kansas and Colorado can be made of mutual advantage." Informing Byers of the action, Anthony assured him that "we do not desire you to come in as mere tenants, but as co-workers and just owners in the enterprise—a union of Kansas and Colorado, in sympathy and in ambition, to present the resources, the capabilities and the civilization of our respective territories at Philadelphia in such manner as to do honor to them by commanding the interest and respect of the nations represented at that assembly."23 On 2 March the Kansas board was authorized to contract with the Colorado commissioners for the joint occupancy of the Kansas building; Colorado was to have one-fourth of the structure on payment of one-fourth of the cost.24

As the negotiations continued with Kansas, the Colorado territorial legislature was discussing what further action was needed to insure a successful Colorado exhibit. Speaking to the Council and the House on 5 January 1876, Governor John L. Routt reminded those assembled that many citizens had already begun making preparations for the exposition, and "the Territory should not be tardy in showing the same activity by making an ample appropriation for that object."25 After considerable debate, an act was approved on 11 February 1876 that repealed the concurrent resolution of 1874, appropriated $10,000 toward the costs of the Colorado exhibition, and provided for the appointment of two Colorado commissioners to make all necessary arrangements. They would receive $150 per month, each, from 1 March to 1 November for their work.26

To serve as commissioners Routt appointed two men widely differing in temperament, background, and education, George Q. Richmond and Stephen Decatur.27 Richmond, a thirty-two-year-old native of Maine, had received his law training in Washington, D. C., where he had practiced before coming to Colorado in 1870 and locating in Pueblo.28 In contrast to the conventional young lawyer, Commissioner Decatur was aptly described by Samuel Bowles in 1868 as a man who ranked high "among the individual institutions and idiosyncracies of Colorado."29 Born in New Jersey in 1825, he had migrated westward through Missouri and Nebraska, reaching Colorado during the gold rush. Along the way he had discarded his last name of Bross (his brother was Lieutenant Governor William Bross of Illinois), acquired the title of "Commodore," and left one wife in the East and another in Nebraska. After coming to Colorado he served with Chivington at Sand Creek and had been a member of the territorial legislature.30 Decatur had also been active in centennial affairs for some time. In 1875, for example,

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21 Denver Daily Rocky Mountain News, 4 January 1876.
22 Kansas at the Centennial, p. 205.
23 Denver Daily Rocky Mountain News, 18 January 1876. See also Kansas at the Centennial, pp. 235-36.
24 Kansas at the Centennial, pp. 221, 235. By this time both Colorado and Kansas had reorganized their centennial boards (see below and Kansas at the Centennial, pp. 217-18).
26 General Laws, 1876, pp. 36-37.
27 John L. Routt to the president of the Council, 11 February 1876, Governor's Letterpress Book, 1876-79, CSA.
he had been named chairman of the centennial association formed by the miners of Summit County.\textsuperscript{31} If Byers was disappointed at the dissolution of the first Colorado board, his feelings were not apparent in the pages of the Denver Rocky Mountain News. On 15 February the paper applauded the passage of the centennial legislation and the appointment of Richmond and Decatur, stating that “no one is better able than the Commodore” to represent the territory’s mining resources at Philadelphia. On this as on other occasions, Byers pointed out the necessity of sending the best possible mineral exhibit to the exposition from Colorado, for “it is on her mines that her hopes for future prosperity rest... Her mining interests are the only ones that are calculated to represent her in the best light.”\textsuperscript{32} Decatur and Richmond echoed such sentiments in a statement they issued soon after their appointment. Speaking of Colorado’s resources, advantages, and progress, they warned that “a failure to prove to the world that our repeated declarations regarding its resources are true, will reflect discredit upon every citizen, and will be used as an argument against us by the inhabitants of every state and territory in the union; will deter foreign capital; retard our progress and discourage capitalists now in our midst.” Asking for an additional $5,000 to be raised from private sources, they exhorted: “Colorado took the prize at the Paris Exposition—shall we be surpassed in our own country?”\textsuperscript{33}

With the passage of the new legislation and the appointment of the Colorado commissioners, preparations for Colorado’s exhibits at Philadelphia at last swung into high gear. In Denver the proprietors of the Inter-Ocean Hotel gave the commissioners a room for use as an office,\textsuperscript{34} while the Colorado Central freight depot was made available for the reception of products destined for Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{35} Headquarters for the southern part of the territory were established in Pueblo.\textsuperscript{36} Because the legislative appropriation was not immediately available in cash, several banks agreed to advance money as needed without interest.\textsuperscript{37} On 26 February Commissioner Richmond left “on a flying trip” to Philadelphia; when he returned a month later he reported that arrangements were progressing well and that the contract had been let for the Kansas-Colorado building.\textsuperscript{38}

In March the commissioners issued a second appeal to Colorado citizens, urging them to “send immediately your articles and products which you intend for exhibition.” The “finest specimens of every kind of product” were desired, “everything which will picture to the universal world at the Centennial exhibition what Colorado is doing in the progress of civilization.”\textsuperscript{39}

Results were soon forthcoming, as interested Coloradans intensified their efforts on behalf of the territorial exhibition. In April ten boxes from Jefferson County containing fire clay, brick, copper, iron, lava, uranium, and other such specimens were received, a collection credited largely to the efforts of E. L. Berthoud and to the faculty and the students of the School of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] Denver Daily Rocky Mountain News, 3 April 1875.
\item[32] Ibid., 15 February 1876. Byers was not the only newspaper editor with a booster spirit; of course, Frank Hall of the Daily Central City Register also actively promoted Colorado’s representation at Philadelphia (see Carl Abbott, Colorado: A History of the Centennial State [Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1976], p. 36).
\item[33] Ibid., 19 March 1876.
\item[34] Pueblo Colorado Chieftain, 20 February 1876.
\item[35] The First National Bank, Colorado National Bank, and City National Bank of Denver pledged $5,000 each, while the Exchange Bank and German Bank of Denver, the First National of Central City, and the First National of Pueblo promised $1,000 each (Denver Daily Rocky Mountain News, 26 February 1876).
\item[36] Ibid., 24 March 1876.
\item[37] Denver Daily Tribune, 18 March 1876.
\end{footnotes}
Superintendent of Schools Horace Hale was busy collecting photographs of schoolhouses for display; some twenty buildings, all constructed since 1870, would be represented. On Larimer Street shoppers could see the exhibit destined for Philadelphia in Richards and Company book and stationery store, which included scenic views by Denver photographer William G. Chamberlain mounted in black walnut and gilt frames, especially manufactured by Avery Gallup of Gallup's Palace Bazaar. To the south, Major Henry McAllister of Colorado Springs had a cabinet constructed of Colorado wood to house mineral specimens from the area. Lined with mirrors, it featured circular revolving shelves bracketed by carved figures on either side representing 1776 and 1876.

Not content merely to sit and wait in Denver, Commissioners Decatur and Richmond conducted several field trips throughout the territory. By mid-April, for example, Richmond reported a good deal of progress in collecting articles in southern Colorado, ranging from specimens of iron, coal, and coke to a barrel “made of Colorado wood, with silver-plated hoops, and handsomely painted” containing flour made of Colorado wheat. And Commissioner Decatur’s haul from a trip to Greeley and Evans included more flour, a harness set made by a Mrs. Adams, “an oil painting executed by Miss Thurza Flower,” and “buffalo robes dressed and painted at a Greeley tannery.”

In early May Commissioner Decatur dispatched three railroad cars filled with Colorado materials to Philadelphia; each was emblazoned with the slogan “Colorado Centennial Freight.” Two more carloads left the territory on 6 June, filled with sixteen thousand pounds of coal “in convenient chunks,” ores from Boulder and Park counties, a “barrel of plaster paris” from southern Colorado, and “a mountain sheep, rigged out and mounted in the best art of the taxidermist.”

Even as the Colorado commissioners were shipping the last of the Colorado exhibit to Philadelphia, crowds of visitors were already enjoying the centennial spectacle in Fairmount Park, which had been officially opened on 10 May by President Ulysses...
S. Grant and the ranking celebrity, Dom Pedro, Emperor of Brazil.\textsuperscript{48} They came on the trains that arrived every few minutes at the Reading and Pennsylvania Central depots erected near the grounds, on street cars from the city (fare: seven cents), or in carriages (fare: fifty cents). "It was a lively scene," recalled Nathan Meeker after he returned to Greeley. "All were dressed in their best, they had come to the great Centennial, the 100th year of the Nation; while across from the Main Entrance on a balcony of the Second Story of a fine building, was a steam piano, or Calliope which constantly played national & lively airs that were heard at least two miles away."\textsuperscript{49}

Once inside the grounds (on payment of a fifty-cent fee), centennial tourists could visit the five principal buildings (the Main Building, the Machinery Hall, the Horticultural Hall, the Memorial Hall, and the Agricultural Hall) as well as numerous smaller structures, including the various state buildings. For twenty-five cents they could go to the top of an observatory on George's Hill and see a view stretching for thirty miles, a sight that Coloradoans, commented Meeker, "were in the habit of saying was far inferior to what at any time we could see for nothing at home in the twinkling of an eye."\textsuperscript{50} Numerous restaurants offered fare for the hungry visitor at various prices. According to Meeker, however, the eating facilities left something to be desired. "Almost every article was adulterated," he remembered; "the sugar was part flour, the milk & other drinks were weak, coffee & tea were slops, meat was gristley & poor, pies were leathery or squasy, in short, swindling was the rule. At the few places where the food was good it cost five cents a mouthful."\textsuperscript{51}

Most of the state buildings were located west of Belmont Avenue on a street known as "State Avenue," although some, including the Kansas-Colorado building, were situated to the south and east.\textsuperscript{52} The 1876 centennial exhibition was the first international exposition to feature such separate structures; the Kansas-Colorado building was one of the few that actually contained exhibits, as most states elected to contribute displays in one of the main buildings. Each state building, however, had a state register, where residents could record their visit to the Centennial, and furnished a resting place where the weary could "retreat for repose after some hours of whirl in the great buildings, and to discuss with one another the special State topics that interest them."\textsuperscript{53} At least one reporter, however, took a more jaundiced view. The Kansas-Colorado building, he stated, was the only one "that has any sensible object in its erection. The others are merely post offices and loafing places for the State people, who are fearfully bored with the hundreds of outsiders who walk in and around, asking all sorts of questions and prying into every niche and closet."\textsuperscript{54}

Although no formal ceremonies were held, by early June much of the Kansas-Colorado building was open to the public. Constructed in the form of a cross, it contained not only the Kansas and Colorado displays, but also exhibits furnished by the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, which had contracted for one-tenth of the space.\textsuperscript{55} Forty-two flags fluttered in the breeze from the top of the building, and the wide porch circling the structure provided a comfortable place for visitors to rest in the shade.

\textsuperscript{49} Nathan Meeker, "The Centennial of 1876," 7 December 1876, p. 12, Box 7, Nathan Meeker Papers, SHSC.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{52} Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Iowa, Missouri, Rhode Island, California, New York, and Mississippi were on State Avenue. The other state buildings were New Jersey, Arkansas, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Kansas-Colorado.
\textsuperscript{53} "Almost every article was adulterated," he remembered; "the sugar was part flour, the milk & other drinks were weak, coffee & tea were slops, meat was gristley & poor, pies were leathery or squasy, in short, swindling was the rule. At the few places where the food was good it cost five cents a mouthful."\textsuperscript{51}
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\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{56} Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Iowa, Missouri, Rhode Island, California, New York, and Mississippi were on State Avenue. The other state buildings were New Jersey, Arkansas, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Kansas-Colorado.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{59} "Almost every article was adulterated," he remembered; "the sugar was part flour, the milk & other drinks were weak, coffee & tea were slops, meat was gristley & poor, pies were leathery or squasy, in short, swindling was the rule. At the few places where the food was good it cost five cents a mouthful."\textsuperscript{51}
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{61} Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Iowa, Missouri, Rhode Island, California, New York, and Mississippi were on State Avenue. The other state buildings were New Jersey, Arkansas, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Kansas-Colorado.
Kansas occupied the north and south wings, connected by a center rotunda. Suspended from the ceiling was a facsimile of the Liberty Bell eight feet ten inches in diameter, made of broom corn, German millet, wheat, sorghum, and flax. At the north end was a large map of Kansas, measuring thirteen by twenty-four feet, which rested on a pedestal containing one thousand glass bottles filled with grains or soils from the various counties. Over the map was a facsimile of the Kansas coat of arms painted on glass, which radiated beams made of Kansas cotton and yellow grains in alternating rays of white and gold. In mid-September certain changes were made so that fall produce could be displayed, the most striking being the addition of a “dome of apples” in the rotunda. Representing the Capitol in Washington, D.C., the dome was nineteen feet high and was entirely covered with apples. It rested on a cruciform-shaped table also covered with apples and was surrounded by a bench displaying pumpkins, beets, sweet potatoes, and ears of corn, interspersed with signs warning the curious to keep “hands off.”

The Liberty Bell, the dome of apples, and other displays such as towering “hills of corn” all made their contributions in demonstrating to doubting Easterners that Kansas farmers indeed knew how to make the desert bloom. “It was amusing to see the skepticism of visitors,” reported Kansas officials later. “Old farmers of the rich valleys of Pennsylvania doubted the evidences of their own senses. They thought they had seen corn, and raised corn, and knew what corn was; but this, they said, ‘was spliced.’ So they took their knives and searched for the artificial joint. But, like Thomas of old, they were at last convinced.”

As Kansas was particularly anxious to display her agricultural resources to best advantage, so Colorado was especially desirous to show off her mineral resources and impress prospective investors. The west wing of the building was devoted to the Colorado exhibits, and here the visitor could see cases filled with all of the specimens so assiduously collected by Richmond and Decatur. On separate blocks stood huge boulders of...
silver-bearing galena, while outside on the veranda were blocks of coal from Boulder, Canon City, and Trinidad that were too large to be taken inside. At least one scientist was impressed; William M. Gabb of Philadelphia wrote that Colorado had made “a splendid showing of enormously rich gold and silver ores.... If even the estimated value be reduced by one-half, the future of Colorado must leave both California and Nevada in the shade.”

Forming a background to the mineral displays were framed photographs and paintings, including an oil entitled *A View of the Entrance Gate to the Garden of the Gods* by Pueblo artist Joseph Hitchins. A sales stand offered photographs and “mineral curiosities,” such as small jewel boxes covered with Colorado ores. Overhead arched streamers of red, white, and blue, lending an appropriately festive and patriotic air.

Although Colorado’s mineral displays were well received, by far the most successful part of the exhibit was that devoted to “Mrs. Maxwell’s Museum.” Calling her “a modern Diana,” a Philadelphia reporter commented that “if there is any one person who at such a place as an international exhibition can be regarded as the observed of all observers it is Mrs. Maxwell.”

Nathan Meeker was not exaggerating when he wrote that “her Collection was what first began to be talked about in distant places, and which induced many who otherwise would not have gone, to make the journey, & her fame increased every day to the last week and the last day.”

The object of these comments was a tiny woman named Martha Dartt Maxwell. In 1860 she and her husband James had come to Colorado, living in such mining camps as Mountain City and Nevadaville before settling in Boulder. A chance encounter on some Maxwell land with a claim jumper who had stuffed and mounted some birds led to her ever-increasing interest in the art of taxidermy. By 1870 she was exhibiting at the territorial fair, and in 1873 she had opened a “museum” in Boulder.
At the Centennial her display comprised almost four hundred birds and over one hundred mammals, all artfully arranged among trees, boulders, and streams against the north wall of the Colorado wing. Visitors outdid themselves in trying to describe the landscape. “There are eagles, doves, owls, opossums, hedgehogs, rabbits on their hind legs, squirrels, goats, bears, panthers, deer, and so on, all a good deal occupied in preying upon each other, or being preyed upon. The water falls into a pool full of fish, where a tortoise sits all day upon a stone; around we must fancy the plains, for there are its wild denizens,—snakes, prairie-dogs, buffaloes.” So lifelike did animals like the small rat terrier seem that “the Emperor of Brazil, like many others, was deceived, and tried to whistle the little favorite from a stare that proved to be only life’s charming but stony counterfeit.”

Although in front of the exhibit stood a modest placard with the words “Woman’s Work,” many found it difficult to believe that a woman was responsible. When Mrs. Maxwell’s sister Mary Dartt volunteered to take a turn at the display she was bombarded by questions: “How could a woman do it? What did she do it for? Did she kill any of the animals?” Disbelief ran high. “I don’t believe them critters was shot; I’ve looked ’em all over and I can’t see any holes. Did she pisen ’em?” Women especially seemed to find it hard to comprehend that a member of their own sex had accomplished such feats. One reporter overheard the following conversation: “‘Six hundred animals, and all stuffed by one woman,’ said a fair neighbor, breathlessly. ‘Wall,—don’ b’lieve that!’ said her fair companion after due deliberation.”

Some wondered why Mrs. Maxwell’s exhibit was not on display in the separate Women’s Pavilion nearby. In fact, according to one report, she had written in 1875 for permission to take part in the Women’s Pavilion exhibits but had received no reply. By the time she received a letter (her correspondence had been overlooked, she was told), her arrangements had already been completed with the Colorado commissioners. Many observers felt that Mrs. Maxwell’s skills would have been a welcome addi-

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“Kansas at the Centennial,” p. 273.
Ibid., p. 8.
Crawfordsville (Ind.) Saturday Mercury, 29 July 1876, Centennial Clippings, 16:54.
tion to the Women's Pavilion, whose exhibits Meeker characterized as having been made by "rich women who had plenty of time, & who never learned to make useful things."³⁷³ Similarly, an eastern reporter commented that Mrs. Maxwell's exhibit would have been a "truthful addition" to the Women's Pavilion, showing what a woman could do "when the necessity is laid upon her."³⁷⁴ Perhaps it was just as well, however, that any plans to be part of the Women's Pavilion fell through. "Just imagine her over among the frippery and gewgaws of the Women's Pavilion," scoffed a Washington commentator.³⁷⁵

Mrs. Maxwell's relations with the Colorado commissioners, however, were not wholly smooth or without controversy. She had been promised that her expenses would be paid and that she could sell photographs of herself and her collections to raise additional funds. According to Meeker, "first she was forbidden to sell any pictures by the Colorado Commissioners, but she paid no attention to the order. Next, the money was exhausted, & her board was not paid."³⁷⁶ Although eventually arrangements were made with the Centennial Photographic Company, which held a monopoly on exhibition views, the firm was never able to supply her with as many photographs as she could sell, thus cutting down on the income she might have realized.³⁷⁷

Such difficulties, however, cast only slight shadows over what seems to have been a happy experience for Mrs. Maxwell, profitable both for her and for Colorado. It was not likely, concluded Meeker, "that Colorado will ever pay Mrs. Maxwell all it owes her."³⁷⁸

All in all, in fact, the Colorado commissioners could take pardonable pride in the success of the exhibit. Colorado reporters could be expected to be favorably impressed with the territory's displays. More impartial evidence that the Kansas-Colorado building was one of the noteworthy features of the exposition comes from such eastern writers as the correspondent for the Hartford Daily Courant, who said that the joint building was "visited as is no other." If it did not succeed in increasing immigration, "it will not be because the people of those states have failed to set forth a seductive invitation in the collection of grains, fruits, and other products with which their large building is stored."³⁷⁹ And in providing a "moderate man's guide to the Exhibition," a reporter for the New York Herald advised those planning to visit the Centennial that they "must not miss" the Agricultural Hall and the Kansas-Colorado building, saying that next to the Main Building they were "the most interesting and valuable to the casual observer, whom I am advising."³⁸⁰

Both Decatur and Richmond were usually on hand during the time the Kansas-Colorado building was open, as were United States commissioners Meeker and Paul.³⁸¹ The Commodore particularly enjoyed holding forth in the Colorado reception room; a News correspondent wrote that he "is very generally reported by the attendants here to keep an eye constantly on the outlook for the comfort of lady visitors."³⁸² The commissioners had evidently spared no expense in decorating the reception room; fine paintings and photographs graced the walls, and there were comfortable lounges, sofas, and a piano.³⁸³ It was, said a Philadelphia reporter, "in point of fact an elegant drawing room, the decorations being luxurious in the extreme."³⁸⁴

Commissioner Richmond also apparently enjoyed himself at the exposition, for it was during his months in Philadelphia that he met Miss Jennie Siner, whom he later married.³⁸⁵ It was also while he was in Philadelphia that he received word of his nomination on the Democratic ticket as attorney general of Colorado, an election he lost the following November by only a few hundred votes.³⁸⁶

Although most of the Colorado exhibits were in the Kansas-

³⁷⁴ [Chicago] Interior, 27 July 1876, Centennial Clippings, 15:162.
³⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-23; Dart, On the Plains, pp. 210-11.
³⁷⁸ Meeker, "The Centennial of 1876," p. 23. After the close of the exposition Mrs. Maxwell's collection was displayed in Washington, D.C., where the naturalist Elliott Coues prepared an annotated list of the mammals, later published as an appendix in On the Plains (see Michael J. Brodhead, "A Naturalist in the Colorado Rockies, 1876," The Colorado Magazine 62 [Summer 1976]:196-97). For an account of the fate of Mrs. Maxwell's collection, see the report written in 1924 by Mary Dart Thompson, "What Became of Mrs. Maxwell's Natural History Collection?" typescript, SHSC.
³⁷⁹ Hartford Daily Courant, 1 October 1876, Centennial Clippings, 8:175.
³⁸⁰ New York Herald, 4 September 1876, Centennial Clippings, 96:33-36.
³⁸³ Kansas at the Centennial, p. 270.
³⁸⁴ Philadelphia Press, 19 August 1876, Centennial Clippings, 17:225. Such descriptions raise interesting questions about the use of the centennial funds by the Colorado commissioners, particularly in the light of the dispute with Mrs. Maxwell. No records survive in the Colorado State Archives to shed light on this issue, as John Routt pointed out in his message to the Colorado General Assembly in November 1876, the act of February 1876 "does not require the commissioners to make report of their expenditures or transactions, hence I am not officially informed in regard to what they have done" (Message of His Excellency, John L. Routt, Governor of Colorado, to the First General Assembly of the State: Delivered November 3, 1876, 1876, p. 19).
³⁸⁵ History of the Arkansas Valley, p. 811; Denver Rocky Mountain News, 18 July 1876.
³⁸⁶ Denver Rocky Mountain News, 15 September 1876, Centennial Clippings, 22:45. The final tally was 13,182 votes for Richmond, 13,729 for his opponent A. J. Sampson (R. G. Dill, The Political Campaign of Colorado, with Complete Tabulated Statements of the Official Vote [Denver: John Dove, 1905], p. 27).
Colorado building, the territory did participate in a few "collective" exhibits, including the display of "ores, minerals, and metallurgical products" in the nearby United States Government Building. Here too were models of the southwestern cliff dwellings in the United States Geological Survey exhibit, presided over by the artist, the young photographer William Henry Jackson.

Indeed, there was something for everyone in Philadelphia, and the crowds continued to come, more slowly at first (due in part to the extremely hot weather at the beginning of the summer), and then in greater numbers. Ten states held "state days" on the exposition grounds, and each state or territory was requested to appoint an orator to deliver an address "upon its history, progress, present condition, and resources." J. Marshall Paul was named "Centennial Orator" for Colorado, but apparently his speech was never delivered.

As would be expected, the centennial Fourth of July was celebrated in grand style, with ceremonies culminating in the reading of the Declaration of Independence from the original manuscript at Independence Hall. From the Colorado contingent at the exposition Stephen Decatur sent a telegram to Governor Routt: "'Are we a State?' Answer." Back came the reply from the Colorado Fourth of July observances on the banks of the South Platte River: "We are. The Centennial State, and twenty thousand here assembled, send joyful greetings to the sister States of the American Union, represented at Philadelphia this ever glorious Fourth."

Another important ceremony took place on 27 September, when many of the centennial exposition awards were presented in the Judges' Pavilion. In a departure from tradition, only a uniform bronze medal was given, instead of first, second, and third prizes. An accompanying written report by the judges set forth the "inherent and comparative" merits of the winning displays or products, which were divided into various groups. There was no limit to the number of awards that might be given in a particular category, and indeed, of some thirty thousand exhibitors, over thirteen thousand, or close to fifty percent, received awards.

In Group I ("Minerals, Mining, and Metallurgy, Including the Machinery") medals were awarded to the School of Mines for its geological collection, to the state of Colorado for a "fine exhibit of coal," to John Evans for "the good color and texture of the blocks of red and white sandstone exhibited," to the state for lead, silver, and gold ores collected by Richmond and Decatur, and to sixteen mines or mining companies. Colorado also received an award for its "tastefully arranged exhibit," and Kansas and Colorado were jointly commended "for a very large and commodious joint State building, of excellent design, and especially well suited to the purposes for which it was constructed." Mrs. Maxwell earned a separate citation "for a very large and exceedingly interesting collection of wild animals and birds of the Rocky Mountain region."

And then it was all over. Six months after President Grant had started the huge Corliss Engine in Machinery Hall came the closing ceremonies on 10 November. Officials of the centennial commission and the board of finance spoke, Beethoven's Fifth Symphony was played, the chorus sang the "Hallelujah Chorus" and "America," and forty-seven guns, representing each state and territory, fired a salute. Finally, the president declared that the "International Exhibition of Arts, Manufactures, and Products of the Soil and Mine" had come to a close.

There remained only the disposition of the city that had grown up among the hills and valleys of Fairmount Park; today,
only the Ohio building, which will function as an information center for the park, and the Memorial Hall are left. Many of the buildings were sold at auction, the Kansas-Colorado building among them. The structure was purchased for $800 by two hotelkeepers named Thomas H. Kennedy and David H. Wilson, who were developing a section of Ocean Beach, New Jersey, into a resort. Here the Kansas-Colorado building continued life as the Colorado Hotel, with a capacity of 350 people, until it was destroyed by fire in October 1922.

Was it all worth it? Most Coloradans in 1876 would have answered in the affirmative. In contrast to the antigrowth sentiments expressed by many of the state's residents today, one hundred years ago Coloradans were anxious to bring tourists and settlers to the area and to encourage eastern and foreign capitalists to invest in the mines. If Colorado's sixteen mining awards did not equal the thirty-seven given to Nevada, still the minerals on exhibition had drawn much favorable comment; "in many respects, [it was] the most wonderful collection of gold ores in the Exhibition," said the Engineering and Mining Journal. Mrs. Maxwell's display, of course, had been one of the high points of the entire centennial exposition. While it is impossible to find objective measurements of the success or failure of their efforts, on the whole Coloradans were probably pleased with the impression they had made at Philadelphia, and, with statehood achieved, they could find much cause for pride in their accomplishments as the year 1876 came to a close.

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98 Philadelphia Times, 28 November 1876, Centennial Clippings, 21:159.
In 1876, the year that troops of the Seventh Cavalry fell at the Little Big Horn in Montana, Thomas M. Patterson, while fighting for Colorado's admission as a state, politically ambushed the presidential hopes of his own Democratic party. Destined to become a controversial figure in a public career that spanned forty years, Patterson had migrated from Indiana to Denver in 1872 and quickly established a reputation as a talented and combative attorney. During his later experience as a United States congressman and a senator, an editor of the Denver Rocky Mountain News, and a political activist, Patterson steadily became involved in the major issues of his times.¹ He succeeded in making the Democratic party a viable force in Colorado politics, briefly but effectively allied himself with Populism, fought for the causes of bimetallism and organized labor, and opposed corporate influence in political and economic affairs. However, during the 1870s when his preoccupation lay in defending the West from what he regarded as exploitation by the East, the young Patterson functioned as a supreme sectionalist. A divided Republican party contributed to Patterson's first election to national office and placed him in the thick of Colorado's fight for statehood. Moreover, without internal dissension in the ranks of the majority Republicans, it seems doubtful that any Colorado Democrat could have been successful in seeking a major office in 1874.² In addition to being a minority,

the Democrats impressed one visiting contemporary observer as a party with virtually "no organization." However, if the Democrats were poorly organized, the Republicans staggered under the weight of serious factionalism. During the 1860s a commercial and political rivalry had developed between Denver and Golden. It centered around railway construction and control of the territorial Republican political machinery. Jerome B. Chaffee spoke for the "Denver Ring" while Henry Moore Teller led the "Golden Gang," and Colorado politics tended to pivot around the careers of these two men and their associates.

Republican territorial delegate Chaffee had enjoyed a close personal relationship with President Ulysses S. Grant's territorial appointees. However, an apparent breakdown in the relationship occurred after Chaffee reportedly quarreled with Grant over a poker game, and the president began to remove Chaffee's friends from their influential positions. Among the casualties was Samuel H. Elbert, removed from the position of territorial governor and replaced by Edward M. McCook, in spite of evidence that McCook had robbed the government of nearly $30,000. In Washington, D.C., Chaffee led the fight to prevent the confirmation of McCook and, failing in that, set out to arouse public indignation in Colorado against misgovernment by federal appointees. He called for statehood for Colorado to eliminate the influence of the president on territorial affairs. However, Teller blamed all the trouble on Chaffee and defended Grant.

Thus, the Colorado Republicans met on 5 August 1874 with their ranks severely divided between the McCook and the Chaffee factions. Following a lengthy and bitter struggle, the

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5 New York Times, 3 June 1874.
6 For a complete picture of the Republican split, see Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller: Defender of the West (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1941), pp. 62-94.
7 Ibid., p. 89.
8 McCook alienated portions of the political community through favoritism, especially to his brother-in-law James B. Thompson, who lined his pockets while a special agent to the Ute (Thomas F. Dawson, "Major Thompson, Chief Ouray, and the Utes," The Colorado Magazine 7 [May 1890]:113-22; Carl Ubelohde, Maxine Benson, and Duane A. Smith, A Colorado History, 3d ed. [Boulder, Colo.: Pruett Publishing Co., 1972], p. 142).
nomination for territorial delegate finally went to a supposedly neutral compromise candidate, H.P.H. Bromwell, but Bromwell soon became a favorite of the McCook faction.9

Meanwhile, delighted over the disarray in the Republican party, the Democrats met in Colorado Springs. For months Patterson had worked diligently to increase his influence in the party. On 3 March 1874 he helped draw up a resolution calling for a revitalized party, which could become a serious political force in the state. During the Denver City Democratic Convention he held a position on the Credentials and Organizational Committee and presented the committee report to the convention. On 15 April he drew praise from the Denver press as a lawyer of "marked ability" who could not fail to make an efficient officer.10 Encouraged by this growing attention, Patterson announced his candidacy for the office of territorial delegate, joining a stampede of nine relatively obscure candidates, each one eager to capitalize on the Republican split. Following a tedious-two-two ballots, Patterson secured the necessary two-thirds total to win.11 In his acceptance speech, he criticized President Grant for having appointed carpetbaggers, thieves, and robbers to high territorial office, but he warned that the Democrats could not rely on Republican dissension alone, and he urged his followers to "enunciate doctrines of government which commend themselves to the conscience and humanity of the people."12 The evidence indicates that Patterson understood the political implications of the Republican split for Democratic aspirations.

Patterson’s nomination displeased some Democrats, especially those who resented his success while still a relative newcomer to Colorado. In addition, Patterson had attracted the support of many young people in the party, and for a time it appeared that the Democrats would duplicate the intraparty fight plaguing the Republicans. Some disgruntled Democrats persuaded Colonel Albert Gallatin Boone to run as an independent candidate, a move which threatened to split the Democratic vote. However, Boone soon withdrew from the race, and the Democrats achieved a shaky solidarity.13 The New York Times correspondent in Denver reported that the Democrats were "showing better organization and doing more work" than ever before, while the Colorado Republicans were "pulling harder than ever in opposite directions."14

As the campaign progressed, Patterson and Bromwell avoided personal invective, but the race also struck observers as exceedingly dull.15 One Democrat called his party’s platform “as dead as the clammy vapor of a toad’s dungeon,” and he did not care for Patterson any better than the platform. The Denver Rocky Mountain News asserted that the only two qualities displayed by Patterson were “cheek” and “talk,” and the paper also itemized major “blunders” committed by the fledgling politician, including a failure to exploit the dissension within the Republican party. However, by early September even the News conceded that Patterson had learned his lessons well and appeared to be a more attractive candidate than he had been earlier in the campaign. Moreover, Patterson proved to be a tireless candidate, at one point stumping in fifteen towns scattered over the state within a period of twenty-one days.16

As election day approached, a feeling seemed to grow among the citizens of Colorado that a Democratic victory would constitute a properly stinging rebuke to President Grant and his "carpetbag" federal appointees. As a result of the ground swell of antiadministration feeling, the internal troubles of the Republicans, and his own improvement as a candidate, Patterson won the election. He carried nineteen out of twenty-five counties in defeating Bromwell by a vote of 9,333 to 7,170, and he became the first Democratic territorial delegate to go to Congress from Colorado.17

Patterson arrived in Washington, D.C., in January of 1875, fired with the enthusiasm of victory and determined to wage a serious battle for Colorado statehood. His wife Katherine cheered him on from Denver, writing, “Hurrah for Colorado! Is the first cry I send you across our plains... if there be any hesitating eyes which hold her trembling in the balance, your voice will let them hesitate no longer.”18 Patterson plunged into

10 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 4 March, 8, 16 April 1874.
12 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 26, 27 July 1874.
13 Boone, a grandson of Daniel Boone, had spent most of his life trading with Indian tribes of the Rocky Mountains and had been in government service. At the time of his nomination he operated a small store on Blake Street in Denver and was seventy years old (Frank Hall, History of the State of Colorado, 4 vols. [Chicago: Blakely Printing Co., 1880], 2:259).
14 New York Times, 3 August 1874.
15 The News sarcastically declared that it had engaged a corps of shorthand reporters to spell each other during the speeches and advised crowds to fortify themselves with crackers and cheese and "take an armchair for an occasional snooze" (Denver Rocky Mountain News, 19 August 1874).
16 Ibid., 3, 18, 26 August, 2 September 1874.
17 Ditt, Political Campaigns of Colorado, pp. 8, 7.
18 Katherine M. Patterson, Denver, Colorado, to Thomas M. Patterson, Washington, D.C., 15 February 1875, Thomas M. Patterson Family Papers, Western Historical Collections, University of Colorado, Boulder (hereinafter cited as Patterson Papers).
action even before he had been officially installed in his new position, laboring zealously for the passage of the enabling act that would bring the territory into the union. He formed an alliance with the outgoing delegate from Colorado, Republican Chaffee, in which each man would recruit votes from his respective party.¹⁹

However, Patterson faced a serious problem in trying to convince his fellow Democrats in Congress that admission of Colorado at that time was desirable from a partisan viewpoint. The presidential election of 1876 loomed as a close race. The proposed new state’s electoral votes, thus, might become crucial, and Colorado had been thoroughly and traditionally Republican. In later years Patterson, recalling the difficult situation he faced, noted that the Republicans had practically made the admission of Colorado a Republican party measure. For that reason, said Patterson, the Democrats had “lined themselves up almost solidly in opposition.”²⁰

Patterson’s strategy involved offering himself as living proof that the fortunes of the Colorado Democratic party were on the upswing and that the state would indeed go Democratic, not Republican, in the national election of 1876. Pursuing this course energetically, by mid-February Patterson believed he had made significant progress with a few key Democrats. He wrote to Katherine that he had persuaded several senators and congressmen to recognize his views as sound and to promise him their support for statehood.²¹ Years later he conceded that some Democratic congressmen had regarded him as “something of a nuisance,” but he expressed satisfaction that he had persevered until he and Chaffee could count the necessary votes to assure consideration and passage of the enabling act.²² For his part, Chaffee recognized that some Democratic votes would be necessary, but Patterson’s success made Chaffee’s task more formidable. Working diligently, the Colorado Republican successfully held in line some Republican congressmen who feared that Patterson’s presence really did portend a Democratic shift in Colorado.²³ Ultimately, the Patterson-Chaffee alliance produced enough strength so that the House of Representatives, concurring on Senate amendments of minor importance, passed the Colorado Enabling Act by a slim margin of five votes. The necessary two-thirds majority included eleven House Democrats, an unexpectedly large number for a decision that was supposed to be along strict party lines.²⁴ When President Grant signed the Colorado Enabling Act in March 1875, the Colorado press responded with great enthusiasm.²⁵

Thus, both Chaffee and Patterson argued effectively for Colorado statehood, with each man sincerely convinced that his political party would control Colorado’s electoral votes in 1876. While Patterson recognized that his victory had been partly the result of the Republican dissension, he had not particularly exploited that issue during the campaign. Rather, he had urged his party to take a positive approach to improving its own image, and he must have been impressed by his fifty-seven to forty-nine percent margin of victory, an edge that undoubtedly reinforced his considerable self-confidence. Moreover, any suspicion that Patterson simply placed Colorado statehood above what would be electorally wise for the Democrats in 1876 fades when measured against the language of his private correspondence. At one point he accused the Republicans of using delaying tactics to postpone statehood for Colorado until after the election of 1876. He wrote Katherine that

*if the state bill should fail, it will be from the treachery of its professed friends in the Republican Party. The danger is, that in their anxiety to saddle the southern states with a military tyranny so that the next election may be secured, our Republican Senators will forget the justice due to Colorado.*²⁶

²¹ Patterson, Washington, D.C., to Katherine M., Denver, Colorado, 16 February 1875, Patterson Papers.
²² Stone, History of Colorado, 1:425.
²⁴ U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 43rd Cong., 2d sess., 1875, pt. 3:3279 (hereinafter cited as “Congressional Record”).
²⁵ Denver Republican, 4, 5 March 1875; Denver Rocky Mountain News, 4, 5 March 1875.
²⁶ Patterson, Washington, D.C., to Katherine M., Denver, Colorado, 2 February 1875, Patterson Papers.
It seems clear that both Patterson and some Republicans believed that Colorado’s first electors could well be Democrats, but whatever Patterson’s motivations, most Colorado historians agree that he exerted an important influence in the passage of the enacting act.27

Patterson continued his efforts on behalf of statehood in other ways. Elements of the eastern press, particularly in New England, greeted the potential entry of Colorado with undisguised hostility. Editorials and articles decried the bill, one such attack describing Coloradoans as roving hordes of adventurers with vagrant habits and semibarbarous.28 Patterson endeavored to counter such feelings by making several speaking tours proclaiming the merits of Colorado, one of which took him through much of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. After the Boston Post carried one of his speeches, Patterson reassured his family in Denver, “We have been everywhere received and treated splendidly and I think I have done some good.”29

Meanwhile, the Colorado Constitutional Convention, meeting from December 1875 through March 1876 faced a major problem in covering convention expenses. Patterson, responding to a plea from the convention, succeeded in securing a $20,000 appropriation from Congress to alleviate the difficulty. His efforts brought him a special citation from the convention.30

Shortly before the vote in Colorado to ratify the proposed state constitution, statehood supporters became worried over a rumor that a determined last-minute opposition might arise because of the anticipated expense of financing and operating a state government.31 Consequently, on election day, 1 July 1876, many statehood advocates voted at more than one polling place. Although these fears proved groundless, Patterson’s law partner, Charles S. Thomas, expressed satisfaction that no formal challenge of the election results occurred, inasmuch as a contested election would have exposed “much chicanery.”32 Following ratification of the state constitution and a proclamation by President Grant, Colorado officially achieved statehood on 1 August 1876. A jubilant Patterson telegraphed, “I greet the Centennial State—the latest but the brightest star in the political firmament. I am proud . . . of representing the grandest state, the bravest men, and the handsomest women on the continent.”33

Once in the union, Colorado raced to qualify and participate in the national election of 1876, only a few weeks away. The state constitution provided for direct election of electors by the people after 1876. However, in order to save legitimately the three electoral votes in 1876, the Colorado General Assembly (the state legislature) was allowed to make the selection of the electors in 1876, and the Republicans controlled the state legislature, thus doomed Patterson’s promise to the congressional Democrats.34

Colorado had narrowly qualified to participate in what turned out to be the most disputed presidential election in United States history. As anticipated by both national parties, the race was close. The respectable Rutherford B. Hayes, burdened by the moral bankruptcy of the Grant administration, appeared to have lost to the Democratic reform candidate, Samuel J. Tilden of New York. Tilden piled up a popular plurality of 250,000 votes and led the electoral count 184 to 165 with 20 votes from four states in question.35 To resolve the involved situation, an Election Commission, the only such group in all of American presidential politics, eventually awarded every contested electoral vote to Hayes, voting along straight party lines. Thus, the commission declared Hayes a 185 to 184 winner, leaving little reason to doubt that the “will of the people” had been frustrated.36

Papers. The “military tyranny” referred to the presence of federal troops still remaining in the South in support of Reconstruction following the Civil War.


27 Patterson, Washington, D.C., to Katherine M., Denver, Colorado, 10 March 1876, Patterson Papers.


29 Thomas, Submittal of Charles S. Thomas, p. 21.
Ultimately, the decision to admit Colorado determined the outcome of the election, for had Colorado not been a state and had she not delivered three electoral votes for Hayes, the Republicans could not have won the presidency, even with all twenty of the disputed votes. A leading political historian states flatly that Tilden lost because of the miscalculation by the Democratic House that Colorado would be safely Democratic.\textsuperscript{37}

Many eastern Democrats, infuriated over the "theft" of the presidency, turned their wrath toward Patterson. Hence, for years Patterson encountered disgruntled congressional Democrats who recalled that he had virtually guaranteed a Democratic Colorado and thereby had persuaded them to support statehood prior to the election. Particularly incensed was Democratic party leader David Bennett Hill of New York, who never forgave Patterson.\textsuperscript{38} Years later, while serving as senator from Colorado, Patterson recalled that he had been widely condemned as the man responsible for Tilden's defeat. He did not explain the motivation behind his advice to the Democrats nor did he defend his conduct. However, his speech reflected a note of pride over the fact that it was generally believed that a presidential election had been lost because of a lowly territorial delegate.\textsuperscript{39}

Although he eventually succeeded in making the Democratic party a consistently formidable force in Colorado politics, the young Patterson's well-entrenched vanity and political inexperience occasionally led him to optimism and error regarding the political prospects of his party. In 1876 one such miscalculation produced both statehood for Colorado and the election of a Republican president.

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\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 396.
\textsuperscript{39} Cong. Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1906, 49, pt. 4:3512.
“Incredible!” exclaimed a stunned member of the Denver Olympic Committee (DOC). “Unbelievable!” moaned another. “It was like having the stuffing slapped out of us,” said a third Olympics supporter. On 7 November 1972 Colorado voters had decisively rejected further state funding of the 1976 Winter Olympic Games by a three-to-two margin. These comments heralded the end of one of the most bitter political campaigns in the state’s history, just as they reflected the magnitude of the upset.

Colorado’s spectacular fight over the 1976 Winter Olympics transcended other local election issues and attracted both national and international attention. Political commentators from the major news media presented “instant analyses” of why the Olympics were defeated. They suggested a wide variety of influences: excessive costs and unreliable financial estimates offered by the DOC; burgeoning antigrowth sentiment; fears of adverse environmental effects; inept planning by the DOC; a well-conceived and executed campaign by opponents of the games; the specter of “nationalism” and the tragic assassinations at the summer games in Munich only two months previously; and others. Each of these summaries contained

elements of truth, but their cumulative effect obscured more than it illuminated. Most analyses of the 1976 Winter Olympics issues cited one or two causes and failed to probe the full sociopolitical implications in greater depth.

In fact, defeat of Colorado’s hosting the 1976 Winter Olympics depended upon a delicate balance of a number of highly volatile forces. From the standpoint of the supporters of the Olympics, everything that could go wrong did so just before the election. Had any one of several factors been appreciably different on election day, Colorado voters might have confirmed Denver the opportunity to host the games, the effort appeared to be more important than it illuminated. Most analyses of the 1976 Winter Olympics were the impression the supporters of the Olympics wished to convey. As Colorado Governor John Love put it, “Hosting the Winter Olympics has been a goal in Denver for many years ... Denver has been watching, waiting, and grooming itself for the time it would be ready to host the Winter Games. 1976 is the year. Denver is strongly backed in its bid ... by its people.”

In the spring of 1969 letters to Denver’s two largest daily newspapers appeared to support that impression. Several letters reflected an idealistic view of the benefits that the games would bring to Denver. One writer suggested that “if Denver were to host the Olympics, our children would have the opportunity to witness the Olympic ideals. To see men and women, boys and girls trying to do better. To see ideals being set, practiced, and achieved. Denver’s cost would be minor ... a modest amount to assist our youth in regaining the desire to triumph in life.”

During the late 1960s public approval of the bid to win the Olympics appeared to be strong. A number of those who later turned into bitter critics of the games voiced their support initially. State Representative Richard Lamm, perhaps the most influential opponent of the games during the 1972 campaign, joined his colleagues in the House in a unanimous vote to support Denver’s initial bid to the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in 1967. Vance R. Dittman, Jr., a retired professor of law from the University of Denver, expressed general support for the Olympics in June 1968, even though he disapproved of holding certain events in the Evergreen-Indian Hills region: “We share the wishes and hopes of the DOC that the 1976 Olympics will come to the Denver area. We realize the economic and other benefits to the state and to the city which will result from the presence of these events here, and we, as citizens of Colorado, have a stake in this too.”

He, too, would later organize much of the early opposition to the games.

When the IOC officially awarded the games to Denver in May 1970, the euphoria of the supporters of the Olympics reached its peak. One woman voiced the delight of many when she exclaimed in a street interview that the Olympics were “great, great ... it’s everything everybody wanted. It’ll bring a lot of people here, and that’ll be good for the economy.”

In retrospect, these supporters would have been wise to notice danger signals beneath the veneer of nearly universal praise for their efforts. An ominous portent of future difficulties might have been noted in the coincidental National Guard takeover of the University of Denver campus on the same day that Denver was awarded the games; the former event displaced the latter as the lead story of the day in local newspapers. However, having seen their early hopes turn into reality by winning the games, DOC officials were in a mood to relax. A former DOC member recalled that the vigilance of the supporters of the Olympics was at a very low ebb in May 1970: “They had worked hard to get the Games, and now they wanted to take it easy for a change, to celebrate, to catch up on other things.”

In the spring of 1970 there seemed to be little cause for worry. To be sure, there were a few critics. For several years before Denver was chosen as the host city, a handful of observers had cited the social and the environmental costs of hosting the Olympics. Predictably, once Denver had been awarded the games and critics had something tangible to question, the number and the
intensity of the complaints rose rapidly. One frequently voiced fear was that the Olympics would do irreparable damage to the environment and to the quality of life in Colorado. Denver Post columnist Joanne Ditmer raised the specter of a “solid line of phony Alpine motels and condominiums from Denver to Loveland ski basin.”

Ditmer’s comment reflected the fact that a number of residents in the Evergreen-Indian Hills area had voiced similar concerns for several years. In December 1967 Dittman had learned from a radio broadcast that the DOC planned to stage several Nordic events in the immediate vicinity of Indian Hills. By the time Denver received designation as host city in 1970, Dittman and several associates from a variety of private environmentalist groups were busy organizing resistance to the plans, as they affected Evergreen and Indian Hills. Whenever they were allowed a platform, Dittman and his allies vividly portrayed the negative environmental impact that the Olympics would exert upon their quiet residential community: destruction of hundreds of acres of trees for construction of luge, bobsled, and ski-jump sites; cross country trails; massive asphalt parking facilities; extensive road-building projects that would draw scores of temporary businesses and thousands of unwelcome tourists; and ugly “white-elephant” athletic facilities that would be permanent scars upon the landscape years after the Olympics were concluded. In August 1970 they incorporated Protect Our Mountain Environment (POME), a privately funded pressure group, which served as one rallying point for critics of the DOC over the next two years.

* Denver Post, 17 May 1970; at the same time, she voiced support for the games, “if they were carefully planned.”
Although environmental fears were a major consideration for many of those who eventually opposed holding the games in Colorado, by no means did all existing environmentalists groups immediately unite in opposition. A few days after Denver was awarded the Olympics, Roger Hansen, executive director of the Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment (ROMCOE), stressed his belief that the Olympics would serve as a stimulus to improved regional and state planning efforts: “We have six years to harness our creativity and imagination to construct an environmental model for the ’76 Olympics.” In fact, at no time did industry-financed ROMCOE come out against the Olympics. Although the Colorado Open Space Council (COSC), the largest environmental organization in the state, eventually passed a resolution opposing the Olympics, it provided neither funds nor staff time to aid the opponents of the games in their successful campaign of 1972.

Although environmental considerations unquestionably stimulated much of the early adverse publicity for the DOC, opponents by and large stressed other points in their opposition to holding the games in Colorado. At the height of the anti-Olympics campaign in 1972, State Representative Lamm suggested that environmental fears were overblown. While acknowledging that some individual property holdings would be adversely affected, Lamm concluded that the overall impact would not be serious: “Colorado will survive the 1976 Winter Olympics, and the direct environmental abuse will be minimal.”

An issue closely related to the environmental concerns of opponents of the Olympics was uncontrolled growth. Both supporters and opponents agreed that the Olympics would stimulate growth; they disagreed, however, over the amount of growth and whether it would be beneficial or detrimental to Colorado’s future. Opponents of the games pointed to states such as New York and California and the problems that overly rapid growth had created in these areas. One Arapahoe County resident protested the DOC’s desire to “put Colorado on the map,” concluding, “New York City is on the map, and it’s problems are insurmountable. Dear God, will we ever learn?” After Denver won the Olympics, another critic chided the progrowth viewpoint, stating that “growth for growth’s sake is the philosophy of the cancer cell.” Tom Gavin, at that time a Denver Post columnist, reminded his readers that “the Denver Olympics bid grew out of the same watch-us-grow, bigger-is-better, chamber of commerce whoop-de-doo that spawned sell Colorado programs of the past.”

The supporters made every effort to allay fears about uncontrolled growth. Carl De Temple, general secretary of the DOC during the 1972 campaign, asserted emphatically that the games “would not have that kind of an impact upon the growth of Colorado.” At the same time Governor Love argued that the Olympics were “a healthy means of boosting the state’s growth.” Love chided those who were “using the Winter Games as a symbol to push the philosophy that we shouldn’t have any more increased economic activity in Colorado.” And he concluded, “I don’t think we can build a fence around the state.” Gavin puckishly retorted: “Maybe we can’t fence Colorado, although I’m willing to try if you are... The trouble with tourists is that, having looked around, many wish to return. To stay... It’s as simple as can be, my opposition to the Olympics; people simply louse things up, and we already have a sufficiency of people lousing Colorado up.”

While environmental and growth considerations were the foundation of much of the early opposition to hosting the games in Colorado, concern over state and city spending was the legal issue upon which opponents based their successful campaign to remove the Olympics. When it made its initial presentations to the USOC in 1968 and to the IOC in 1970, the DOC grossly underestimated the total cost of the games. Olympics promoters blithely assured both the USOC and the IOC that “since Denver already had 80 percent of the needed facilities,” the city could host a well-organized Olympics for a modest $14 million. The smooth sales pitch portrayed Denver as an intimate setting for the Olympics; most events could be held on Front Range sites.

10 Denver Post, 17 May 1970. The DOC picked up this point and for the next two years constantly hammered at the theme that the Olympics would, in effect, force the state legislature to draft meaningful state land use legislation (Denver Post, 23 January 1972). Two years later, however, Roger Hansen concluded that the DOC had failed to live up to its promise to consider and provide sound environmental guidelines in their planning (Hansen, “Review and Critique: Draft Environmental Statement of Proposed 1976 Winter Olympic Games,” Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and Department of Interior, Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment, 1972, typescript, p. 2, Dittman Papers).


very close-in to the city and its transportation, restaurant, and hotel facilities. The DOC's promise to conduct low-cost and low-key games impressed both USOC and IOC officials, and Denver was named the host city.

Soon after the DOC's triumphant return in May 1970, thoughtful observers began scrutinizing DOC cost estimates more closely. The DOC was confronted with the difficult task of converting the "80 percent of needed facilities" rhetoric into reality. Appearing before the state legislature's Joint Budget Committee (JBC) early in 1971, DOC officials began raising their cost estimates sharply. At the JBC hearing, one DOC official conceded that the Olympics "could cost up to $25 million." In April 1971 the Denver Rocky Mountain News prominently featured a six-part series dealing with the prospects and the pitfalls confronting DOC planners. The writer, Richard O'Rielly, noted that the host cities for previous Winter Olympics had grossly underestimated the ultimate costs. These cities had, consequently, suffered because of the higher taxes and the capital improvements of dubious public appeal and with limited after-use potential. He pointed out that the 1960 Winter Olympics at Squaw Valley had cost the state of California thirteen times as much as had been originally predicted. Critics also noted that Grenoble, France, had spent $250 million in 1968; Sapporo, Japan, was in the process of spending anywhere from $750 million to $1.3 billion for the 1972 Winter Games.

By early 1972 the DOC was finding it increasingly difficult to convince legislators that its cost projections were realistic. When the JBC met in March 1972 to consider further state funding for the DOC, inquisitive legislators forced De Temple to admit that $65.3 million was a more realistic, "revised" estimate—nearly five times the original figure. A few weeks later, De Temple cast doubt upon even this estimate when he stated that "as a matter of fact, some of the figures which we have right now are not tied down to the penny." By October 1972, a month before the Olympics referendum, cost estimates ranged from $81.1 million to $92.8 million. Opponents of the Olympics sported bumper stickers bearing the slogan, "Olympics—$100 million snow job."

The opponents skillfully manipulated the public's sense of frustration by publicizing the constantly rising cost estimates. But they also raised basic questions about the propriety of spending any further state funds on a ten-day sporting event at a time when the state had failed to face far more urgent social problems. Sam Brown, Jr., one of the organizers of Citizens for Colorado's Future (CCF), an anti-Olympics group, pointed out that while the money amounts sound relatively small in the context of billions for weapons systems, they are critical to a small state such as Colorado. For instance, the cost of the bobsled and luge is four times the annual state appropriation for air and water pollution control; the cost of the speed skating facilities is seven times the budget for handicapped children; and the ski jump will cost 75 times the amount spent on the control of veneral disease last year.

In the weeks preceding the vote on the Olympics referendum, opponents to holding the games in Colorado continually emphasized that Colorado voters had an unparalleled opportunity to effect an urgently needed reordering of the state's priorities by rejecting further state funding of the games.

Significant as all of the above influences were in affecting defeat of the 1976 Winter Olympics in Colorado, one factor transcended all others in importance: the conduct of the DOC itself. In the final analysis, the DOC was its own worst enemy. From beginning to end, the organization was plagued by over-confidence and insensitivity among its leading spokesmen, as well as by bad planning and even poorer public relations. The DOC repeatedly ignored opportunities to consider constructive, alternative site suggestions from those who asked questions at the outset. The supporters of the 1976 Winter Olympics in Colorado demonstrated a remarkable inability to recognize that threats to the life styles of many people living in areas that would be directly affected by the games were bound to arouse opposition. As a result, a variety of civic and home owner groups soon assumed the role of watchdog over the DOC's every move.

Slipshod planning was evident from the very beginning. According to one-time member Ted Farwell, the DOC pursued an unrealistic and "marginally feasible" plan from the start. Realizing that the IOC was composed of men who conceived of the Olympics as a "big social occasion," and who insisted upon

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1 Denver Post, 4 February 1971.
2 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 5-10 April 1971; Sapporo's inflated expense figure included many millions spent on construction only vaguely related to the 1972 Winter Olympics. Such items included improved rapid transit, a number of new highways, and a virtual facelift for the city.
5 Alternative sites were suggested as early as mid-1968, to little avail (Vance R. Dittman, Jr., to Gerald Groswold, 11 July 1968, Dittman Papers).
holding all of the events close together “so that they wouldn’t miss anything—including the cocktail parties, receptions, meetings, etc.” the DOC proposed to hold the Alpine and ski-jumping events in the Front Range area, within easy commuting distance of Denver.\textsuperscript{22} While the plan earned the praise of both the USOC and IOC, it precipitated a host of unanticipated difficulties, which the DOC proved incapable of surmounting.

The DOC’s unforeseen technical and public relations problems were undoubtedly magnified because of the secrecy with which the group originally determined the Front Range sites for certain events. Private property owners who were directly affected were never advised of the DOC’s plans prior to their announcement. Only by accident did Dittman discover in December 1967 that the DOC planned to set up cross-country ski trails that would traverse his property and that of several of his neighbors. None of those affected had ever been consulted.\textsuperscript{23} Dittman’s attempts to acquire more detailed information about these plans were rewarded only by a series of unanswered phone calls and letters as well as puzzling evasions by those DOC officials whom he managed to contact. In mid-1968 Dittman began organizing several dozen of his neighbors in a concerted effort to persuade the DOC to move several of the planned events away from the Indian Hills-Evergreen area.\textsuperscript{24}

Although the major concern of the Dittmans and their neighbors was to maintain the integrity of their area as a quiet, residential neighborhood—unsullied by manifestations of crass commercialism, which they associated with construction of the Olympic sites—they soon discovered even more compelling reasons why their area would be wholly unsuitable for the events that were planned. The poor planning by DOC officials was clearly revealed by their failure to consider weather conditions in proposed site areas.\textsuperscript{25} The Dittmans’ research revealed that the region received only one-third the average snow fall during the month of February than higher mountain locations, such as Steamboat Springs received. In addition, the Evergreen-Indian Hills’s daily maximum temperature for February had averaged twelve degrees higher over the previous decade. Between 1960 and 1970, Evergreen-Indian Hills’s average maximum daily temperature in February was forty-six degrees Fahrenheit, while that of Steamboat Springs was only thirty-four degrees Fahrenheit.\textsuperscript{26} Their data clearly supported arguments opposing any events requiring snow in the Front Range area. Critics of the DOC logically pointed out that the Evergreen-Indian Hills area was not located in “Ski-Country, USA,” as the DOC had led the

\textsuperscript{22}Farwell, “Olympic Bubble,” p. 20. Significantly, as early as 1964 some local Olympics supporters mentioned the need to “farm out” a number of events to sites located some distance from the Front Range (Denver Post, 8 February 1964).

\textsuperscript{23}Interview, Vance R. Dittman, Jr., 2 August 1970.

\textsuperscript{24}Organized opposition to the Olympics dated from this point. Within months, several environmental and home owner groups were involved in the campaign against the Front Range sites. They included the Hill and Dale Society (HADS), Mountain Area Planning Council (MAPC); and several others. In the interest of brevity, a detailed history of the original opposition will not be provided, since this history has already been well covered in Suzanne M. Spitz, “The 1976 Winter Olympics in Colorado: Environmental Challenge or Disaster?” unpublished paper, University of Colorado Law School, April 1971, esp. esp. pp. 33-39.


\textsuperscript{26}Dittman to Clifford H. Buck, 8 December 1970, Dittman to Avery Brundage, 23 December 1970, Dittman Papers.
IOC to believe. They argued that the Olympics would be best served by removing the Winter Games from the Front Range altogether.

Confronted by hard evidence regarding the lack of snow and overly warm daytime temperatures, the DOC was unprepared to respond intelligently. 

Caught off guard, spokesmen for the DOC suggested the possibility of artificial snow in those areas where insufficient snowfall and warm daytime temperatures constituted a problem. The suggestion only generated more opposition to DOC plans. Environmental groups such as the Mountain Area Planning Council (MAPC) pointed out that much of the Front Range mountain area was already plagued by actual or potential water shortages; any unnecessary diversion of scarce water resources would not only be prohibitively expensive but would exacerbate the already serious problem of maintaining a severely threatened ecological balance. The cost of providing artificial snow alone would seem to have been sufficient reason for removal of many events from the Front Range. 

Even if the costs could have been met, few ski competitors relished the thought of sloshing through miles of artificial snow. One ex-Olympic, cross-country skiing competitor objected to any such artificially created conditions as a "sad and capricious waste of resources, both environmental and human as well (and that includes the athletes thus endangered)."

The DOC's poor public relations at the local level were doubly curious, particularly to those familiar with its highly polished pitches to both the USOC and the IOC. Perhaps the DOC was so "conditioned" to creating rapport with upper-class, "establishment" decision makers that it considered a more humble, down-to-earth approach to "plain folk" Coloradoans beneath its dignity. DOC officials may have believed that local critics would inevitably "come around" to their way of thinking as the date of the great event drew nearer.

The supporters of the Olympics had certainly realized that strong local opposition would severely hamper Denver's chances of being awarded the games before the DOC made its formal presentation to the IOC in May 1970. In an effort to subdue public criticism, particularly that coming from the Evergreen-Indian Hills area, the DOC had promised a "complete reevaluation" of proposed Front Range sites in the event that Denver won the bid. Unfortunately, misunderstandings surfaced immediately after the DOC's triumphant return with its prize. Many residents in the Evergreen-Indian Hills area interpreted the DOC's promise as a commitment to remove virtually all Olympic events from their area.

In an attempt to iron out their differences, both sides agreed to meet at a public gathering at the Evergreen High School in June 1970. If anything, the meeting exacerbated tensions and suspicions between the two sides. Over six hundred people attended the meeting, and several dozen persons spoke. According to reporters present, seventy-five percent of the speakers opposed holding any events in their area. Speakers favoring the DOC plans were frequently interrupted by shouts and could not be heard because of the general level of noise. After the tumultuous meeting the weekly Evergreen Canyon Courier editorialized: "The DOC for the 1976 Winter Olympics will never be able to say it wasn't told what Mountain Area residents objected to."

The DOC's ignoring local appeals, expressed through polite letters and small, unpublicized meetings, might be explained charitably as merely a failure to understand the depth and the degree of local opposition. However, by ignoring the blunt warnings of several hundred irate citizens, the DOC demonstrated a baffling inability to appreciate the sense of desperation among area residents seeking firm commitments. Despite public arousal, the DOC apparently still believed it could stall for time by employing the same old tactics that had been used upon the smaller citizen groups: vague, patronizing reassurances that everything would be alright in the long run. Governor John Love tried to reassure the Dittmans and the hundreds of others who had promised his influence to remove many events from the Front Range by stating that the DOC "would honor its commitment to review the selection of Front Range sites." At the same time, however, the DOC tried a new tactic after the June 1970 public gathering in Evergreen; the DOC insisted that it could make no "explicit promise" that any events could be removed from Front...
curious sense of social priorities: "It's an excellent way for Colorado to spend its money. Look what it cost to play golf on the moon." 37

Despite its inept public relations campaign and such verbal faux pas, the DOC still looked invincible in January 1971. Critics of the games held little hope of driving them off the Front Range, let alone forcing their removal from the state altogether. Organizations such as POME were not yet thinking beyond their attempts to remove the Olympic events from Front Range sites. 38 Although State Representatives Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson and a few private citizens discussed the prospect of removing the games from Colorado, their chances seemed very remote. 39 When Jackson announced plans to introduce, a bill in the legislature that would cut off funding for the Olympics, he and his handful of supporters ran into a buzz saw of newspaper editorial criticism. Labeling Jackson and his supporters "uncompromising ax-grinders," the Denver Post huffed: "The sniping at the Denver Olympic Committee (DOC) is getting out of hand... To follow Jackson's advice... would be a disastrous and stupid mistake." The Denver Rocky Mountain News denounced the protesters in equally vigorous terms. Labeling the DOC's request for $760,000 in state funds "peanuts," the paper charged that the representatives involved were trying to "sabotage" the Olympics. After charging the legislators with engaging in "the rawest kind of political pandering," the News urged Coloradans to "remember" the legislators involved in the next election.

It is difficult to determine whether or not such newspaper pressure from Colorado's two largest dailies intimidated fellow legislators. Whatever the cause, Jackson's and Lamm's efforts to marshall support from their colleagues aroused little enthusiasm. Several weeks later, Jackson voiced his discouragement: "We might as well face it; we're going to have an Olympics here." 40

Despite discouraging prospects in the spring and summer of 1971, critics of the games refused to give up. In September 1971

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34 Magarrell to Dittman, 28 October 1970; see several letters to Dittman from IOC officials, dated between July 1970 and January 1971, Dittman Papers.


36 Denver Post, 9 March 1971. Carl De Temple reported that the remark was made in a facetious manner, among a group of friends. Unfortunately for the DOC, an "unfriendly" reporter picked up the remark, which soon made excellent cannon fodder for critics of the DOC (interview, Carl De Temple, 19 July 1973).

37 Denver Rocky Mountain News, 9 April 1971. This quote was noteworthy enough to be reported by the international press (Manchester Guardian, 16 November 1971).

38 POME did not officially join the anti-Olympics campaign waged by the CCF until the last few weeks before the election, even though many of its members worked for the CCF on a volunteer basis (POME Bulletin, 28 August 1972).


40 Denver Post, 12 January 1971; Denver Rocky Mountain News, 27 January 1971; Denver Post, 9 March 1971; nevertheless, Jackson insisted upon writing a minority report to the Olympics Study Committee, continuing and recording his objections.
an ad hoc group, consisting of State Representatives Lamm and Jackson, POME spokesman Dittman, environmentalist Estelle Brown, University of Colorado law professor Donald Carmichael, and several others convened in Denver to explore "what, if anything, could be done to monitor and control the DOC's plans." REALIZING THAT VIRTUALLY ALL PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE OLYMPICS CAME IN THE FORM OF "CANNED" PUBLICITY RELEASES FROM THE DOC, THE GROUP DECIDED THAT IF IT DESIRED TO PRESENT A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD HAVE TO RAISE FUNDS TO PURCHASE ITS OWN ADVERTISING SPACE. SOON THEREAFTER, MOST OF THE PERSONS WHO WERE PRESENT AT THE FIRST MEETING, JOINED BY MEAG LUNDSTROM, JOHN PARR, AND SAM BROWN, JR., ORGANIZED CITIZENS FOR COLORADO'S FUTURE (CCF).

INCORPORATED IN DECEMBER 1971, THE CCF PROMPTLY SPONSORED THE FIRST ADVERTISEMENT IN LOCAL PAPERS THAT WAS CRITICAL OF THE LOCAL PLANNING FOR THE OLYMPICS. MORE IMPORTANT, IN JANUARY 1972, CCF FOLLOWED UP ITS ADVERTISEMENT BY ORGANIZING AN OPINION-PETITION DRIVE TO ASCERTAIN THE AMOUNT OF PUBLIC HOSTILITY TO THE OLYMPICS. ACCORDING TO CCF COORDINATOR ESTELLE BROWN, THE OPINION-PETITION DRIVE SUCCEEDED BEYOND THE CCF'S WILDEST EXPECTATIONS:

IT WAS THE RESULT OF A COLLABORATION BETWEEN SAM BROWN (NO RELATION) AND MYSELF. WE SIMPLY MAILED OUT OPINION PETITIONS TO PEOPLE ON EVERY MAILING LIST WE KNEW ...(MEMBERS OF THE SIERRA CLUB, COLORADO OPEN SPACE COUNCIL (COSC), AUDUBON SOCIETY, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, EVERYBODY WE KNEW WOULD BE INTERESTED. WE WERE PROMPTLY DELUGED BY PHONE CALLS FROM PEOPLE ASKING FOR MORE PETITIONS. IN THREE WEEKS WE COLLECTED OVER 25,000 SIGNATURES, WHICH GAVE EVIDENCE OF FAR MORE LATENT OPPOSITION TO THE GAMES THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED.

STIMULATED BY THIS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT, SAM BROWN NEXT PROPOSED SENDING THREE MEMBERS OF THE CCF TO SAPPoro IN LATE JANUARY 1972 TO PRESENT PERSONALLY TO MEMBERS OF THE IOC THE 25,000 SIGNATURES OPPOSING THE 1976 WINTER OLYMPICS IN COLORADO. THIS SPUR-OF-THE-MOMENT IDEA WAS CONCEIVED AS A PUBLICITY DEVICE TO ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO THE GROWING ANTI-OLYMPICS SENTIMENT IN COLORADO. THE TRIP PRODUCED A MINOR INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT THAT PUT THE COLORADO OPPOSITION ON NATIONAL TELEVISION AND INTO NEWS MEDIA SYNDICATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.


IN THE CORRIDOR THE THREE DENVERITES WERE IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDED BY DOZENS OF NEWSMEN FROM INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS, ALL EAGER TO RECORD THE FULL STORY BEHIND THE EVENT. THE CCF REPRESENTATIVES SOON RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE IOC'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE GRANTING A FULL HEARING FOR THEIR VIEWS.

WHETHER AS A RESULT OF THESE EVENTS, OR FROM THE SHEER INEPTITUDE OF THE DOC, IT IS HARD TO TELL, THE IOC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PROMPTLY VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO REMOVE THE 1976 WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES FROM DENVER. HOWEVER, A SERIES OF FRANTIC

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2 See environmental section of Denver Post, 2 January 1974.
4 For a related account of the "Sapporo Incident," see John Parr, "Face to Face with the Olympic Gods," Capitol Ledger 1 (March 1972).
measures by the DOC, including several long distance phone calls between Sapporo and Washington, D. C., brought sufficient pressure to induce the full IOC to overrule its executive committee the next day.46 For the moment, at least, DOC officials breathed easier.

Their respite was very brief. No sooner had the DOC officials returned from their harrowing adventure at Sapporo, than they were confronted by another crisis at home. For years the DOC had insisted that revenue from television would cover much of the cost of putting on the games. Their estimates varied, but DOC officials generally anticipated between $5.5 and $9 million in revenue from television. A week after their return from Sapporo, Carl Lindemann, Jr., NBC's vice-president for sports, announced that far from being a money maker for the DOC, televising the games would be a heavy financial burden. Lindemann said that although revenues from television could amount to $10 million, production costs would run between $20 and $25 million. The television networks were understandably reluctant to absorb such astronomical production costs, regardless of the "prestige" involved. "What it really comes down to," stated Lindemann, "is that they [the DOC] are just so wrong." The NBC bombshell caught DOC officials totally off guard. Governor Love, in shocked surprise, stated, "I don't quite understand the whole thing." Denver Mayor William McNichols, equally puzzled, replied, "I don't have any knowledge that we'll have to pay any money."47

The DOC's mix-up over television revenues had an important side effect that few, if any, persons noticed at the time. Newspapers, which had previously endorsed virtually any effort that the DOC made, suddenly became more critical. Even sports writer Jim Graham of the Denver Post, one of the DOC's most ardent supporters, expressed dismay at the DOC's vacillation over costs, pleading for that body to "just give us the cold, hard facts." A Denver Rocky Mountain News reporter suggested that "the biggest shock to DOC officials here seemed to be not that TV executives were saying they wouldn't make money, but that the public had finally found out about it." Attempts by DOC officials to "clarify" the situation met failure, even in the eyes of friendly, pro-Olympics media. Responding to an "explanatory" speech by Governor Love, the News editorialized: "Those Coloradoans who were looking to the Governor's address for some specific clarification ... must have been disappointed in what turned out to be merely a pep talk for uncritical support of the Olympics." Carl De Temple, then general secretary for the DOC, recalled that by the spring of 1972, reporters who had previously been very friendly and who had uncritically accepted the DOC's publicity releases were relentlessly pressing its members to reveal more information. "It seemed that every time our members turned around, reporters were badgering them for facts, figures, and estimates they weren't fully prepared to give. Unfortunately, we made some mistakes and gave conflicting figures in several cases. We were amateurs; our members had never been subjected to that type of pressure before. We did a lousy job of public relations."48

Unfortunately for the DOC, its troubles did not end with publication of the unpleasant truths about television revenues. In March 1972 the state legislature once again had to consider the amount of state funds that would be provided for DOC planning activities. Whereas the legislature's JBC had in previous years routinely appropriated public funds to the DOC with few questions asked, the rising tide of anti-Olympics sentiment induced committee members to ask penetrating questions at the spring 1972 hearing. General Secretary De Temple and other DOC leaders spent several uncomfortable hours before that committee on 21 March. Legislators found DOC responses to sharp, pointed questions about finances and planning unsatisfactory and did not hide their displeasure. State Representative Donald Friedman became impatient with the evasiveness of many of the DOC's responses and told De Temple, "I came in here with a strong desire to support the Olympics. I've sat here for two hours, and I couldn't tell anybody what the Olympics will cost the state of Colorado." State Representative Joseph Shoemaker snapped: "I can't get from you gentlemen whether you have a plan or not!"49 Although the DOC eventually received almost the entire appropriation requested, the victory was pyrrhic. The DOC program received still more adverse publicity at a time when the DOC could ill-afford to lose any more popular support.

These rapid-fire blows to the DOC early in 1972 unquestionably stimulated anti-Olympics activities in Colorado. On 15 March 1972 the CCF and its allies announced the beginning of an official and legal petition drive to place a proposition on the November ballot that, if passed, would prohibit further

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state funding for the games. By June it was obvious that the CCF, with the support of hundreds of volunteers from groups such as POME, the League of Women Voters, and the Sierra Club, had rounded up more than the 50,000 required signatures to force the November referendum vote. By early July, at the deadline for ballot referendum petitions, over 76,000 signatures had been collected. State Representative Lamm suggested that the CCF’s “Committee of 76,000” was in stark contrast to Governor Love’s “Committee of 76,” a group comprised largely of elite business and financial leaders, organized to help retain the Olympics. As Lamm put it, “Your 76,000 is a fitting number because the Governor has formed his own committee of bankers and land developers. Ours are just plain citizens.”

As the CCF geared up the petition drive in the spring of 1972, leading spokesmen for the DOC masked their growing concern behind confident public statements. Governor Love insisted that “Colorado is in no danger of losing the 1976 Winter Olympic Games. I guess we’ve won it three times now and are entitled to keep it.” Yet, this public optimism hardly disguised the fact that the spring of 1972 was a trying time for DOC officials.

In retrospect, one of the DOC’s most critical weaknesses was its inability to perceive that the opposition to the games could be generated from sincere motives. Opponents of the 1976 Winter Olympics were all too often treated as “ecology freaks” and unpatriotic zealots. To DOC officials, opposition to the Olympics seemed inconceivable to the point of heresy. In early 1971 G. D. Hubbard, treasurer of the DOC, stated that “whether or not we have the Olympics is not an issue. It can’t be an issue. . . . The only issue is the best way to hold them.” While members of the DOC necessarily took note of the growing opposition to the games in the spring of 1972, they clearly perceived the opposition as unjustified, even irrational. To one private citizen who complained that the DOC was attempting to stifle public debate, Governor Love unctuously replied, “I consider it unthinkable that we might act in such a way as to nullify state participation in the Olympic effort which we sought and obtained together.”

In August 1972 the DOC hosted a gala bash for nationally known celebrities, who gathered at the Brown Palace Hotel to rally support for the Olympics. Reporters cornered Bud Wilkinson, a well-known sports broadcaster and ex-football coach, who insisted, “It is inconceivable that there will be any Americans who will not take pride in getting to help the games.” In addition to infuriating those persons who had never been consulted before Denver promoters made their bid in the name of their city, the self-righteous attitude of the supporters of the Olympics may well have prevented them from intelligently gauging and responding to the criticisms of their opponents.

As the intensity of the anti-Olympics campaign mounted, it became increasingly evident that the DOC was cracking under the pressure. In late June 1972 De Temple and other DOC members appeared at a second public meeting at the Evergreen High School in an attempt to overcome anti-Olympics forces once and for all. Instead, they were routed, as opponents of the Olympics immediately took the offensive. A Lakewood Sentinel reporter noted the supporters’ sense of confusion and bewilderment: “Mostly, the DOC spokesmen there bore the brunt of withering charges in wounded silence.” If nothing else, the DOC representatives maintained their dignity at that particular gathering.

Unfortunately for the DOC, other spokesmen were not so cool under pressure. A reporter was appalled at the behavior of ecologist Dr. Beatrice Willard—a DOC representative and later a Richard Nixon appointee to the Council on Environmental Quality—at an August hearing regarding sites in Jefferson County. According to the reporter, when questions were directed at Dr. Willard, she “glowered and shouted her response.” Another recalled that “last week we witnessed an interpretation of respect and courteous consideration by the planning arm of the Denver Olympic Organizing Committee (DOOC)—the DOC changed its name late in the summer of 1972) that was appallingly brusque. [Dr. Willard], posturing imperiously rather than as one who wanted to reason together, scarcely bothered to disguise that dissent to DOOC proposals was viewed as tainted with heresy.” In the aftermath of Colorado’s rejection of the 1976 Winter Games, the supporters of the Olympics themselves viewed poor personal relations as one of the primary reasons for their defeat. Several days after the vote, DOOC board member Neil Allen admitted, “The DOOC was arrogant and aloof. Everyone outside the organization was treated like a clod.”

Although the ill-conceived public relations campaign by the

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40 Denver Post, 10 March 1972; Denver Rocky Mountain News, 7 July 1972.
41 Denver Post, 31 May 1972.
DOC officials earned them considerable notoriety, it was by no means their most serious mistake. Their fatal error was underestimating both the sincerity and the amount of citizen-based opposition. It can be easily understood why DOC (later DOOC) officials initially fell into this trap. The anti-Olympics campaign by the CCF and its allies was not in full gear until early 1972. Furthermore, throughout both of its petition drives, the CCF remained a shoestring operation, run strictly by amateurs. What is difficult to comprehend is why the DOOC failed to understand fully the gravity of the challenge even after the CCF and its allies gathered the signatures necessary to force the November referendum. Perhaps, as Ted Farwell suggested, the DOOC had actually begun to believe its own confident press releases. While the DOOC spent most of the early months of 1972 in organizational shuffling and reshuffling, in wrangles over final site selections, and in raising funds from the state’s elite for a last-minute media blitz, the CCF and its allies were busy building a grass roots organization. During the final weeks before the November election, the CCF and its “army” of some three thousand volunteers were busy ringing doorbells and distributing anti-Olympics literature.

Four years after the election, it is still difficult to understand fully the ineptitude of the DOOC—DOOC. Months before the referendum vote, local newspapers criticized the inadequacies of the whole Olympics operation. In an editorial entitled “They Blew It,” the Arvada Citizen-Sentinel roasted the DOOC’s tactics: “If the Winter Olympics are not . . . held in Colorado, the blame should be placed directly on the DOOC.” The editorial tone of Cersei’s Rocky Mountain Journal was even more acid: “We have no hesitation in stating that were a private business operated the way the DOOC and the DOC have run the Olympic affairs, its principals would join the line outside the office of the referee in bankruptcy.”

These and similar admonitions failed to spark the DOOC to more careful planning and campaign strategy. In the campaign’s last days the DOOC even managed to fall into its own traps. Four weeks before the November vote, Henry Kimbrough, one of Governor Love’s top aides, distributed a pamphlet on behalf of the DOOC labeling John Parr and Meg Lundstrom, two of the CCF’s leaders, as “street people,” contending that the CCF was composed largely of a “band of tenacious young political ac-

tivists who have filtered into Colorado over the past two years, seeking populist issues to exploit and promote.” In a classic display of one-upsmanship, State Representative Lamm publicly labeled the DOOC’s charges as “scurrilous campaign tactics,” noting that Parr and Lundstrom had resided in Colorado several times as long as Eric Auer and Richard Goodwin, two of the most prominent leaders of the DOOC.

Suggestive of the superior campaign strategy of the CCF was the fact that supporters of the Olympics gave it rueful accolades in the weeks and months following the election. Ex-DOOC official De Temple manfully placed blame for defeat upon his own organization’s failure to comprehend changing priorities and “people power.” He also praised the dedication and the skill of the CCF and its allies: “They amazed me in their ability to weld a coalition of strange bedfellows . . . long-hairs, hippies if you will, middle-class whites, blacks, blue-collar people . . . all working together. CCF and our other opponents were real pros. If I were to try to find the best possible way of running a campaign, I would use theirs as a model.” Clearly the CCF’s collaborative effort appeared all the more brilliant, in sharp contrast to the ill-conceived and poorly executed campaign waged by the supporters of the winter games.

Emotional as this issue was, it was probably inevitable that both the supporters and the opponents of the Colorado-based games would oversimplify the reasons behind the outcome of the vote. In the days immediately following the election, spokesmen for the DOOC blamed their defeat upon bad luck and public “misunderstanding” of the issues. The opponents heralded the outcome as dramatic evidence that Colorado voters had reached a new level of consciousness and were demanding a wholesale reassessment of the state’s priorities. As one opponent put it, “A corollary to the principle that nothing can stop an idea whose time has come is the principle that nothing can revive an idea whose time has passed.” The latter judgment appears closer to the truth. Burgeoning antigrowth sentiment, fears over possible environmental damage, excessive costs, and the baffling, shattering impact of uncontrollable world events—symbolized by the murders at the 1972 Summer Games in Munich—all played a part in Colorado’s vote to oppose Denver’s hosting of the 1976 Winter Olympic Games. Despite all of these factors, the

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evidence suggests that had the Olympic officials and their supporters demonstrated a modicum of public concern, tact, and good political sense, they still might have induced Colorado voters to confirm the DOC's invitation to the world's athletes to compete in Denver's 1976 Winter Olympic Games.60

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Defeat of the 1976 Winter Olympics clearly affected state politics far beyond the referendum issue in 1972, though detailed analysis of subsequent events is far beyond the scope of this article. Several prominent politicians closely associated with pro-Olympics forces experienced setbacks, either in 1972 or 1974; they included Congressmen Wayne Aspinall, Senators Gordon Allott and Peter Dominick, and Governor John Vanderhoof. State Representative Richard Lamm parlayed the fame he won as a driving force behind the CCF into the governorship in 1974. The early 1970s clearly witnessed a turnover in a number of older, generally conservative, and "pro-growth" politicians. A "new breed" of younger (usually Democratic), "liberal," and environmentally oriented politicians rose to prominence. Whether defeat of the games has exerted, or will exert, any measurable long-range effects upon Colorado's economy and social structure is a far more difficult question. During the Olympics fight, some backers of the games warned that reneging on the state's "commitment" to the IOC would not only provide an immediate setback to the local economy but would discourage new business from coming to Colorado for years to come. On the other hand, a few highly influential business leaders feared that with class antagonisms already raised to a fever pitch, the Olympics would degenerate into a fiasco if held as planned; the unfavorable publicity would set the recruitment of new industry back. In light of the downturn of the national economy between 1972 and the present, it is difficult to assess either viewpoint. It is a fact, however, that Colorado's leading economic indicators have maintained a strong margin over those of the nation as a whole. This entire issue is extremely complex and deserves separate treatment. Finally, this essay did not intend to portray the DOC as a small group of willful men, selfishly pursuing only their own interests. Many members of the DOC believed that their commitment to host the games was patriotism of the best sort. No evidence was found to counter this view. At the same time, their "patriotic self-perception" played an important part in preventing flexible, intelligent responses to changing realities.